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Essays On Dynamic Incentive Design
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine incentive problems within various dynamic
environments. In Chapter 1, I study the optimal design of a dynamic regulatory system that encourages
regulated agents to monitor their activities and voluntarily report their violations. Self-monitoring is a private
and costly process, and comprises the core of the incentive problem. There are no monetary transfers. Instead,
the regulator (she) uses future regulatory behavior for incentive provision. When the regulator has full
commitment power, she can induce costly self-monitoring and revelation of ``bad news'' in the initial phase of
the optimal policy. During this phase, the agent is promised a higher continuation utility (in the form of future
regulatory approval) each time he discloses ``bad news''. If the regulator internalizes self-monitoring costs, the
agent is either blacklisted or whitelisted in the long run. When she does not internalize these costs,
blacklisting is replaced by a temporary probation state, and whitelisting becomes the unique long run
outcome. This result suggests that whitelisting, which may appear to be a form of regulatory capture, may
instead be a consequence of optimal policy.
In Chapter 2, I study the dynamic pricing problem of a durable good monopolist with commitment power,
when a new version of the good is expected at some point in the future. The new version of the good is
superior to the existing one, bringing a higher flow utility. The buyers are heterogeneous in terms of their
valuations and strategically time their purchases. When the arrival is a stationary stochastic process, the
corresponding optimal price path is shown to be constant for both versions of the good, hence there is no
delay on purchases and time is not used to discriminate over buyers, which is in line with the literature.
However, if the arrival of the new version occurs at a commonly known deterministic date, then the price path
may decrease over time, resulting in delayed purchases. For both arrival processes, posted prices is a sub-
optimal selling mechanism. The optimal one involves bundling of both versions of the good and selling them
only together, which can easily be implemented by selling the initial version of the good with a replacement
guarantee.
Finally, Chapter 3 examines the question under what conditions can automation be less desirable compared to
human labor. We study a firm that has to decide between a human-human team and a human-machine team
for production. The effort choice of a human employee is not observed by the manager, therefore the
incentives need to be properly aligned. We argue that, despite the desirable benefits resulting from the partial
substitution of labor with automated machines such as less costly machine input and reduced scope of moral
hazard, the teams with only human employees can, under some conditions, be more preferred over the
human-machine teams. This stems from the fact that, in all-human teams, the principal, through the selection
of incentive scheme, can control the interaction among the agents and get benefit from the mutual monitoring
capacity between them. The automation, however, eliminates this interaction and shuts down a channel that
can potentially help to mitigate the overall agency problem.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC INCENTIVE DESIGN
Mustafa Dogan
George J. Mailath
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine incentive problems within various
dynamic environments. In Chapter 1, I study the optimal design of a dynamic regulatory
system that encourages regulated agents to monitor their activities and voluntarily report
their violations. Self-monitoring is a private and costly process, and comprises the core of
the incentive problem. There are no monetary transfers. Instead, the regulator (she) uses
future regulatory behavior for incentive provision. When the regulator has full commitment
power, she can induce costly self-monitoring and revelation of “bad news” in the initial
phase of the optimal policy. During this phase, the agent is promised a higher continuation
utility (in the form of future regulatory approval) each time he discloses “bad news”. If
the regulator internalizes self-monitoring costs, the agent is either blacklisted or whitelisted
in the long run. When she does not internalize these costs, blacklisting is replaced by a
temporary probation state, and whitelisting becomes the unique long run outcome. This
result suggests that whitelisting, which may appear to be a form of regulatory capture, may
instead be a consequence of optimal policy.
In Chapter 2, I study the dynamic pricing problem of a durable good monopolist with
commitment power, when a new version of the good is expected at some point in the
future. The new version of the good is superior to the existing one, bringing a higher flow
utility. The buyers are heterogeneous in terms of their valuations and strategically time
their purchases. When the arrival is a stationary stochastic process, the corresponding
optimal price path is shown to be constant for both versions of the good, hence there
is no delay on purchases and time is not used to discriminate over buyers, which is in
line with the literature. However, if the arrival of the new version occurs at a commonly
v
known deterministic date, then the price path may decrease over time, resulting in delayed
purchases. For both arrival processes, posted prices is a sub-optimal selling mechanism. The
optimal one involves bundling of both versions of the good and selling them only together,
which can easily be implemented by selling the initial version of the good with a replacement
guarantee.
Finally, Chapter 3, which is a joint work with Pinar Yildirim, examines the question
under what conditions can automation be less desirable compared to human labor. We
study a firm that has to decide between a human-human team and a human-machine team
for production. The effort choice of a human employee is not observed by the manager,
therefore the incentives need to be properly aligned. We argue that, despite the desirable
benefits resulting from the partial substitution of labor with automated machines such as
less costly machine input and reduced scope of moral hazard, the teams with only human
employees can, under some conditions, be more preferred over the human-machine teams.
This stems from the fact that, in all-human teams, the principal, through the selection
of incentive scheme, can control the interaction among the agents and get benefit from
the mutual monitoring capacity between them. The automation, however, eliminates this
interaction and shuts down a channel that can potentially help to mitigate the overall agency
problem.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Incentives for Self-Monitoring
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has an auditing policy that encourages compa-
nies to monitor their ongoing and planned activities that may fall within its authority, and
to voluntarily report their violations.1 This is an example of the framework that I explore
in this paper. I am interested in understanding the behavior of regulators in environments
where the regulated activity may result in bad outcomes and where there is significant un-
certainty. Agents have an advantage in acquiring information about these activities because
they have lower costs of monitoring. The regulator, in an efficient regulatory regime, would
like to use agents’ self-monitoring. I study how regulators can induce economic agents to
acquire and disclose costly information about the negative consequences of their activities
through the use of future regulatory behavior without resorting to monetary transfers.
I show that, when the regulator has full commitment power, the optimal policy can
induce self-monitoring only in an initial phase, which endures over a stochastic number of
periods. When it ends, a terminal phase of the policy is initiated and self-monitoring stops.
1The auditing policy is defined in Environmental Protection Agency (11 April 2000), titled “Incentives
for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations”.
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The outcome in this terminal phase is history-dependent and involves either blacklisting the
agent or whitelisting him. When the regulator does not internalize self-monitoring costs,
blacklisting is replaced by a temporary probation state. The unique long-run outcome is
whitelisting in this case. This result suggests that whitelisting, which may appear to be a
form of regulatory capture, may instead be a consequence of optimal policy. I also analyze
the case in which the regulator’s commitment power is limited so that she cannot commit
to policies with negative continuation values. In this case, if the expected cost of the social
harm is larger than the economic benefits of the projects, then whitelisting never occurs
in an optimal policy. Moreover, self-monitoring is sustained over the long term when the
regulator does not internalize its costs.
In general, many enforcement authorities adopt self-monitoring practices for various
regulatory purposes.2 A specific practice is the process of issuing licenses for activities with
possible environmental consequences. A mining company, for example, in applying for a
mining license, may be asked to submit an Environmental Impact Statement and sometimes
other supplementary information that requires substantial and costly self-monitoring. The
grant of the license empowers the company to operate and contributes to the aggregate
economy. Yet, it may also cause some undesirable social consequences that the regulator
needs to take into account.3 To make matters worse, these undesired outcomes oftentimes
take a considerable amount of time to become apparent so that it is no more feasible to
take ameliorating action.4 Therefore, investigating these potential harms prior to making a
licensing decision is the only convenient policy for the regulator. And these investigations are
delegated to the applicant company through the request of Environment Impact Statement.
Incentive divergence is the most prominent feature of the aforementioned settings. The
agents prefer to avoid suspension of their activities and also generally prefer to avoid mon-
2Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Defense, and
Food and Drug Administration are examples.
3For example, the mining area may have invisible connections to groundwater resources, in which case
mining activities might lead to the production and the spread of hazardous material.
4There are many cases, in the mining industry, for example, where the actual damage become apparent
only decades after the operations took place.
2
itoring due to its costs and the possibility of unfavorable signals that it might reveal. On
the other hand, the regulators care about efficiency for which monitoring and suspending
harm-producing activities are essential. Therefore, the regulator has a complicated policy
problem that involves supervising the agents and at the same time incentivizing them to
self-monitor.
To study the regulator’s problem, I construct a dynamic principal-agent model in which
a stream of projects arrives over time, one for each period. The agent (he) wants to under-
take the projects, but needs the approval of the regulator (she), who is the principal. The
projects are ex-ante identical, yielding the same revenue for the agent. On the other hand,
a project might either be harmless or it might result in social costs which would outweigh
the value that the project generates. The agent can acquire information about whether the
project has social costs by costly self-monitoring, but the efforts spent on self-monitoring
are not directly observed by the principal. The principal has the objective of inducing
socially preferable outcomes. Her preferences involve the economic benefits as well as the
social costs resulting from these projects. Each period, the principal first decides whether
or not to ask for self-monitoring, and then chooses whether to approve the project. There
is no ex-post monitoring, and the realized harms are never observed. In many settings, the
harms occur, or become evident, with a significant lag compared to the economic yields
of the projects. To abstract from this reality, I analyze the case in which this lag goes to
infinity.
There are no monetary transfers. In many situations, regulatory agencies are limited in
their ability to use monetary transfers for various reasons. For example, in some industries
there is a legal limitation on the size of the monetary fines that regulators can levy.5 As
a result, monetary transfers are too weak to induce proper behavior, and the regulator
needs to use other tools for incentive provision. This paper focuses on the extreme case
5In the oil and gas industry of the U.S., there is a daily limit on the maximum amount of fines, and
this limit varies across states in the U.S. The total amount of fine the regulating authority collects is is
negligible compared to the economic benefit that the companies receive, see for instance E&E Publishing,
LLC (November 14, 2011).
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of the regulators’ limited use of monetary transfers by ruling them out. In the absence of
monetary transfers, the regulator provides incentives by linking her decisions over time.
The information structure governing the self-monitoring process takes the form of ver-
ifiable “bad news” which are publicly observed. More precisely, there is a unique verifiable
signal perfectly revealing bad news and informing about the harm that will occur if the
project is undertaken. In case the agent performs self-monitoring in a particular period,
conditional on the project being harmful, the signal will be realized with some probability
and will be publicly observed. If there is no news, then there are two possibilities from the
principal’s perspective. First, the agent shirked and did not monitor. Second, the agent
acquired information; however, no signal was realized since the project is more likely not
to cause harm. There is no direct signal indicating good news. In most of the settings
that fit into this paper, the only good news is the absence of bad news. In other words,
certifiably disclosing good news is not possible. On the contrary, bad news, in general, pro-
vides concrete evidence and detailed description of the harm that will occur if the project is
undertaken. Conditional on this information structure, assuming that the signal is publicly
observed is without loss of generality. As long as the agent prefers to monitor himself, he
also prefers to disclose the signal in case it is realized. Otherwise, he could simply shirk in
the first place and eliminate the cost of monitoring. The incentives that induce information
acquisition automatically induces the disclosure contingent upon acquisition. Therefore,
the signal remains public throughout the discussion in the paper, and hence self-disclosure
exogenously occurs conditional on self-monitoring.
Initially, I study the case in which the principal has full commitment power. At the
beginning, she commits to history-contingent policy that specifies her decisions regarding
self-monitoring requests, and the approval of the projects in each period. I show that self-
monitoring is only induced in an initial phase of the optimal policy. During this initial
phase, the agent is promised a higher continuation utility (in the form of future regulatory
approval) each time he discloses bad news. His current project is less likely to get approved,
4
but the regulator promises more frequent approval in the future. If he does not disclose
any signal, he is downgraded to a lower continuation utility. His current project has higher
chances of approval, yet he will be given less frequent approvals in the future. The duration
of this phase is stochastic; when it ends, the policy reaches a second phase in which there is
no more self-monitoring. The transitional dynamics between the phases and the long-run
outcome of the optimal policy depends on whether the principal internalizes the cost of
self-monitoring.
If the principal internalizes the costs of self-monitoring, the acquired information is
always used in the approval decision. The agent’s continuation utility eventually reaches
either its minimum or maximum and remains constant. In this stage, the principal perma-
nently rejects or permanently approves projects, that is, the agent is either blacklisted or
whitelisted in the long run.6
When the principal does not internalize the self-monitoring costs, the content of the
information is not always used in the current approval decision, in contrast to the previous
case. There is a probation state, which replaces blacklisting, wherein the agent acquires
information, but the project is rejected regardless of the outcome. The probation occurs
when the agent’s continuation utility reaches its minimum in consequence of the agent not
disclosing bad news frequent enough. After being initiated, this probationary state repeats
until the agent discloses some bad news. Leaving the probation state today does not rule out
the possibility of facing it again in the future. The agent’s continuation utility eventually
reaches its maximum which still puts permanent approval into action, in the long run, the
agent is always whitelisted.
The above-mentioned difference in the principal’s preferences alters the set of effec-
tive incentive devices she is willing to use. When she does not internalize its costs, self-
monitoring can purely be used to punish the agent. It is possible for the principal to use
6EPA blacklists companies at times, by labeling them as ineligible for federal contracts, subcontracts,
grants or loans. See Washington Post (February 5, 1977). The outcome permanent rejection can be consid-
ered as the counterpart of blacklisting. .
5
self-monitoring as punishment, because verifiability ensures that monitoring effort is taken.
While the same channel was also feasible when the principal internalized the self-monitoring
costs, she preferred not to punish this way because she cared about the cost.
In this model, whitelisting is an outcome of the optimal regulatory policy. Hence, I do
not interpret it as a form of regulatory capture even though it shares some of its features.
My paper, therefore, suggests that what has been described as regulatory capture in some
cases may instead be an outcome of optimal regulatory policy.
Two situations give rise to inefficiencies in this framework. The first one occurs when
the agent forgoes information acquisition, and the second one arises when the content of the
information is not used efficiently. The first type only appears during the terminal phase
of the optimal policy where there is no more self-monitoring. The second type, appears in
the initial phase. Its occurrence triggers the terminal phase of the contract, when principal
internalizes self-monitoring costs. Therefore, the inefficiencies are back-loaded in this case.
However, when the principal does not internalize the self-monitoring costs, the second type
of inefficiency occurs in a non-consecutive stochastic order, and its occurrence does not
necessarily initiate the terminal phase. In this respect, efficiency will be lost and restored
stochastically throughout the optimal policy.
I also study the situation in which the principal has limited commitment power, in
that she cannot commit to a policy with a negative continuation value. The results change
remarkably. If the expected cost of a project is higher than its economic benefit, the
policy does not feature whitelisting. In this case, if the principal does not internalize self-
monitoring costs, the policy never reaches a stable outcome and fluctuates over time.
1.1.1 Literature Review
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) is the first study analyzing self-monitoring and self-reporting.
They introduce a self-reporting stage into the classical probabilistic law enforcement model
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of Becker (1968). By self-reporting a harmful act, the agent is granted a reduction in the
sanctions he faces. In contrast to my model, the agent in their paper is initially endowed with
the relevant information. Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) introduce a more general framework
in which the agency problem has two tiers: testing for noncompliance and fixing it.7 There
is no information asymmetry to begin with, and the agent needs to exert effort to acquire
relevant information. Most of the papers in this literature focus on characterizing the
optimal incentive scheme in a static framework. My paper, however, studies the dynamics of
a regulatory regime incorporating self-monitoring. In a contemporaneous work, Wang et al.
(2016) also study a similar dynamic environment. The main distinction is that the harms
are already known to agent and monetary transfers are allowed in their framework. They
show that the optimal regime, in order to induce the agent to disclose harms, incorporates
a cyclical structure alternating between rewarding self-disclosure and initiating inspections.
Departing from theirs, my paper provides some explanation for practices such as blacklisting
which arise from dynamic consequences.
In its use of non-monetary intertemporal incentives as a disciplining device, this paper
relates to several different branches of literature. In mechanism design, Horner and Guo
(2015) (HG) analyze a dynamic allocation problem in the absence of monetary transfers.
The principal is interested in efficiency, which requires that the principal allocate the good
only if the agent has a high valuation. The optimal mechanism follows a history-dependent
rule which eventually converges to permanent allocation or permanent rejection of allo-
cation. In the literature on relational contracts, Li et al. (2015) analyze the evolution of
power inside organizations within the context of what they call a repeated trust game. The
efficient equilibrium has a structure similar to that of HG, incorporating a bipolar long run
outcome with permanent punishment and permanent rewards for the agent. Both of these
papers assumes that the agent is initially informed about the state variable. In my paper,
however, the state variable is initially unknown to both (the principal and the agent); but,
the agent can acquire information about it at some cost. The effort spent on information
7Also see Short and Toffel (2008), Innes (1999a), and Innes (1999b).
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acquisition is not observed by the principal, and the agency problem is moral hazard in-
stead of adverse selection unlike HG. The fact that the relevant information comes with a
cost changes the dynamic structure of the optimal contract/policy. More precisely, when
the principal does not internalize the cost of information acquisition, the long-run outcome
is unique, and permanent punishment is never a part of the optimal policy in contrast to
HG and (Li et al., 2015). Moreover, if the principal has a limited commitment power, the
optimal policy does not reach a stable outcome, instead it fluctuates over time.
Lipnowski and Ramos (2015) consider the repeated game version of HG. The efficient
equilibria in their framework have a unique long-run outcome featuring a permanent pun-
ishment for the agent, for much the same reason permanent does not occur in the limited
commitment section of my paper. In contrast to Lipnowski and Ramos (2015), I show
that the optimal policy does not necessarily reach a stable outcome in this case, when the
principal does not internalize the self-monitoring costs. Battaglini (2005) focuses on the
same allocation problem as in HG without ruling out monetary transfers. The principal is
a profit-maximizing monopolist. In this paper, the inefficiencies are entirely front-loaded.
The use of monetary transfers played an important role on this significant difference, as it
alters the natural way of providing incentives.
This paper also relates to the literature on relationship formation and trading favors.
Mo¨bius (2001), Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008), and Abdulkadirog˘lu and Bagwell (2013)
are examples. Within a repeated game setting, players facilitate cooperation by providing
favors to each other. The favor provision ability changes over time and is privately observed.
Inter-temporal incentives are utilized to elicit proper behavior and sustain cooperative gains.
Mo¨bius (2001) suggests a simple chip mechanism which keeps track of the difference in the
number of favors provided. There is a maximum number of chips that can be maintained
in an equilibrium. Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008) improve on this by considering a more
general set of mechanisms. The optimal policy in my paper can also be interpreted as a
chips mechanism, in which several different factors affecting the amount of chips that the
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agent has for the next period. First, the quantity of the agent’s chips expands over time at
a constant rate that is equal to the inverse of the discount factor. Second, the amount of
chips that the agent has for the next period diminishes at an amount that is proportional
to the approval rate in the current period. Finally, the agent receives a fixed amount of
additional chips for each piece of bad news he discloses.
My paper also relates to the literature on linked decisions. Jackson and Sonnenschein
(2007), within a static environment, showed that linking multiple independent decisions can
help overcome incentive constraints. See also Cohn (2010), Hortala-Vallve (2010), and Fang
and Norman (2006).
1.2 Model
There is a principal (she) and an agent (he) interacting within a discrete time infinite horizon
setting, and δ is the common discount factor. A stream of projects arrives over time, one
for each period t = 1, 2, .....,∞. The agent would like to undertake each of these projects
for which he needs the approval of the principal.
Approving a project yields a positive value v ∈ (0, 1) to the agent. In addition to this
value, each project may cause a social harm depending on its type θ, which takes its values
from the binary space Θ = {θg, θb}. If θ = θb, then the project is “bad”, producing harm
with a magnitude normalized to 1. Otherwise, if θ = θg, then the project is “good”, and
does not produce any harm. The type of the project is initially unknown to the principal
and the agent, and µ = P (θ = θb) is the common prior about it. The project types
are independently and identically distributed over time; hence, the project arriving at the
beginning of each period is believed to be a bad one with probability µ ∈ (0, 1).
The principal is interested in efficiency, and wants to maximize the social surplus in
her decision. The surplus resulting from the approval of the project is equal to v or v − 1
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depending on whether the project is good or bad, respectively. The agent, on the other hand,
only cares about the value that the project generates for him, hence his utility increases by
v each time a project is approved irrespective of its type. Rejecting the project causes a
loss due to the forgone value v, yet, at the same time, prevents the production of probable
harms. Therefore, from an ex-post point of view, she wants to grant an approval for a
project only if it is a good one.
At each period, the agent can acquire information about the type of the project at cost
c prior to the principal’s approval decision. The information acquisition process, which is
also referred as self-monitoring, is governed by the following information structure. There
is a unique verifiable signal “s” which perfectly reveals “bad news” about the type of the
project. Conditional on the project being bad, the signal is realized with probability λ ≤ 1.
If the project is good, then the signal is never realized. More precisely:
P (s|θb) = λ, P (s|θg) = 0.
I assume that the signal is publicly observed whenever it is realized.8 Due to this pub-
licity, “self-reporting”, which refers to the event of signal realization, exogenously follows
conditional on self-monitoring.
The event of no signal realization following the information acquisition, besides being
informative, does not perfectly reveal the type of the project (unless λ = 1). Conditional on
information acquisition, the posterior beliefs after signal realization and no signal realization
8This publicity assumption is without loss of any generality. All of the results would also follow in a
more general framework, where the agent privately observes the signal and then decides whether or not to
disclose it to the principal. This stems from the fact that, as long as the agent prefers to monitor himself,
he also prefers to disclose the signal in case it is realized. Otherwise, he could simply shirk in the first place
and eliminate the cost of monitoring. Of course, this property crucially depends on the signal structure
governing the information acquisition.
10
are denoted by µs and µns respectively, which satisfy:
µs = 1,
µns =
µ(1− λ)
1− µλ .
In the ex-ante stage the expected cost of a project is equal to µ = µ1 + (1−µ)0. Therefore,
the ex-ante expected surplus that arises from the project approval is v − µ. There is no
assumption imposed on the sign of this value, hence both approval and rejection can be
the optimal uninformed decision. The assumptions on the parameters that are maintained
throughout the entire paper are defined as follows:
Assumption 1.1. The parameters of the model satisfies the following:
i) v > µns.
ii) (1− µλ)(v − µns)− c > max(v − µ, 0).
iii) δ > 11+µλv .
The first assumption states that, from the principal’s perspective, it is optimal to
approve the project in case no signal realization takes place as a result of information
acquisition. The second assumption states that the information acquisition is efficient,
hence the problem is not a trivial one. The third assumption states that the discount factor
is large enough and players are sufficiently patient.
The effort spent on self-monitoring is not observed by the principal, and this generates
the moral hazard component which constitutes the main source of the agency problem. If
the incentives are not provided properly, then the agent would shirk rather than monitoring
the projects. By this, the agent can get rid of the cost of self-monitoring, and at the
same time prevent the revelation of bad news and hence the suspension of his projects.
Nonetheless, because the information acquisition is efficient, the principal wants to design
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an incentive scheme to motivate the agent towards this end. Note that the verifiability of
the signal plays a crucial role. It would never be feasible to induce self-monitoring under
an information structure that comprises only non-verifiable soft information.
There are no monetary transfers. In many situations, regulatory agencies has limited
ability to use monetary transfers, which leads them to use other tools such as future reg-
ulatory behavior for incentive provision. In this framework, the principal would be able
to induce the first-best outcome under the presence of monetary transfers, by using a sta-
tionary payment scheme.9 Such a stationary scheme, however, would be insufficient to sort
out the extent to which the principal utilizes the continuation values arising from future
regulatory behavior as an incentive device. In order to analyze these dynamics, one should
either employ a more general framework incorporating additional aspects, or restrict the
existing one. To eliminate technical difficulties and maintain tractability, I follow the latter
and rule out the monetary transfers in the analysis.
There is no initial information asymmetry about the type of the project. This does not
rule out the possibility of an agent having superior information about other relevant issues.
For instance, as the owner of the project, the agent might be better informed about the
direction in which to search for “bad news”. This can be considered as the basis for agent’s
comparative advantage in terms of monitoring capability. This is effectively an information
asymmetry, yet it is not directly related to the type of the project.
Ex-ante monitoring is the only source of information on the type of the project. There
is no possibility of ex-post monitoring, and hence the realized harm is never observed. This
assumption reflects the fact that, in many circumstances, the harms take place with a
significant lag compared to the economic yields of the projects.
A later section of this paper analyzes a model where the principal can also monitor the
project with a higher cost. In that setting, in each period prior to making the approval
9The first-best scheme involves delegating monitoring to the agent and employing the efficient approval
decisions in every period.
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decision, the principal makes a decision regarding monitoring. She either monitors the
project on her own, or delegates monitoring to the agent, or completely avoids monitoring.
In the current model, requesting self-monitoring from the agent is not delegation since the
principal does not have an option to monitor the projects on her own. Nonetheless, for
notational ease, I will use the word delegation to refer to a self-monitoring request in this
section as well.
1.2.1 Actions and Preferences
For each period t, after a new project arrives, the principal first decides whether or not to
delegate monitoring to the agent. If delegation occurs, the agent moves and decides decides
either to shirk or to exert effort and monitor himself. Then, finally, the principal moves
again and decides whether or not to approve the project. This stage game is repeated
infinitely many times.
The scope of the conflict between the principal and the agent is not limited to the
social costs that the projects may generate. The monitoring costs that the agent assumes
is another factor contributing to the extent of the conflict. This paper studies two dif-
ferent specifications. Under the first specification, the principal internalizes the cost of
self-monitoring; in the second one, she does not internalize it. The conflict becomes more
intense under the second specification. The corresponding stage game, together with the
payoffs corresponding to the first specification, is illustrated in the following figure. Note
that the principal’s payoffs are in expectation terms except for those terminal nodes result-
ing from project rejections, and signal realization. The expectation is based on the belief
about the type of the project, which is either µ, if no information is acquired, or µns if
information is acquired but no signal is realized.
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Figure 1.1: The stage game between the principal and the agent. The principal internalizes
the cost of self-monitoring. All the terminal nodes, except those are reached by nature’s
move θb,s , and project rejections, are reflecting principal’s expected payoffs over the deter-
mination of the type of the project. µ is the unconditional probability of project being bad,
and µns is the probability of project being bad conditional on no signal is realized after
information acquisition.
1.2.2 An Alternative Interpretation
There is an alternative interpretation of the model. Suppose that there are some costly
precautionary measures that can be initiated by the agent if the principal forces him to do
so. From the principal’s point of view, these precautions are necessary in case the project
is bad since they completely eliminate the harms; otherwise, they are wasteful. The agent
wants to avoid these measures regardless of the type of the project, due to the costs. Let z
be the cost of these measures; then the corresponding ex-post payoffs are described in the
following table:
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Precautions No Precautions
Good v − z, v − z v, v
Bad v − z, v − z v − 1, v
Table 1.1: Description of the corresponding payoffs at the ex-post stage for the principal
and the agent respectively.
When z = v, the above description is equivalent to the baseline model, where forcing
the precautions corresponds to the rejection of the project, and vice versa. However, the
results of the paper also follow for a larger set of z values. One just needs to make sure
that z is not very different from v.10
1.2.3 Policy
The principal is endowed with the full commitment power, and, at t = 0, commits to a
dynamic policy that specifies delegation and approval decisions over time as a function of
the public history. The public history consists of information about the realized decisions
in the earlier periods as well as the self-monitoring outcomes for those periods in which the
monitoring is delegated to the agent.
For a given time period t, the corresponding delegation decision and the realized out-
come of the self-monitoring, if performed, are denoted together by rt ∈ {s, ns, n}. When
monitoring is delegated to agent, rt will be either “s”, if self-disclosure takes place; or will
be “ns”, if no self-disclosure takes place. If there is no delegation, then rt = n. Moreover,
the approval decision at time t is denoted by dt ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 indicates rejection
and approval respectively. Consequently, a within-period public history, at the end of the
period, which is denoted by ht, is of the following form:
ht = (rt, dt) ∈ {s, ns, n} × {0, 1},
10For instance, when z is sufficiently small, then the principal would always force these measures and avoid
costly information acquisition.
15
for each t. At the beginning of a period t, a public history is defined as
ht = (h1, ......, ht−1).
The initial history is h1 = h0 = ∅, and Ht is the set of public histories at period t.
A policy Γ = {γt, xt}∞t=1 is then a sequence of functions which are defined as follows:
γt : H
t → [0, 1],
xt : H
t × {s, ns, n} → [0, 1].
The function γt is the probability of delegation. Because the delegation takes place at the
beginning of each period, it is a function defined over the set Ht. On the contrary, the
approval decision is also conditioned on the value of rt, hence the relevant domain for xt is
Ht×{s, ns, n}. For each possible value of rt, I use a separate notation for the approval rate,
i.e., xt = (x
s
t , x
ns
t , x
n
t ). Note that, x
s
t and x
ns
t are well-defined as long as γ > 0; similarly x
n
t
is relevant when γ < 1.
For an incentive compatible policy Γ, the expected utilities of the principal and the
agent are denoted by V and U respectively, and are given by:
U = E
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
γt{µλxstv + (1− µλ)xnst v − c}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Delegation
+ (1− γt)xnt v︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Delegation
]]
V = E
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
γt{µλxst (v − 1) + (1− µλ)xnst (v − µns)− c}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Delegation
+ (1− γt)xnt (v − µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Delegation
]]
The posterior beliefs about the type of the project affect only the principal’s utility.
The agent does not care about the project’s type. Another important point is that the
self-monitoring cost is included in the principal’s utility. As it was mentioned earlier, the
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other case will be analyzed later on.
1.2.4 Stationary Representation
Following Spear and Srivastava (1987), I express the principal’s problem within a stationary
form, in which the ex-ante expected utility of the agent is the state variable. In this form, the
interval [0, v] is the corresponding state space as it consists of all of the possible values that
the ex-ante expected utility of the agent can take. The agent’s utility cannot be negative,
because he can always guarantee a non-negative utility by shirking every time he is asked to
monitor. On the other hand, v is the maximum that the agent can receive in a policy. The
principal can grant this maximal utility to agent by approving all of the projects without
requesting self-monitoring.
State variable is updated over time depending on the realized public history. Within-
period decisions and the promised future continuation utilities of the agent, depend on this
state variable as well as the realized outcomes of the current period. An optimal policy
specifies a different continuation utility for each possible rt ∈ {s, ns, n} as in the case of the
approval probabilities. More precisely, the components of the policy are defined as:
γ, xs, xns, xn : [0, v]→ [0, 1],
Us, Uns, Un : [0, v]→ [0, v].
The delegation and the approval decisions consist, in essence, of probabilities; therefore,
the functions γ, xs, xns, xn take their values from the unit interval. The continuation utili-
ties, on the other hand, specify the state variable for the next period; hence, they are defined
as functions from the state space to itself. For a given policy, the functions Us, Uns, xs, and
xns are relevant only for those values of U ∈ [0, v] satisfying γ(U) > 0, whereas the functions
Un and xn are relevant only for those satisfying γ(U) < 1.
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The promised utility of the agent is calculated in ex-ante terms; hence, it will be granted
to the agent only in expectation. It aggregates the flow and continuation utilities of the
agent. Its transition is governed by the policy and the stochastic realizations. Starting
from U , the state variable of the next period becomes Un(U), or Us(U), or Uns(U) with the
corresponding probabilities 1− γ(U), γ(U)µλ and γ(U)(1− µλ) respectively.
In an optimal policy, the functions Un, Us, Uns, γ, xn, xs, xns are chosen to maximize the
principal’s objective function. There are two constraints that the principal needs to take
into account in this problem: incentive constraint and promise keeping constraint. More
precisely:
1.2.5 Principal’s Problem P
V (U) = max
γ,
xn,xs,xns,
Un,Us,Uns
γ
[
µλ
[
(1− δ)xs(v − 1) + δV (Us)
]
+ (1− µλ)[(1− δ)xns(v − µns) + δV (Uns)]− c]
+(1− γ)
[
(1− δ)xn(v − µ) + δV (Un)
]
subject to the (PK) and (IC) respectively:
U = γ
[
µλ
[
(1− δ)xsv + δUs
]
+ (1− µλ)[(1− δ)xnsv + δUns]− c]+ (1− γ)[(1− δ)xnv + δUn],
γ
[
µλ
[
(1− δ)xsv + δUs
]
+ (1− µλ)[(1− δ)xnsv + δUns]− c] ≥ γ[(1− δ)xnsv + δUns].
The first line of the principal’s objective function includes her utility contingent upon
self-monitoring request; hence, it is multiplied by the probability γ. The second line, on the
other hand, corresponds to the contingency of no self-monitoring; hence, it is multiplied by
1− γ.
The first constraint is the promise keeping constraint. It makes sure that the agent’s
expected utility is equal to U , the utility level promised to him. Likewise the principal’s
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utility, the agent’s utility also has two components depending on the principal’s delegation
decision.
The second constraint is the incentive constraint, which is defined to make sure that
acquiring information is an optimal choice for the agent when he is asked to do so; hence,
it is relevant only if γ > 0. It guarantees that the utility the agent achieves from shirking
is no better than the promised utility. If he shirks, there is no self-disclosure; hence, the
current approval rate and the continuation utility will be equal to xns and Uns respectively.
Note that Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions, i.e., monotonicity and discounting, are
fulfilled. Therefore, the existence of a solution for the problem P is guaranteed.
1.3 Case 1: Principal Internalizes Cost
In this section, I study the optimal policy and its properties under the first preference
specification, i.e., when the principal internalizes the self-monitoring costs. First, I start
with a benchmark analysis.
1.3.1 Observable Information Acquisition
In this benchmark, I consider the case in which the agent’s self-monitoring costs are publicly
observed; hence, there is no agency problem. The natural question is whether the principal
can induce the first best outcome or not? The first best outcome involves information
acquisition and utilization of the optimal approval decision, i.e., approving the project if
no-signal is generated and rejecting it otherwise, in every period. The principal can simply
induce this first best outcome by punishing any deviation with permanent rejection of the
future projects. Such an incentive scheme is sufficient to induce the proper behavior; because
the agent has a positive utility from the first best outcome, whereas permanent rejection
leaves him a 0 payoff. The expected utilities of the agent and the principal are denoted by
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w and pi respectively, and are given by:
w = (1− µλ)v − c,
pi = (1− µλ)(v − µns)− c.
The optimal policy when the self-monitoring effort is observable induces the first best out-
come, which gives the maximum possible utility to the principal. What about the optimal
policy conditional on the agent receiving a certain utility U ∈ [0, v] when the effort is ob-
servable? To answer this question, one needs to solve the same problem P without including
the incentive constraint. This problem has a solution, and the value function arising from
its solution, which I denote by V ∗, is an upper-bound for the value function V .
To describe V ∗ and the corresponding “benchmark policy”, I will point out some initial
observations. First of all, the benchmark policy is stationary without loss of generality. The
expected utility of the agent stays constant throughout time; and hence, one just needs to
characterize the delegation and the approval decisions, which I denote by γ∗, x∗n, x∗s, x∗ns, as
functions of U ∈ [0, v].
Second, the information must be used efficiently. In other words, whenever the agent
is asked to monitor himself, the following approval decision must be efficient conditional
on the content of the resulting information. This is a direct implication of the fact that
the principal internalizes the self-monitoring costs. Rather than having x∗s > 0 or x∗ns < 1,
the principal could adjust the probability of delegation, γ∗, without hurting the promise
keeping constraint, and get strictly better off. To see this, first note that:
U = γ∗[µλx∗sv + (1− µλ)x∗nsv − c] + (1− γ∗)x∗nv.
Suppose, xs > 0 to get a contradiction, then it must be true that xns = 1; because,
otherwise, there is an immediate deviation that the principal can perform by decreasing x∗s
and increasing x∗ns. Then, consider decreasing xs ↓ by some  > 0; and decreasing delegation
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probability to γ − ζ. Moreover assume that the principal employs a direct approval with
the remaining ζ probability. Then ζ satisfies:
γ∗[µλx∗sv + (1− µλ)v − c] = (γ∗ − ζ)[µλ(x∗s − )v + (1− µλ)v − c] + ζv.
Therefore:
ζ =
γµλv
µλv(1− xn + ) + c .
Such a deviation is strictly better for the principal, because:
[
(γ∗−ζ)[µλ(x∗s−)(v−1)+(1−µλ)(v−µns)−c]+ζ(v−µ)
]
−
[
γ∗[µλx∗s(v−1)+(1−µλ)(v−µns)−c]
]
> 0.
A similar contradiction follows for the case x∗ns < 1.
Finally, upon not requesting self-monitoring, the principal either directly approves or
directly rejects the projects and not chooses a randomized approval decision. Instead of
choosing an x∗n ∈ (0, 1), she could increase the probability of delegation, γ∗, and adjust the
value of x∗n by respecting the promise keeping constraint. This increases the probability of
informed decision making and improves the principal’s objective.
By putting these observations in an order, one can easily specify the details of the
benchmark policy. When U ∈ [0, w), the agent is supposed to get a utility that is less
than the utility he would get in the first best outcome. Therefore, the principal randomizes
between the first best outcome and the direct rejection without information acquisition. On
the other hand, when U ∈ (w, v], the randomization occurs between the first best outcome
and the direct approval without information acquisition. In both cases, the probability of
delegation γ is chosen such that the agent gets the exact utility promised to him. More
precisely, an optimal policy in this benchmark is given by:
21
γ∗(U) =

U
w if U ∈ [0, w]
v−U
v−w if U ∈ (w, v]
x∗s = 0, x
∗
ns = 1, ∀U ∈ (0, v)
x∗n(U) =

0 if U ∈ [0, w)
1 if U ∈ (w, v]
And the resulting value function is:
V ∗(U) =

U
wpi if U ∈ [0, w]
v−U
v−wpi +
U−w
v−w (v − µ) if U ∈ (w, v]
The following figure illustrates the value function.
0 w v
v − µ
0
pi
V
∗(U)
Figure 1.2: The benchmark value function V ∗, which consists of an upper bound for V .
The parameters used in the illustration assumes that v < µ.
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1.3.2 Moral Hazard and The Optimal Policy
The focus is now on the agency problem where the agent’s efforts spent on self-monitoring
are not observed by the principal. The interest is particularly on the characterization of
the value function V , within-period decisions γ, xn, xs, xns, and the promised continuation
utilities Un, Us, Uns, which are defined as functions of the ex-ante expected promised utility
U . The following lemma, which is proved in appendix, is a first step towards this goal.
Lemma 1.1. The value function, V is concave and hence differentiable almost everywhere.
Moreover its derivative is bounded and satisfies:
1− µλ
µλv + c
≤ V ′(U) ≤ 1− µ(1− λ)
(1− µλ)v − c , ∀U ∈ [0, v]. (1.1)
Proof. See appendix A.1.
The concavity of the value function is a direct implication of the fact that the principal
can randomize between different utility levels while granting a specific promised utility to
agent. Since V is concave, it is almost everywhere differentiable, which can also be proved
by applying the result of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979). The following observations
are sufficient to show the bounds of the derivative of V . First, for any promised utility U ,
V (U) cannot be larger than V ∗(U). Second, the values of V and V ∗ are equal to each other
at the boundaries of the state space, i.e., at 0 and v. These observations together with the
concavity require that the constant slopes of V ∗ over the intervals [0, w] and [w, v] are the
upper and the lower bounds of V ′ respectively.
In each period, the principal first makes her delegation decision. In case she randomizes
with some γ ∈ (0, 1), each possible outcome of this randomization may result with different
utility levels for the principal and the agent. This stems from the fact that the promised
utility of the agent is given only in expectation. The principal’s commitment power plays a
crucial role here. She can fulfill the exact randomization that the policy specifies, and keep
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her promises in expectation. Otherwise, the principal, in each period that she is supposed
to randomize, could pick the outcome that she prefers most instead of following the specified
randomization.
In this regard, one can represent the utility of the agent as a weighted average of two
components, one for each possible outcome of the delegation decision. Precisely, let UD and
UN be the resulting utilities of the agent after delegation and no delegation respectively.
More precisely:
UN = (1− δ)xnv + δUn
UD = µλ
[
(1− δ)xsv + δUs
]
+ (1− µλ)[(1− δ)xnsv + δUns]− c.
The promise keeping constraint imposes a restriction on the choices of UD, UN , and γ, so
that the equality U = γUD + (1 − γ)UN must hold. When the agent is delegated with
certainty, i.e when γ = 1, it must be U = UD; similarly, U = UN must hold when γ = 0.
1.3.3 Conditional Representation
In what follows, I will further exploit the above-mentioned observation, and rewrite the
principal’s problem P as a decomposition of two conditional sub-programs. These sub-
programs are defined conditional on the current delegation decision, and their task is to
characterize the approval decision in the current period as well as the continuation utilities
for the next period.
The first problem is defined conditional on principal delegating monitoring to the agent
in the current period. The solution to this problem characterizes the optimal values for xns,
xs, Uns, and Us depending on the value of UD. It incorporates the incentive constraint and
a promise keeping constraint. The promise keeping constraint here is defined to make sure
that the agent’s conditional expected utility is equal to UD.
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The second program is defined conditional on agent not delegating monitoring to the
agent in the current period. Its solution characterizes the optimal values of xn and Un
depending on the value of UN . There is no incentive constraint in this problem, since there
is no request of self-monitoring. There is only a promise keeping constraint defined to make
sure that xn and Un are arranged so that the agent’s utility is equal to UN .
Conditional on no delegation, the agent’s utility can take all the values in the entire
state space, hence the range of UN is equal to [0, v]. However, this is not the case for UD.
It is defined conditional on an incentive compatible self-monitoring in the current period;
hence, the agent already assumes the cost c. This means that UD cannot be equal to v or
anything sufficiently close to v; therefore, the range of UD can only be a proper subset of
the state space. The exact range of UD will be discussed later on.
The corresponding value functions arising from these conditional programs are denoted
by VD and VN respectively. The unconditional value function, V , is then given by:
V (U) = γ(U)VD(UD) + (1− γ(U))VN (UN ),
where U = γ(U)UD + (1 − γ(U))UN . The following diagram illustrates this conditional
representation of the principal’s problem.
U
UD
UN
xs(UD)
Us(UD)
xns(UD)
Uns(UD)
xn(UN )
Un(UN )
Self-Disclosure
No Self-Disclosure
No Delegation
γ
Delegate
1− γ
Not Delegate
(µλ)
(1− µλ)
Figure 1.3: The principal’s problem is equivalent to solving for the optimal values of UD,
UN , and γ.
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This new form of the principal’s problem is denoted by P ′ and it is defined as follows:
V (U) = max
γ,UD,UN
γVD(UD) + (1− γ)VN (UN ),
s.t. U = γUD + (1− γ)UN .
The sub-program that is conditional on no delegation in the current period is denoted by
PN , and is defined as follows:
VN (UN ) = max
xn,Un
[(1− δ)xn(v − µ) + δV (Un)] ,
s.t. UN = (1− δ)xnv + δUn.
Finally, the sub-program that is conditional on delegation in the current period is denoted
as PD, and is defined as:
VD(UD) = maxxn,xs,xns,
Un,Us,Uns
[
µλ
[
(1− δ)xs(v − 1) + δV (Us)
]
+ (1− µλ)[(1− δ)xns(v − µns) + δV (Uns)]− c]
subject to (PKD) and (ICD) respectively:
UD = µλ
[
(1− δ)xsv + δUs
]
+ (1− µλ)[(1− δ)xnsv + δUns]− c,
UD ≥ (1− δ)xnsv + δUns.
Thanks to this conditional formulation, it is possible to analyze the principal’s delega-
tion and approval decisions separately. First, I will consider the conditional problems in
isolation, and solve for the corresponding optimal approval decisions. Then, I will focus
on the unconditional problem P ′, and characterize the optimal delegation decision over the
state space.
There is a crucial observation that I make use of during the above-mentioned process.
If, for a given U , a randomized delegation decision, γ ∈ (0, 1), is optimal and randomization
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takes place between VD(UD) and VN (UN ), then V (UD) = VD(UD) and V (UN ) = VN (UN ).
In other words, γ = 1 is optimal at UD, and γ = 0 is optimal at UN . This observation is
based on the fact that the principal, in order to grant the agent his promised utility U , can
always randomize between V (UD) and VN (UN ). Therefore, V (UD) cannot be strictly larger
than VD(UD), as it would contradict with the optimality.
On account of this, characterizing the state variables that are featuring γ = 0 or
γ = 1 would be sufficient to pin down the optimal delegation decision. In other words,
the focus should be on the subsets of the state space over which either V (U) = VD(U) or
V (U) = VN (U) is satisfied. For the rest of the state space, there will be a randomized
delegation decision, and the corresponding values UD and UN will always be a part of the
subsets of [0, v] satisfying V = VD and V = VN respectively.
The discussion in the sequel will follow the plan descrived above. In order to carry
through the first step, I will first focus on the conditional problems in isolation.
1.3.4 The problem PD
An initial observation is that the incentive constraint is always binding. First of all, note
that the IC can be written as a restriction on the difference between the continuation utilities
Us and Uns:
Us − Uns ≥ 1− δ
δµλ
c+
1− δ
δ
(xns − xs)v.
In case the difference between Us and Uns is larger than the value that is necessary to
maintain incentive compatibility, the principal can move them closer to each other without
violating the promise keeping constraint. More precisely, she can decrease Us by  and
increase Uns by
µλ
1−µλ. Such a modification is always feasible as long as  > 0 is chosen
sufficiently small, since both of the constraints are respected. Moreover, it is preferred by
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the principal due to the concavity of the value function V . This is because the suggested
modification consists of a mean preserving contraction of the continuation utilities, hence
the expectation of V for the next period becomes larger. Therefore incentive constraint
is always binding, without loss of generality. Solving binding incentive constraint together
with the promise keeping constraint gives:
Us =
UD
δ
+
1− δ
δµλ
c− 1− δ
δ
xsv, (1.2)
Uns =
UD
δ
− 1− δ
δ
xnsv. (1.3)
These expressions suggest that the agent is compensated for the cost of information
acquisition only after the signal is realized. To see this more clearly, one can rewrite them
as follows:
(1− δ)xnsv + δUns = UD,
(1− δ)xsv + δUs = UD + 1−δµλ c.
Self-reporting increases the agent’s utility by a constant. Since the signal is verifiable, it
also serves as a proof of the effort spent on self-monitoring. Therefore, the most efficient
incentive provision scheme involves compensating the agent for the costs of monitoring only
after the realization of the signal. Another important aspect is that the continuation utility
in one contingency is independent of the approval rate in the other contingency. In other
words, Us is independent of the choice of xns, and Uns is independent of xs.
After figuring out the relation between approval probabilities and the continuation
utilities, it is now possible to discuss the domain of value function VD. By using the
equations (1.2), and (1.3), one can see that the maximum value that UD can take is equal
to δv+ (1−δ)cµλ , which can be achieved by setting xs and Us equal to their maximum values,
1 and v respectively. Therefore, the domain of VD is the interval [0, δv +
(1−δ)c
µλ ].
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To characterize the solution of the problem PD, one needs to use the equations (1.2), and
(1.3) that govern the trade-off between the continuation utilities and the current approval
rates for both contingencies, i.e., self-disclosure and no self-disclosure. The question is, to
what extent the principal would like to use efficient approval decisions, i.e. xns = 1 and
xs = 0? It turns out that the approval decisions will be set as close as possible to the
efficient ones. More precisely, xs = 0 and xns = 1 as long as the resulting continuation
utilities, i.e., Us and Uns, stays inside the state space [0, v]. This requires UD to be in an
intermediate range. When UD is sufficiently small, setting xns = 1 is not feasible, since the
resulting Uns would be negative. For these values, the approval rate xns will be chosen such
that the continuation utility Uns becomes 0. By the same logic, for those values of UD that
are sufficiently large, the approval rate xs will be chosen so that the continuation utility
Us takes its largest possible value v. The formal statement of the lemma is given by the
following lemma.
Lemma 1.2. There exists critical values
¯
U = (1− δ)v, and U¯ = δv − (1−δ)cµλ , such that the
solution to the problem PD satisfies:
(xs, xns) =

(0, UD(1−δ)v ) if UD ≤ ¯U,
(0, 1) if UD ∈ (
¯
U, U¯),
(
UD+
(1−δ)c
µλ
−δv
(1−δ)v , 1) if UD ≥ U¯.
(Us, Uns) =

(UDδ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ , 0) if UD ≤ ¯U,
(UDδ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ ,
UD−(1−δ)v
δ ) if UD ∈ (¯U, U¯),
(v, UD−(1−δ)vδ ) if UD ≥ U¯.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Focusing on the approval rates in isolation, the principal prefers to increase xns and
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decrease xs as much as possible due to the efficiency concerns. However, these approval
rates also alters the continuation utilities, therefore there is a non-trivial tradeoff that the
principal needs to take into account. As can be seen from the equations (1.2), and (1.3), a
higher xns requires a lower Uns, and a smaller xs requires a higher Uns.
Lemma 1.2 proves that, even if there is a loss resulting from a lower Uns, the tradeoff
always favors a higher approval rate xns. Similarly, even if there is a loss resulting from
higher Us, the tradeoff always favors lower xs. The lower and upper bounds of the derivative
of the value function V , which are defined in lemma 1.1, are the main driving force behind
this result. Precisely, the upper and lower bounds of V ′ puts a limit on the maximum loss
that can arise, and this limit is always less than the gain from employing more efficient
approval decisions. Note that the U < U¯ is always satisfied due to the restriction imposed
on the discount factor δ.
1.3.5 The problem PN
This problem is defined conditional on no delegation in the current period. Its solution
follows from straightforward arguments. The decision is mainly about how much of the
promised utility, UN , to provide the agent in the current period in the form of project
approval, and how much of it to leave as a continuation utility. The amount that is left as
a continuation utility will be granted to the agent starting from the next period without
any restriction on the delegation decision. The optimal choice of the approval rate follows
from the following maximization problem.
max
xn
(1− δ)xn(v − µ) + δV (UN−(1−δ)xnvδ ).
The shape of the value function V plays a crucial on the optimal choice of xn and hence
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on Un. Let I = [
¯
a, a¯] be an interval where the boundaries
¯
a and a¯ satisfy:
¯
a = inf{U ∈ [0, v] | V ′(U) ≤ v − µ
v
},
a¯ = sup{U ∈ [0, v] | V ′(U) ≥ v − µ
v
}.
In words, I is the interval over which the derivative of the value function V is equal
to v−µv . This interval resides in the interior of the state space [0, v]. This stems from the
fact that, the line that connects the points (0, V (0)) and (v, V (v)) has the slope v−µv , and
the graph of the value function V locates over this line.11 Then due to the concavity,
V ′(0) > v−µv > V
′(v), hence the interval I is in the interior of the state space [0, v].12 Then,
one can conclude that the optimal choice of xn satisfies the following:
xn(UN ) =

0 if UN ≤ δ
¯
a,
∈ (0, 1) if UN ∈ (δ
¯
a, δa¯+ (1− δ)v) ,
1 if UN ≥ δa¯+ (1− δ)v.
(1.4)
Intuitively, for smaller values of UN , the continuation value Un will be in a range where
the derivative of V is sufficiently large. In this region, it is better for principal to keep
the continuation utility as high as possible by setting xn = 0. On the contrary, for larger
values of UN , the value of V
′ becomes small, and increasing the continuation utility does
not benefit the principal. Therefore, she keeps the continuation utility of the agent as small
as possible by setting xn = 1.
In the intermediate range of UN , however, the value of xn is set so that the continuation
value lies in the interval I, and hence the value function has a derivative equal to v−µv . The
principal is indifferent between marginally increasing xn and Un. If the interval I consists
11The linear line can be achieved by an always feasible policy: randomizing between its extreme values.
Hence it is strictly dominated, and V stays on top of this line.
12The interval I can be a singleton.
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of a single point, then the optimal value of xn is also singleton. Otherwise, there is a
continuum of optimal values for xn in this intermediate range.
1.3.6 The problem P ′
From now on, the conditional problems PD and PN will be considered together in order
to characterize the solution of the unconditional problem. The task is to figure out the
optimal way to decompose U into UD and UN together with the the optimal choice of γ.
Completing these tasks will lead to the description of the value function V , which is equal
to the concavification of the functions VD and VN .
13
The following lemma describes the set of state variables over which the equality V = VN
is satisfied. It further indicates that the corresponding approval rates at these state variables
must be either 0 or 1. In other words, having an interior probability of approval, i.e.
xn ∈ (0, 1), after avoiding self-monitoring never happens in an optimal policy.
Lemma 1.3. There are two critical values 0 <
¯
UN < U¯N < v, such that:
i) V (U) = VN (U) if and only if U ∈ [0,
¯
UN ] ∪ [U¯N , v]
ii) V is linear over [0,
¯
UN ] and [U¯N , v].
iii) The optimal approval decision xn satisfies:
xn(U) =

0 if U ∈ [0,
¯
UN ]
1 if U ∈ [U¯N , v]
Proof. See appendix A.3
13The value function V depends on VD and VN , which in turn depend on V . In this regard, V , VD, and
VN are the solutions of a complicated fixed point problem. However, a solution for this problem exists since
the existence of the solution for the problem P is guaranteed.
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Lemma 1.3 points out that making an uninformed decision without monitoring can
be optimal only if the promised utility is close to the boundaries of the state space. It is
already known that the equality V = VN holds at the extreme values of the state space,
i.e., at 0 and v. By using the comparison between the V ′N and V
′, which can be achieved
from the equation (1.4), one can show that the equality V = VN can hold only over the
union [0, δ
¯
a] ∪ [δa¯+ (1− δ)v, v]. Then by using the expression (1.4), one can conclude that
the approval probability xn must be either 0 or 1 for all the promised utilities at which
no-delegation is optimal. The second step of the proof shows the existence of the cutoffs
¯
UN , and U¯N , and also the fact that they reside in the interior of the state space.
This result is rather intuitive. When U is sufficiently low, it is not feasible to utilize a
large approval rate; similarly, when U is sufficiently large, it is not feasible to employ a large
rejection rate. Therefore, the principal can get only limited benefit from the information in
these state variables, and the extent of this benefit is not sufficient to compensate the cost
of acquisition. For this reason, she does not ask the agent to self-monitor at these promised
utilities as she also cares about the costs. Therefore, no-delegation is an optimal solution,
and hence V = VN holds.
The result is also informant about the shape of the value function over the lower and
upper ends of the state space, as it points out that the value function V is linear over the
intervals [0,
¯
UN ], and [U¯N , v]. Following some simple logic, one can see that the linearity is
not limited to these intervals. More precisely:
V (U) = VN (U) =

δV (Uδ ) if U ∈ [0, ¯UN ]
(1− δ)(v − µ) + δV (U−(1−δ)vδ ) if U ∈ [U¯N , v]
Then, by taking the derivative of both sides, one can get the following:
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V ′(U) = V ′N (U) =

V ′(Uδ ) if U ∈ [0, ¯UN ]
V ′(U−(1−δ)vδ ) if U ∈ [U¯N , v]
Since V ′(U) = V ′(Uδ ) for every U ∈ [0, ¯UN ], and V is concave, the slope is constant over
[0,
¯
UN ]∪ [
¯
UN , ¯
UN
δ ]. Similarly, the slope of V is constant over [
U¯N−(1−δ)v
δ , U¯N ]∪ [U¯N , v]. Due
to the linearity of the value function, it is without loss of generality to assume that there is
a randomized delegation decision over the intervals (
¯
UN ,
¯
UD) and (U¯D, U¯N ).
The constant slopes, however, does not carry beyond the values ¯
UN
δ , and
U¯N−(1−δ)v
δ .
14
As a result, no randomized delegation decision can be optimal at these values, since they
do not have any neighborhood over which the slope of V stays constant. At these values,
γ = 0 can not be optimal either, because it is already known that VN < V for all of the
state variables that are outside of [0,
¯
UN ] ∪ [U¯N , v] form the previous lemma. As the only
remaining option, the equality V = VD must hold at these values. To this respect, one shall
define:
¯
UD = ¯
UN
δ
U¯D =
U¯N − (1− δ)v
δ
The values
¯
UD, and U¯D are the smallest and largest values of U satisfying V (U) = VD(U)
without loss of any generality. The interval (
¯
UD, U¯D) is the only remaining region where
the delegation decision is yet to be described. However, it is natural to expect that V = VD
and hence γ = 1 over (
¯
UD, U¯D).
Let U ∈ (
¯
UD, U¯D). From lemma 1.3, VN < V , and hence γ > 0 at this U . Moreover,
a randomized delegation decision cannot be optimal either. Suppose otherwise to get a
contradiction, and assume that a randomization takes place between VD(UD) and VN (UN ).
14If V ′ were to be constant on any neighborhood of ¯U
δ
and U¯N−(1−δ)v
δ
, then the equality V = VN would
hold for a larger subset of [0, v], which contradicts with the definition of
¯
UN and U¯N .
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The corresponding value of UN must belong to either [0,
¯
UN ] or [U¯N , v]; without loss of gen-
erality assume the precedent. Then, the principal could rather randomize between VD(
¯
UD)
and VD(UD) and get strictly better off. The reason for this stems from the fact that slope
of V alters at
¯
UD, hence the line connecting the values VD(UD) and VD(
¯
UD) locates on top
of the line connecting VD(UD) and VN (UN ). Therefore, it is optimal to set γ = 1 and hence
V = VD in this region.
The optimal delegation decision for each possible promised utility U ∈ [0, v] is now
known, and summarized in the following diagram:
0 ¯
UN
¯
UD U¯D U¯N v
V = VN V = VNV = VD
Linear V Linear V
Figure 1.4: Partition of the state space depending on the optimal delegation decision.
To complete the characterization of the optimal policy, one should also describe the
approval decisions. Particularly, the description of xs and xns over the interval [
¯
UD, U¯D],
where delegation is the optimal choice, is incomplete.
The problem PD is analyzed in isolation, and its solution is provided in lemma 1.2.
The result asserts that the efficient decision making, i.e. xs = 0, and xns = 1 will take
place as long as the promised utility U is in between [
¯
U, U¯ ]. For the rest of the state space,
making the efficient decisions is not feasible. Instead, the principal employs the decisions
that are closest to the efficient among the feasible ones. However, the problem PD is defined
conditional on delegation in the current period regardless of its optimality. Now, the focus
is on the interval [
¯
UD, U¯D], where delegating monitoring is optimal.
The question one shall inquire at this point is, how do the values of
¯
UD, and U¯D
compare to the values of
¯
U , and U¯ respectively? The answer to this question is important
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as it indicates whether the approval decisions taking place in an optimal policy are always
efficient or not. This comparison will also be informative about the long-run outcome of
the optimal policy. It turns out that
¯
U ≥
¯
UD and U¯ ≤ U¯D. Therefore, there are some
state variables over which the optimal policy employs an inefficient approval decision, i.e.
xns < 1 or xs > 0. The next lemma summarizes these findings:
Lemma 1.4. In an optimal policy, ∀U ∈ [
¯
UD, U¯D], V (U) = VD(U), and γ(U) = 1. More-
over,
¯
UD ≤
¯
U < U¯ ≤ U¯D.
Proof. See appendix A.4
Now, the optimal delegation and approval decisions, and the transition rule over the
entire state space is known. Once the policy is initiated with an initial promised utility
for the agent, the rest follows immediately. The question is how to choose this initial state
variable. In other words, what is the utility level that the principal promises to the agent in
the beginning? To answer this question one shall look for the utility level that is maximizing
the value function V .
The value function V increases over [0,
¯
UD), as it has a positive constant slope; and
decreases over (U¯D, v]. The initial utility, which is denoted by U
∗, must be an element of
the interval [
¯
UD, U¯D]. Due to the continuity, the existence of U
∗ is guaranteed. Moreover, I
show that the value function V is strictly concave over [U¯D, U¯D], hence U
∗ is unique. This
result, and the earlier findings are summarized in the following theorem; which, at the same
time, describes an optimal policy.
Proposition 1.1. The value function V is strictly concave over [U¯D, U¯D], and attains its
maximum at U∗ ∈ (U¯D, U¯D). At t = 0, the agent is promised an expected utility of U∗, and
delegated for self-monitoring.
As long as the promised utility stays in the interval (U¯D, U¯D), the monitoring is delegated
to agent, i.e. γ = 1. Moreover, the approval decisions and the transition rule for the state
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variable satisfies:
• xs(U) = max{0,
U+
(1−δ)c
µλ −δv
(1−δ)v }, and xns(U) = min{1, U(1−δ)v}, ∀U ∈ [U¯D, U¯D].
• Us(U) = min{v, Uδ + (1−δ)cδµλ }, and Uns(U) = max{0, Uδ − (1−δ)vδ }, ∀U ∈ [U¯D, U¯D].
When the state variable reaches to [0,
¯
UD), the monitoring is delegated to agent with prob-
ability γ = U
¯
UD
. If the realized delegation decision is:
• Delegation: (xs, xns) = (0, ¯UD(1−δ)v ), and (Us, Uns) =
(
U
δ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ , 0
)
• No delegation: xn = 0, and Un = 0
When the state variable reaches to U ∈ (U¯D, v], the monitoring is delegated to agent with
probability γ = v−Uv−
¯
UD
. If the realized delegation decision is:
• Delegation: (xs, xns) = (
U+
(1−δ)c
µλ −δv
(1−δ)v , 1), and (Us, Uns) =
(
v, Uδ − (1−δ)vδ
)
• No delegation: xn = 1, and Un = v
Proof. See appendix A.5
All of the components of the above theorem, except the strict concavity, are already
discussed. Strict concavity of V over the interval [
¯
UD, U¯D] follows from technical arguments
that are depicted in the appendix. The following figure provides an illustration of the value
functions VD and VN . The unconditional value function, V , is the concavification of them.
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U
N
U
D
U¯D U¯N
0
v
U
V(U)
VD
VN
Figure 1.5: Illustration of conditional value functions VD and VN . The unconditional value
function V is the upper envelope of VD and VN . The equality V = VN holds over the
intervals [0, UN ] and [U¯N , v]. The equality V = VD holds over the interval [UD, U¯D]. For
the rest of the state space V is strictly larger than VN and VD.
The policy described in the theorem is an optimal policy, and it is not the only one.
There is a multiplicity originating from the linearity of the value function over the lower and
upper ends of the state space. One can come up with another optimal policy that employs
different policy specifications over these regions, where V is linear. For example, when
U ∈ [0,
¯
UN ], it is also optimal to set γ = 0, xn = 0, and Un =
U
δ . Over the intermediate
region, however, the value function is strictly concave, and there is no such multiplicity.
The specific policy given in the theorem is easy to describe and has some substantiation
properties. It features a two-phase structure, in which all of the periods in which self-
monitoring takes place are front-loaded. The following corollary describes this in detail.
Corollary 1.1 (Two-Phase Structure). The optimal policy depicted above consists of two
consecutive phases:
i) The initial phase, starting at t = 0, is where all the information acquisition takes
place. The principal delegates monitoring to the agent as long as the policy stays in
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this stage. Efficient decision making will be employed as long as it is available. The
duration of this stage is stochastic and depends on the realized information outcomes.
ii) The terminal phase is no-delegation phase. Once it is reached there is no informa-
tion acquisition anymore, and all the remaining approval decisions are uninformed.
The projects are either always approved or always rejected depending on the realized
outcomes during the initial phase.
As long as the delegation takes place, the agent is promised a higher continuation utility
(in the form of future regulatory approval) each time he discloses bad news. His current
project is less likely to get approved but the regulator promises more frequent approval in
the future. If he does not disclose any signal, he is downgraded to a lower continuation
utility. His current project has higher chances of approval, yet he will be given less frequent
approvals in the future. The duration of this phase is stochastic; when it ends, the policy
reaches a second phase in which there is no more self-monitoring.
If the policy reaches to the minimum promised utility the agent is black-listed and
all of the projects will be directly rejected afterwards. On the contrary, if it reaches to its
maximum, the agent is whitelisted and all the projects will be directly approved afterwards.
Such a structure is also observed in the papers Horner and Guo (2015), and (Li et al.,
2015). The long run outcome consists of either a permanent rewarding or a permanent
punishment depending on the earlier course of the relation. As it will be apparent shortly,
this structure is not prevailing when the principal does not internalize the cost of information
acquisition.
Efficiency aspects of the optimal policy are also significant. Likewise the papers referred
in the previous paragraph, all the inefficiencies are back-loaded in the optimal policy that
is defined in theorem 1.1. In this framework, an inefficiency arises in two consequences:
first one arises if information acquisition is not requested, and the second one occurs due to
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inefficient use of the acquired information. Clearly, a first type inefficiency appears only in
the terminal phase of the policy. On the other hand, a second type inefficiency can occur
only the last period of the initial phase. When the promised utility is in the interval [
¯
UD,
¯
U),
which is sometimes an empty set depending on the parameter values, self monitoring takes
place, and the approval decision following a no self-disclosure is inefficient since xns < 1.
Right after this event, the state variable is downgraded to its minimum, hence the ultimate
stage with a permanent rejection starts. Analogous reasoning works for (U¯, U¯D] as well.
Therefore, all the second type of inefficiencies takes place right before the ultimate stage
starts. To this respect, all the inefficiencies are back-loaded.
Some of the properties mentioned above are specific to the policy depicted in the theo-
rem. The long run outcome, on the other hand, is independent of the policy choice. It always
features whitelisting or blacklisting. This stems from the fact that
¯
UD ≤
¯
U < U¯ ≤ U¯D.15The
following result indicates this observation.
Corollary 1.2. If the principal cares about the cost of monitoring, the eventual outcome
features either permanent approval or permanent rejection in any optimal policy. Therefore,
in the long run, the agent is either blacklisted or whitelisted with probability 1.
1.4 Case 2: Principal Does Not Internalize Cost
Now, the principal does not internalize the agent’s cost of information acquisition. In
this case, the optimal policy turns out to be remarkably different in terms of its long
run properties and the efficiency aspects. These discrepancies have their origins on the
principal’s richer capacity of providing incentives. From a technical point of view, principal
can use monitoring requests purely on the grounds of punishing the agent, as she does
not care about its cost. From time to time, the agent is asked to monitor himself, even
15If it was
¯
UD >
¯
U or U¯ > U¯D, then it would be possible to specify an optimal policy that does not
feature blacklisting or whitelisting respectively.
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though the resulting information will be completely ignored in the approval decision. Such
a punishment scheme was feasible for the the previous case as well; however, as it also
punishes the principal, it is not used in the optimal policy. The verifiability of the “bad
news” plays a crucial role on this additional channel of incentive provision. Precisely, the
signal provides a hard evidence for the efforts the agent spent on self-monitoring; therefore,
the principal can make sure that the necessary punishment is executed.
The formal description of the principal’s problem is barely changed, with a minor
modification due to principal’s shifted preferences towards monitoring costs. The objective
function does not include the cost parameter, c, now. To recognize the differences, all of the
variables are denoted with a tilde now. More precisely, the policy consists of the functions
γ˜, x˜n, x˜s, x˜ns, U˜n, U˜s, U˜ns.
1.4.1 Observable Information Acquisition
The initial focus is on the benchmark where the agent’s effort is observable. This will be
helpful to reveal how this case is different than the previous one. The first best policy is as
before, inducing the efficient outcome, i.e. monitoring and efficient decision making in each
period with a stationary payment scheme. The agent’s utility form this first best outcome
is the same as before, i.e. equal to w; yet, the principal has a different utility since she does
not care about the cost of monitoring. Her utility is denoted by p˜i, and is equal to:
p˜i = (1− µλ)v − µ(1− λ).
The benchmark policy, which is defined conditional on the agent’s ex-ante expected
utility when effort is observable, is now different then the benchmark policy of the previous
case. The approval decisions employed after information acquisition are not always efficient.
The principal requests self-monitoring more often since she does not care about its costs.
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The benchmark policy is stationary as before, hence there is no need to define the con-
tinuation utilities. The benchmark policy only consists of delegation and approval decisions,
which are denoted by γ˜∗, x˜∗n, x˜∗s, x˜∗ns.
When U < w, the principal, while keeping her promise, cannot employ the efficient
scheme, because the agent is promised a utility that is less then the utility of the first
best outcome. She can decrease the probability of self-monitoring and employ the direct
rejection with positive probability instead. This was exactly what had been done in the
previous case. Alternatively, she can decrease the probability of approval without decreasing
the probability of delegation. Since she does not internalize the costs of self-monitoring, this
alternative method turns out to be better for the principal. First, note that the probability
of wrong approval, x˜∗s, is always 0. Therefore, the principal only needs to choose γ˜∗ and x˜∗ns
properly so that she keeps her promise. In doing so, her only concern is to maximize the
probability of true approval, x˜∗ns, since she does not care about the cost of self-monitoring.
And, the probability of true approval is maximized when the probability of delegation is at
its maximum, conditional on U being less than w. Therefore, the principal always delegates
the monitoring to agent and approves the project with some probability chosen specifically
to meet the promised utility U . In other words, x˜∗ns satisfies:
(1− µλ)x˜∗nsv − c = U.
Therefore, for every U < w, the benchmark policy is characterized by: γ˜∗ = 1, x˜∗s = 0, and
x˜∗ns =
U + c
(1− µλ)v .
When U > w, the first best policy is exactly the same with the one depicted in the
previous case. The promised utility of the agent is higher than the utility of the first best
outcome. The optimal way to grant the promised utility to the agent requires to employ
the direct approval without delegation due to the same arguments provided in the previous
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section. Consequently, there is a randomization between first best outcome and the direct
approval without monitoring. The value function V˜ ∗ over [w, v], is the linear line combining
the points (p˜i, w) and (v, v − µ). Therefore, the benchmark policy can be summarized as
follows:
γ˜∗(U) =

1 if U ∈ [0, w)
U−w
µλv+c if U ∈ (w, v]
(x˜∗s(U), x˜ns(U)) =

(
0, U+c(1−µλ)v
)
if U ∈ [0, w)
(0, 1) if U ∈ (w, v]
x˜∗n(U) =

Irrelevant if U ∈ [0, w)
1 if U ∈ (w, v]
Therefore the corresponding value function V˜ ∗ is given by:
V˜ ∗(U) =

w−U
w
c(v−µns)
v +
U
w p˜i if U ∈ [0, w)
v−U
v−w p˜i +
U−w
v−w (v − µ) if U ∈ (w, v]
The following figure illustrates the value function V˜ ∗:
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0 w v
v − µ
0
p˜i
V˜
∗(U)
Figure 1.6: The value function V˜ ∗. The illustration assumes v < µ.
1.4.2 Moral Hazard and the Optimal Policy
Now, I revert back to the agency problem in which the self-monitoring efforts are not
observed by the principal. The observable effort benchmark is already informative about
how the optimal policy would be different from the optimal policy given in previous case.
As it will be clear shortly, the corresponding optimal delegation decision is different over
the lower end of the state space, and this will significantly alter the transitional dynamics
as well as the long-run outcome.
The description of the problem is barely changed. The cost is not included in the objec-
tive function; however, the incentive constraint and the promise keeping constraint remain
the same. Following the exposition of the previous section, the problem is decomposed
into two conditional sub-problems. The corresponding value functions are now denoted by
V˜, V˜N , and V˜N .
For the maximal possible promised utility of the agent, permanent approval without any
monitoring is still the only feasible policy, hence the optimal one. Therefore, V˜ (v) = V˜N (v),
and γ˜(v) = 0. On the contrary, for the minimal expected utility of the agent, permanent
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rejection is not the optimal policy, unlike the previous case. The principal can do better by
requesting self-monitoring. To see this, note that the incentive constraint is still binding, and
the equations (1.3) and (1.2) are still valid. Then by plugging U = 0 into these equations,
one can get:
U˜ns(0) = −(1− δ)v
δ
x˜ns(0),
U˜s(0) =
1− δ
δµλ
c− (1− δ)v
δ
x˜s(0).
Clearly, x˜ns is equal to 0, since the continuation utility U˜ns(0) cannot be negative.
On the other hand, after a self-disclosure, one possible policy is to set x˜s(0) = 0 and
U˜s(0) =
1−δ
δµλ c.
16 Therefore:
V˜D(0) ≥ δµλV˜ ((1− δ)c
δµλ
) > 0
Therefore no delegation cannot be the optimal policy at the minimal promised utility,
as it would require V (0) = 0. This situation alters the structure of the optimal policy over
the lower end of the state space.
On the other hand, there is still a neighborhood of the maximal promised utility v over
which no delegation is an optimal policy. In the outside of this neighborhood, V˜N is always
strictly smaller than V˜ , hence the probability of delegation is always strictly positive. In
other words, not requesting self-monitoring can be an optimal policy only if the promised
utility of the agent is sufficiently large. The following lemma summarizes these findings.
And its proof follows the same logic used in the proof of lemma 1.3.
Lemma 1.5. There is a critical value 0 < U˜N < v, such that:
i) V˜ (U) = V˜N (U) if and only if U ∈ [U˜N , v], moreover x˜n = 1 in this region.
16Setting x˜s = 0 is optimal at U = 0 as it will become clear shortly.
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ii) V˜ is linear over [U˜N , v].
Proof. See appendix A.6
Using the same arguments provided in the previous section, one can show that the
linearity of V˜ carries over to a larger interval, which is denoted by [U˜D, v] where U˜D =
U˜N−(1−δ)v
δ . The slope of V changes at U˜D, and the equality V˜ (U˜D) = V˜D(U˜D) holds.
17
Over the interval [0, U˜D], delegation is optimal for the principal. It is already known
that this statement is valid for the boundaries of the interval, and the rest follows from the
same idea used in lemma 1.4. The following diagram summarizes the findings so far.
0 U˜D U˜N v
V˜ = V˜NV˜ = V˜D
Linear V˜
Figure 1.7: Illustration of the partition of the state space depending on the optimality of
the delegation decisions, when the principal does not care about monitoring costs.
Due to the linearity of the value function over the interval [U˜D, v], there are many
different possible ways to specify the optimal policy. The policy the paper focuses on
assumes that whenever the promised utility reaches to this region, the principal randomizes
between V˜N (v) and V˜D(U˜D) with a properly chosen delegation probability. This completes
the characterization of the optimal delegation decisions.
When it comes to the approval decisions, it is known that, if the agent is not asked to
monitor himself, the project will be approved directly, hence x˜n is equal to 1. To achieve a
17The reasons for the latter are twofold. First, it is already known that V˜ (U˜D) > V˜N (U˜D) from the
previous result, hence γ˜ = 0 cannot be optimal. Second, there is no neighborhood of U˜D over which V˜
′ stays
constant, hence a randomization cannot be optimal either.
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complete characterization of the approval decisions, one also needs to describe the optimal
values of x˜s, and x˜ns. For this, it is sufficient to focus on the interval [0, U˜D], where γ˜ = 1
is the optimal decision.
Recall that the approval decision and the promised continuation utility are substitutes
of each other, after both self-disclosure and no self-disclosure. More precisely, ∀U ∈ [0, U˜D]:
(1− δ)x˜sv + δU˜s = U + (1− δ)c
µλ
(1− δ)x˜nsv + δU˜ns = U
In the previous section, it was asserted that the principal employs the efficient decision
making as long as the resulting continuation utilities are feasible. Bounds of the derivative
of the value function was the main driving force behind this result. It was shown that
the gain from increasing xns always dominates any possible loss due to the reduction on
Uns. Similarly, the gain from decreasing xs always dominates any possible loss due to the
amplification on Us.
Here in this case, there is an obvious lower bound for V˜ ′, which is equal to the slope of
the benchmark value function V˜ ∗ over [w, v]. And the logic given in the previous paragraph
leads to the same conclusion for x˜s. On the contrary, the slope of V˜
∗ over the region [0, w]
does not necessarily constitute an upper bound for V˜ ′, since the equality V˜ ∗(0) = V˜ (0) does
not hold. As a result, it is not clear whether or not the principal always prefers to set x˜ns
as high as possible.
In principle, V˜ ′ can be sufficiently large, when U is sufficiently close to 0; and, hence,
the gain from a higher continuation utility might dominate the gain from higher x˜ns. Yet,
it turns out that the trade-off is still in favor of x˜ns. In other words, as long as it is feasible,
setting x˜ns = 1 is optimal. Otherwise x˜ns will be set such that the continuation utility hits
its minimum.
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Finally, the value function V˜ is strictly concave over the delegation region [0, U˜D].
Therefore there is a unique state variable U˜∗ ∈ [0, U˜D] maximizing V˜ . And the value of
U˜D is larger than U¯ , hence incorrect approval following a self-disclosure takes place with
positive probability in the optimal policy. The following theorem, which constitutes the
main result of this section, summarizes these findings:
Proposition 1.2. The value function V˜ is strictly concave over [0, U˜D], and attains its
maximum at some U˜∗ ∈ (0, U˜D). At t = 0, the agent is promised the expected utility of U˜∗,
and the monitoring is delegated to him.
As long as the state variable stays in the interval [0, U˜D], the principal requests self-
monitoring with probability 1. The approval decisions and the transition rule satisfies:
• x˜s(U) = max{0,
U+
(1−δ)c
µλ −δv
(1−δ)v }, and x˜ns(U) = min{1, U(1−δ)v}, ∀U ∈ [0, U˜D].
• U˜s(U) = min{v, Uδ + (1−δ)cδµλ }, and U˜ns(U) = max{0, Uδ − (1−δ)vδ }, ∀U ∈ [0, U˜D].
When the state variable reaches to (U˜D, v], there will be a randomized delegation decision;
the monitoring is delegated to agent with probability γ˜ = v−U
v−U˜D . If the realized randomized
decision is:
• Delegation: (x˜s, x˜ns) = (
U+
(1−δ)c
µλ −δv
(1−δ)v , 1), and (U˜s, U˜ns) = (v,
U
δ − (1−δ)vδ )
• No delegation: x˜n = 1, and U˜n = v
Proof. See appendix A.7.
The dynamic properties of this policy are remarkably different now. Particularly, there
is no permanent rejection state, and hence the agent is never blacklisted unlike the previous
case. Instead, there is a state of probation, which occurs when the agent’s promised utility
reaches to its minimum. At this state, the project will be rejected for sure, yet the agent
is still asked to monitor himself. This probation state keeps repeating itself until a self
disclosure takes place. After a self-disclosure the agent is promoted to a higher promised
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utility, and get out of probation for one period. Leaving the probation state today does not
rule out the possibility of facing it again in the future.
Eventually, a terminal phase will be reached where there is no information acquisition
anymore and all the projects are directly approved. This happens when the agent’s promised
utility reaches its maximum. The following corollary summarizes these implications of the
optimal policy.
Corollary 1.3. The optimal policy has a two-phase structure.
i) The initial phase is where the agent is always asked to monitor himself. Acquired
information is not always used for the current approval decision. The policy reaches
to a probationary state with positive probability during this phase. In this probationary
state, the content of the information will be completely ignored for the current approval
decision. This probation state keeps repeating itself until a self-disclosure takes place.
The duration of this stage is stochastic and depends on the outcomes of the self-
monitoring.
ii) The terminal phase is no-delegation phase. Once it is reached there is no informa-
tion acquisition anymore, and all the remaining approval decisions are uninformed.
Projects are directly approved in this phase. This phases starts when the promised
utility of the agent reaches its maximum.
The distribution of inefficiencies over time constitutes an important divergence from the
previous case, and from the existing papers. The inefficiencies are not entirely back-loaded
now. Especially, the second type of inefficiencies arise in a stochastic nonconsecutive order
until the second phase of the policy is reached. To this respect, the efficiency will be gained
and lost throughout time.
The eventual outcome described above is not specific to the policy that I focus. Since
the inequality U¯ ≥ U˜D is satisfied, the permanent approval is the eventual outcome of all
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optimal policies. The following corollary points out this issue.
Corollary 1.4. In any optimal policy, there is a unique long-run outcome featuring per-
manent approval of the projects without any request of self-monitoring. Therefore, in the
long-run, the agent is whitelisted with probability 1.
1.5 Limited Commitment
So far,I assumed that the principal has full commitment power in that she can commit
to any incentive compatible policy. In this section I relax this assumption and consider a
case where the principal’s commitment power is limited. More precisely, I assume that she
cannot commit to any policy with a negative continuation value. Precisely, at the beginning
of each period, she needs to have a non-negative value in expectation. She still has within
period commitment power and can fulfill any specified within period randomization. In
other words, the limited commitment structure I impose does not rule out the possibility of
having a negative realized value for some periods. For expositional convenience, I will call
the model with full commitment power as the baseline model and denote the corresponding
value function by VB afterwards. Clearly, when the expected social cost of the projects is
less then their economic benefits, i.e. µ ≤ v, an optimal policy for the baseline model is
also optimal in this limited commitment environment. This stems from the fact that the
continuation valuation of the principal never becomes negative in this case, i.e. VB(U) ≥ 0
for every U ∈ [0, v].
On the contrary, when the expected cost is higher then the economic benefits, i.e.
µ > v, baseline policy can not be an optimal policy. Principal’s continuation value becomes
negative with positive probability, as in the outcome of whitelisting. She cannot promise
the maximal utility to agent in this limited commitment environment. As a result, the
optimal policy differs from the one of baseline model. From now on, the analysis will be
based on the case µ > v.
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For a given history, the continuation of an optimal policy must also be optimal con-
dition on the agent’s expected utility. Moreover it maintains a non-negative value for the
principal by definition. Therefore, it is still possible to represent principal’s problem within
a stationary form. The distinction is that the state space is endogenous and will be a proper
subset of [0, v]. In describing this endogenous state space, the most prominent property one
shall look for is the non-negativity of the corresponding value function for each value in-
side the state space. Indeed, the state space will be the maximum subset of [0, v] that is
satisfying this property. This is due to the fact that an optimal policy conditional on a
specific state space is also a feasible policy under any larger state space. Hence enlarging
state space without hurting the non-negativity can only improve the principal’s policy.
In this regard, it is not hard to conclude that the state space is an interval and contains
the utility level 0. Then, it is sufficient to find out the maximal utility Umax that the
principal can promise to the agent without violating the limited commitment constraint.
This would complete the characterization of the endogenous state space [0, Umax]. However,
one needs to be sure about the existence of such a value. To this end, I define some auxiliary
objects. First of all, for a given value W < v, it is known that the Bellman equation that is
defined over [0,W ] is guaranteed to have a solution since Blackwell sufficiency conditions are
satisfied. Let VW be the corresponding value function arising from the solution of Bellman
equation.
Lemma 1.6. When principal has a limited commitment power, there exists a utility level
Umax which is equal to the maximum utility that the principal can promise the agent in an
optimal policy. Its value is given by:
Umax = sup{W | VW (W ) ≥ 0}.
Moreover, the value function arising from an optimal policy satisfies:
V = VUmax , and V (Umax) = 0.
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The value of Umax strictly decreases with µ, conditional on having an optimal policy inducing
self-monitoring.
Proof. See appendix A.8
The proof of this result, first indicates that the existence of Umax is guaranteed. Then
it is argued that VW (W ) is continuous, and hence the resulting value function always takes
non-negative values over the interval [0, Umax]. The fact that the value of the principal at
the maximal promised utility is equal to 0 follows from the continuity of VW (W ). Finally,
the proof points out an important observation in order to conclude the monotonicity of
Umax with respect to µ. Incentive compatibility of an optimal policy is independent of
the prior belief. Therefore an optimal policy at the maximal utility for some prior is also
incentive compatible and brings a higher value to principal for any other smaller prior.
Then by using the arguments provided in the earlier sections one can conclude the
following result.
Proposition 1.3. When principal has a limited commitment power and the expected so-
cial cost of a project is larger than its value, whitelisting never appears in an equilibrium.
Conditional on having an informative optimal policy,
• If principal internalizes the cost of self-monitoring, then the agent gets blacklisted
eventually in the optimal contract.
• If principal does not internalize the cost of self-monitoring, then the optimal policy
never reaches to a stable outcome and fluctuates over time.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies a regulatory system that incorporates self-monitoring. More precisely, it
explores the behavior of regulators in environments where there is a significant uncertainty
about the activities that the regulated agent carries on. The regulator, in an efficient
regulatory regime, would like to use the information of the agent, who is superior in acquiring
information. In order to incentivize the agent to acquire unfavorable information about his
own activities, the regulator uses continuation values arising from future regulatory behavior
as an incentive device.
I show that, when the regulator has full commitment power, self-monitoring can only
be sustained in an initial phase of the optimal policy. During this phase, the agent is
promised a higher continuation utility (in the form of future regulatory approval) each time
he discloses “bad news”; otherwise, he is downgraded to a lower continuation utility in order
to encourage him to acquire information. The eventual outcome crucially depends on the
regulator’s preferences over the cost of self-monitoring. If she internalizes this cost, both
whitelisting and blacklisting are possible long-run outcomes; otherwise, whitelisting is the
only long run outcome.
When the regulator has limited commitment power in that she can only commit to
policies with non-negative continuation values, the results are remarkably different. When
the expected social costs of the projects are larger than their economic yields, the policy
does not feature whitelisting anymore. Furthermore, it is possible to sustain self-monitoring
over the long-run in this case.
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Chapter 2
Product Upgrades and Posted Prices
2.1 Introduction
The literature on durable good monopolies assumes a population of forward looking buy-
ers with heterogeneous valuations for a unique product that a monopolist sells over time.
Buyers, that are strategically timing their purchase decisions, have unit demand for the
product, and hence leave the market after purchasing. In this general framework, there are
two counterbalancing factors governing the pricing decision of the monopolist. First, to be
able to sell the product to the agents with lower valuations, the monopolist must decrease
the price of the good over time. Second, customers with high valuations might delay their
purchases since they predict that the monopolist will decrease the price over time. Hence,
decreasing prices is beneficial as it allows the firm to capture the surplus from the demand
of the agents with lower valuations, but at the same time it is costly as it causes a delay in
the purchases.
The pioneering paper of the literature, Stokey (1979), shows that, if the firm can commit
to a price path before starting to sell, then the optimal price path is constant and equal to
the static monopoly price. Consequently, all the purchases take place at the beginning of
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the sales and so there is no delay. This result is significant as it asserts that the time is not
used to discriminate over buyers with different valuations, which would have occurred with
a decreasing price path and delayed purchases.
In this paper, we turn our attention to the optimal pricing problem when a new version
of the existing good is expected to arrive at some point in the future. In contrast to
one of the main assumptions of the existing literature, durable goods, for many real life
examples, do not persistently stay in the market. Rather, newer and better functioning
versions are taking place of the older ones over time. Technology companies such as Apple,
Intel, Samsung, and Microsoft are good examples for this. This situation does not hurt the
durability of the product that is replaced as customers can still use it after the new version
is launched. However it alters the consumer’s preferences as the newer product might offer
more benefits. In such an environment, the structure of the buyers’ incentives would be
different than the ones in the classical framework. In particular, a buyer does not necessarily
leave the market after purchasing a version of the good. He may rather prefer to stay to
purchase the newer version as well when it is launched. Or he may abandon to purchase the
current version to purchase the newer one. That is to say that the price path of a version
of the good not only affects its own sales, but also the sales of the other versions.
We consider a monopolist which is selling two consecutive versions of the same good,
with a restriction that it only sells the most current version at a given period. We assume
that it has full commitment power, and can commit to a price path for both versions of the
good at the beginning. The monopolist is initially endowed with the first version and the
upgrade will take place over time. The timing of the upgrade is not a choice variable in this
paper, rather we take it as exogenously given.
The analysis is divided into two parts depending on the specification of the arrival
process of the new version of the good. In the first part, the arrival time is stochastic
and follows a Poisson process. The optimal price path is shown to be constant for both
versions of the good (at different levels) and the price level for the second version of the
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good is independent from the realized arrival time. Consequently, there are no delays in any
purchases. Any purchase of the first version occurs immediately at the beginning, and any
purchase of the second version occurs as soon as it arrives into the market. This result is in
line with Stokey (1979) as it also suggests that the time is not used as a tool to discriminate
over buyers with different valuations. Stationarity is the main reason for this result to carry
over to our setting.
In the second part, we considered the case in which the arrival of the newer version
occurs at a commonly known certain date. This non-stationary environment comes with
a cost of intractability, and to overcome this, we assume a binary type space for buyers’
valuations. It is shown that, in this case, a decreasing price path is possible for some
parameters and this gives rise to delayed purchases. That is to say that the time might be
used as a discriminatory tool when the arrival of the new version occurs at a commonly
known certain date.
Unlike the existing literature on durable good pricing with full commitment power, in
our environment, a sale mechanism with posted prices is not an optimal mechanism. Strictly
speaking, the anonymous structure of the posted prices (The sales of the new version of the
good cannot be conditioned on the first version sales under the regime of posted prices.),
comes at a cost for the monopolist. The optimal selling mechanism, on the other hand,
requires the monopolist to bundle both versions of the good and selling them only together.
More precisely, in this optimal sales mechanism there exists a group of consumers that are
purchasing both versions of the good, and the rest of the consumers does not purchase
anything. The resulting allocation of this policy cannot be implemented with posted price
path which is anonymous by definition.
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2.1.1 Literature Review
Our paper mainly fits into the literature of durable good pricing with full commitment
power. The classic reference is Stokey (1979), which shows that the optimal price path is
constant and equal to the static monopoly price.1 Therefore all the buyers either purchase
immediately or leave without any purchase, hence the time is not used by monopolist to
discriminate over buyers with different valuations.
In our paper, there are both favoring and contradicting results with this mainstream
result. We show that, under some circumstances, the optimal posted price path may be
decreasing over time. Some other papers have also shown that the optimal posted price
path, under full commitment power, may fluctuate over time. In particular, Board (2008)
shows that, in a setting with stochastic population, if there is demand heterogeneity over the
incoming population of buyers, then the optimal price path might fluctuate over time. This
leads some buyers to delay their purchases, hence time is an effective discriminatory tool
in such a situation. Another important paper showing a fluctuating price path is Garrett
(2012) in which the flow valuations of buyers are stochastic due to the private circumstances.
The environment is stationary, as neither the value distributions of the entering buyers nor
the stochastic process governing the valuations are time dependent, yet the optimal price
path is fluctuating over time. Like our paper, in Garrett (2012), the posted prices is not
an optimal selling mechanism. The optimal mechanism involves selling option contracts to
purchase the good at future dates. However, the source of the inefficiency regarding the
posted prices is different than the one in this paper.
In addition, our paper is also related to the literature on dynamic auctions.2 A common
feature of this literature is that there is a certain time period T, until when the seller
must sell his multi-unit indivisible goods. The buyers are entering into and leaving from
1Actually optimal price path is not unique, there are infinitely many price paths resulting with the same
allocation. The important thing is that the initial price level is equal to the static monopoly price and the
price level never falls below that.
2Bergemann and Said (2011) is a good survey about dynamic auctions.
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the market over time. Pai and Vohra (2008), also Board and Skrzypacz (2010) are good
examples. They first define the optimal allocations, which follows a simple index rule, and
then show how to implement this via monetary transfers. The main difference of our paper
from this literature is that, in ours, the number of goods that the seller can sell is not
limited whereas in dynamic auction literature the seller is endowed with a certain number
of goods.
There are couple of other topics incorporating some features that are conceptually
related to ours. The literature of planned obsolescence is one of them. The monopolist
that is selling a single good in a dynamic setting strategically arranges the lifetime of the
durable good. There are benefits from producing goods with a shorter lifetime as it leads
consumers to repurchase again. Bulow (1986) is a good example of this literature. There is
an old literature investigating the effect of vintage capital on the aggregate growth of the
economy. The basic story of these papers is that, in each period, the machines of production
are being improved because of technological progress. And firms are deciding how much
to invest in replacing old machines with the newer ones. An example of this literature is
Benhabib and Rustichini (1991). Finally, there is a literature regarding the R&D planning
of durable good monopolies, see for example Swan (1970), Fishman and Rob (2000). The
main concern of these papers is to understand the product development decisions of the
firms given a non-strategic buyers side, which is represented with a demand function on the
quality of the durable good.
2.2 Model
Time, t ∈ [0,∞), is continuous and r is the common discount factor. There is a monopoly
selling a durable good, an initial version of which exists in the marketplace at the beginning
of the time (t=0), and a newer version will eventually take the place of the existing one.
The process governing the arrival of the newer version will be described later. The firm
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sells only the most current version of the good at a given time; in other words, when the
new version arrives the firm is no longer able to sell the earlier version. The cost of the
production is normalized to 0 for both versions of the good.
On the demand side, there is a unit mass of buyers that are heterogeneous in terms of
their valuations. They can consume at most one unit of the good at a time, and all of them
are having a higher value for the newer version of the good. Moreover, we assume that the
ratio of valuations for two versions of the good is same for all buyers. In particular, there
is a constant β > 1 such that, a type x buyer has a flow utility x and and a flow utility βx
from consuming the first and the second versions of the good respectively. Buyers’ types
follows a continuously differentiable distribution function F (x) over the unit interval [0, 1].
F (x) has full support and a corresponding continuous density functionf(x). The buyers are
strategically deciding the time of their purchase(s), and also which version(s) of the good
to buy. The good is durable and so a buyer may use it forever after purchasing. However,
since the flow utility of the newer version is higher, one may want to replace the old one
with the newer one. Therefore, buyers do not necessarily leave the market upon purchase,
unlike the existing literature. On the other hand, version-wise strategic delays of purchases
may appear.Precisely, a buyer might prefer to wait for the arrival of the new version rather
than buying the current version of the good.
The monopolist commits to a price path for both versions of the good at t = 0. The
price path is consisting of a price level for the first version of the good for each time until
the arrival of the new version and also a price level for the new version of the good for each
time after its arrival contingent on its arrival time. Note that a posted price that is defined
in this way indirectly implies anonymity: the monopolist has to charge the same price for
every buyer that is purchasing at the same. In other words, the possibility of conditioning
the new version sales to the buyers’ ownership status of the old version is ruled out. This
puts a restriction on the monopolist and hence the resulting optimal posted prices will
not be the optimal mechanism. Nevertheless, as a benchmark, we also analyzed the case
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without anonymity. The arrival process of the new version is modeled in two different ways:
2.2.1 Stochastic Arrival
The second version of the good arrives stochastically with a Poisson arrival process at rate
λ, the realized arrival time is denoted by T. The price path that the firm commits at t = 0
is contingent on T . More precisely, it is of the form:
(
{pt}t∈[0,∞),
{{pTt }t∈[0,∞)}T∈[0,∞)).
The first term is the single price path for the first good, since the arrival is stochastic it is
defined over t ∈ [0,∞). The second term is the price path for the newer version. Note that
there is a different price path for every possible arrival time. In particular, conditional on
the arrival time T, the term pTt is the price level of the second version of the good at T + t,
i.e. t period after the arrival T .
Each buyer decides whether and when to purchase the first version of the good, also
whether and when to purchase the second version of the good for each possible arrival time
T . More precisely, buyer x’s decisions are of the form:
(
tx, {tx,T }T∈(0,∞)
)
. The term tx
is the purchase time of the first version of the good; hence if realized T is less than tx,
then it means that the buyer does not buy the first version. Therefore, if tx = ∞, then
it means that the buyer never purchases the first version of the good. The term tx,T , on
the other hand, specifies how long after the realized arrival time T, buyer x purchases the
second version. Hence, the corresponding calendar time of the purchase is T + tx,T . Again
if tx,T =∞ then the agent does not purchase the second version if the arrival occurs at T .
The utility type x buyer, denoted by U(x):
U(x) =
∫ tx
0
e−λTλ
(∫ ∞
T+tx,T
e−rtβxdt− e−r(T+tx,T )pTtx,T
)
dT
+
∫ ∞
tx
e−λTλ
(∫ T+tx,T
tx
e−rtxdt+
∫ ∞
T+tx,T
e−rtβxdt − e−rtxptx − e−r(T+tx,T )pTtx,T
)
dT
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The first line captures the contingencies in which arrival occurs before tx. The utility
in these cases depends only on the timing of the purchase of the newer version. For each
arrival time T ∈ [0, tx], the corresponding utility is the expression inside the parenthesis.
Then, after weighting them with probability of arrival at T(i.e with e−λTλ), we integrate
it to get the expectation. The second line accounts for the arrivals occurring after the
purchase of the first version, where the expression inside the parenthesis represents the
utility corresponding to a specific arrival time T ∈ [tx,∞). In each contingency the agent
acquires a flow utility x until the purchase of the new version, and βx afterwards. We also
discount the payments and integrate them after weighting with the probability of arrival.
Note that, if tx = ∞, i.e the agent never purchases the first generation of the good, then
the second line is irrelevant; similarly if tx = 0 then the first line is irrelevant.
The profit of the firm, denoted by Π:
Π =
∫ 1
0
e−λtxe−rtxptxf(x)dx+
∫ ∞
0
e−λTλ
(∫ 1
0
e−r(T+tx,T )pTtx,T f(x)dx
)
dT.
First and second terms are the corresponding profits from the sales of first and second
versions of the good respectively. For the first term, the discounted payment of each type of
buyer is integrated over the type space. To discount the payment of type x buyer (i.e ptx),
we multiply it by e−rtx and also by the probability of the event that the arrival does not
occur until tx, which is e
−λtx . For the second term, the inner integral is the level of profit
resulting from a specific arrival time T; and the outside integral takes their expectations
over possible arrival times.
2.2.2 Deterministic Arrival
In the second part of the paper, we assume that the arrival occurs at a certain time period
T , which is commonly known. In this case, the monopolist commits to a single price path:
{pt}t∈[0,∞), where pt is the price level of the first(second) version of the good at time t if
61
t < T (t ≥ T ). To the sequel, we characterize the optimal posted prices for both of these
arrival processes.
2.3 Optimal Posted Prices: Stochastic Arrival
Before delving into the main concern of the paper, we consider some benchmarks to de-
velop a better understanding of the general framework. First we illustrate the canonical
durable good monopoly pricing problem, in which there is no product upgrade. The sec-
ond benchmark considers the case where there is a product upgrade but the monopolist is
not restricted to use posted prices. It can rather use any selling mechanism including the
non-anonymous ones.
2.3.1 Benchmark I: Canonical Durable Good Monopoly
This benchmark is analyzed in Stokey (1979).3 There is only one version of the durable
good staying in the market forever. It is a special case of our model in several directions. For
example, we can get this canonical model from ours by assuming that λ = 0, i.e. the newer
version of the good never arrives; or by assuming β = 1, i.e. there is no distinction between
the first and the second versions of the good for buyers. The monopolist chooses a unique
price path {pt}t∈[0,∞), and agents decide the timing of their purchases tx. Corresponding
utility of the agent x is:
U(x) =
∫ ∞
tx
e−rtxdt− e−rtxptx = e−rtx(
x
r
− ptx), (2.1)
3Here unlike the analysis presented in Stokey (1979) we follow the general mechanism design approach.
We first characterize the incentive constraints and then rewrite the firm’s problem as an optimal allocation
problem.
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and the profit of the firm is:
Π =
∫ 1
0
e−rtxptxf(x)dx.
Since the monopolist has full commitment power, his problem is a mechanism design
problem. Thanks to the revelation principle we can restrict attention to the direct mech-
anisms. In particular, the firm asks agents to report their types, and then decides their
allocations, i.e. a purchase time tx, and a payment level px in an incentive compatible way.
The payment for the agents that are purchasing the good at the same time must be the
same, otherwise truthful reporting would not be incentive compatibility. Therefore, for each
allocation time there is a corresponding payment level, i.e. we can denote the payments by
pt. The following Lemma, illustrating the nature of the incentive constraints, is an adapted
version of the fundamental IC Lemma corresponding to the durable good pricing framework.
Lemma 2.1. The direct mechanism is incentive compatible iff:
i) tx is non-increasing with x.
ii) U(x) = U(0) +
1
r
∫ x
0
e−rtx˜dx˜
Proof. See appendix B.1.
Lemma 2.1 states that a higher type will not purchase the good at a later time than
a lower type. It also asserts that the derivative of U(x) is proportional to the effective
discount (1re
−rtx). Since these conditions are both necessary and sufficient for incentive
compatibility, the monopolist’s problem can be written as:
max
{pt}t∈[0,∞),{tx}x∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
e−rtxptxf(x)dx s.t · tx is non-increasing with x.
· U(x) = U(0) + 1
r
∫ x
0
e−rtx˜dx˜ ∀x
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We can further simplify the above problem, and get rid of the price terms in it. To this
respect, by using equation (2.1) and Lemma 2.1 we get:
e−rtxptx = e
−rtx x
r
− 1
r
∫ x
0
e−rtx˜dx˜.4
Therefore, the profit of the firm is equal to:
Π =
∫ 1
0
e−rtxptxf(x)dx =
∫ 1
0
(−rtx x
r
− 1
r
∫ x
0
e−rtx˜dx˜
)
f(x)dx.
After integrating it by parts we get the new form of the problem as:
max
{tx}x∈[0,1]
1
r
∫ 1
0
e−rtx
(
x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
)
f(x)dx s.t tx is non-increasing. (2.2)
Note that, this problem consists of only the terms tx’s. Therefore, its solution gives us the
optimal allocations, and then by using the incentive constraints we get the corresponding
price path inducing the optimal allocations. The term (x− 1−F (x)f(x) ) is referred as the virtual
value of type x, and as can be seen the monopolist’s problem boils down to maximization of
the integral of the discounted virtual valuations. The optimal solution of the above problem
is of the following form:
tx =
 0 if x ∈ [x
?, 1]
∞ otherwise
In words, there is a threshold type x? such that all the buyers above this threshold are
acquiring the good immediately, and the rest of the buyers are never getting the good. If the
virtual valuation function, x− 1−F (x)f(x) , is increasing in x, then the threshold x? would be the
minimum value of x at which the virtual value function is equal to 0. This is rather intuitive
since the monopolist’s problem boils down to maximization of the integral of discounted
virtual valuations. For a given type x, if the virtual value is positive(negative) then tx =
4In optimal mechanism U(0) = 0, hence we can omit it.
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0(tx = ∞) and this does not violate the monotonicity constraint. If virtual valuation
function is non-monotonic, the optimal allocations follows a cutoff rule with immediate
allocations as well. But in this case the monopolist will choose x? in such a way that the
integral of the virtual valuation function above x? is maximized. This does not mean that all
the buyers of a type higher than x? have a positive virtual valuation though. An important
thing to note here is that this allocation rule is exactly the same with the optimal allocation
rule of the static monopoly.
Now, we need to find an optimal price path inducing this optimal allocation rule. Since
U(0) = 0 in an optimal mechanism, U(x?) = e−rtx? (x
?
r − ptx? ) = U(0) + 1r
∫ x?
0 e
−rtx˜dx˜ = 0,
which requires ptx? = p0 =
x?
r . Therefore an optimal price path to implement the optimal
allocation is a constant price path at level x
?
r . The importance of this price level is that
the buyer with type x? is indifferent between purchasing and not.5 The significance of this
result is that, for the dynamic setting, the optimal price is constant and equal to the static
monopoly price. Therefore the monopolist does not use the time to discriminate over the
buyers with heterogeneous valuations.
2.3.2 Benchmark II: Product Upgrade without Anonymous Prices
In this benchmark, the arrival process is a stationary stochastic process, but the monop-
olist is not restricted to use posted prices as the selling mechanism. More precisely, the
monopolist can choose a mechanism in which he can condition the second version sales on
the sales of the first version. The direct mechanism, in this case, contains a joint allocation
rule for both versions of the goods and a corresponding payment for each type of buyer.
The payment rule is denoted by P (x) for a given reported type x and is to be paid at time
t = 0.6 Allocations for type x buyer are tx, and {tx,T }T∈[0,∞), which are defined in the same
5Even though the optimal allocation is unique, there are infinitely many price paths that can implement
it. The important thing is to fix the initial price level to x
?
r
and always keep it above or equal to the initial
level.
6Any dynamic payment rule with a present value equal to P (x) would be an equivalent to this payment
rule. Hence there is no loss of generality here.
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way as before. Then the utility of the agent x, U(x), can be written as:
U(x) = Q(x)x− P (x).
where
Q(x) =
∫ tx
0
e−λTλ e−r(T+tx,T )dT +
∫ ∞
tx
e−λTλ
(∫ T+tx,T
tx
e−rtdt+ β
∫ ∞
T+tx,T
e−rtdt
)
dT
The term, Q(x), can be considered as the total allocation that is resulting from the al-
locations of both versions of the good, and it can only take values from [0, r+βλr(r+λ) ]. Its
maximum value is acquired by arranging tx = 0 and tx,T = 0 ∀T (immediate allocation of
both versions), and its minimum value is acquired by arranging tx = ∞ and tx,T = ∞ ∀T
(no allocation of any versions of the good). Following the same steps as in the previous
benchmark we get:
Lemma 2.2. The direct mechanism without anonymity restriction is incentive compatible
if and only if:
i) Q(x) is non-decreasing
ii) U(x) = U(0) +
∫ x
0
Q(x˜)dx˜
Proof. Follows exactly the same steps with the proof of lemma 2.1.
Then, the monopolist’s problem can be written as:
max
{Q(x)}x∈[0,1]
1
r
∫ 1
0
Q(x)
(
x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
)
f(x)dx s.t Q(x) is non-decreasing with x.
The solution will be analogous to the one of the previous benchmark. In particular, there
exists a threshold x?, which is equal to the threshold that is defined in the first bench-
mark, such that for all the buyers above(below) this threshold the value of Q(x) is maxi-
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mized(minimized). More precisely, the optimal allocation rule is:
i)tx = tx,T = 0 ∀x ∈ [x?, 1]
ii)tx = tx,T =∞ ∀x ∈ [0, x?)
In the optimal mechanism there is no buyer acquiring only one version of the good. In
other words, the monopolist is bundling two generations of the good and selling them only
together. This allocation rule resembles some selling strategies that we observe in real life.
For instance, some companies, like Microsoft, offer discounts to their customers in case they
have an old version and want to upgrade to a newer one. Here we see an extreme version
of this policy in the sense that the price of the second version for those who already own
the first version of the good is equal to zero.
The payment scheme inducing this allocation requires all the agents in [x?, 1] to pay
the same amount since all of them have the same Q(x). This payment is equal to x? r+βλr(r+λ) ,
which leaves the marginal agent x? indifferent between purchasing and not. This mechanism
is the optimal selling mechanism. However, it is impossible to implement this allocation
rule by using posted prices. To see this, suppose there is a contingent price path that
can implement it anonymously. Then, under these prices, marginal return from the second
version purchase for agent x? is larger than or equal to the price at the corresponding time
period. But since his marginal benefit is equal to (β−1)x?, the agent x?−, for  sufficiently
small, would prefer to purchase the second version as well. Hence we get a contradiction.
2.3.3 Sales With Posted Prices: Anonymity
Here, the focus is on the characterization of the optimal posted prices, which is anonymous
by definition. In this case, buyer x that is owning the first version of the good and the buyer
(β−1)x that is not owning the first version of the good will have the same marginal benefit
from the newer version of the good. Therefore a mechanism corresponding to the posted
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prices must treat these buyers in the same manner for the allocation of the second version
of the good. Therefore a direct mechanism will have some further constraints in this case.
For this reason, we rather use a different approach, which we call as ”two-step mechanism”,
in which the allocations of each version of the good follows independent reporting stages.
First, we define the following concept:
Definition 2.1. The Effective type of buyer x at realized arrival time T, is equal to his
marginal flow utility from the purchase of the second version of the good. Particularly, it is
equal to βx if he does not own the first version and it is equal to (β − 1)x if he does.
The buyers can use at most one unit of the good at a time. Therefore a buyer, owning
both versions of the good, uses only the current one as it gives more flow utility. Alterna-
tively, we can think of these two versions of the goods as if they are two separate goods
where both can be consumed at the same time, yet the flow utility of the second good is
equal to the effective type that we described above. From this point on we exploit this
interpretation in our analysis, as it simplifies the exposition. The two-step mechanism is
defined as:
Definition 2.2. The two-step mechanism is a mechanism in which buyers are asked to
report twice. First, at t = 0, buyers are asked to report their types. Then the allocations
and payments for the first version of the good are decided according to the first step reports.
Second, at the realized arrival time T, buyers are asked to report their effective types and
the allocations and the payments of the second version of the good are decided according to
the second step reports independent from the first step reports.
Finding the optimal mechanism among this class of mechanisms will give us the optimal
posted prices that the monopolist can commit. The mechanism structure here is different
than a direct mechanism, hence we slightly modify the notation specified earlier. For the
second step allocations, contingent on the realized arrival time T , the amount of time after
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which the effective type x purchases the second version of the good is denoted by tTx and
so the corresponding purchase time is T + tTx .
7 For the first step allocations the relevant
information is the initial type hence we keep the old notation, where tx is the purchase time
for type x.
The utility of an agent is has two parts, one for each step of the mechanism. Starting
with the second step, contingent on the arrival time T , discounted expected utility of the
effective type x calculated at T , denoted by V Tx :
V Tx =
∫ ∞
tTx
e−rtxdt− e−rtTx pTtTx = e
−rtTx
(x
r
− pTtTx
)
.
For the first step, the expected utility of buyer of type x, calculated at t=0, denoted by Vx:
Vx = e
−λtx
∫ ∞
tx
e−rtxdt− e−(r+λ)txptx = e−(r+λ)tx
(x
r
− ptx
)
.
Note that this expression reflects the alternative interpretation mentioned earlier. In par-
ticular, first version of the good is used forever after the purchase. Total utility of buyer x,
which is denoted by U(x), can be written as:
U(x) = Vx +
∫ tx
0
e−(r+λ)TλV TβxdT +
∫ ∞
tx
e−(r+λ)TλV T(β−1)xdT.
There is a crucial point that we better to stress out here: depending on the realized arrival
time the effective type and hence the resulting second step utility of the buyer changes. If
the arrival occurs before (after) tx, then the effective type of the agent x is βx ((β − 1)x)
and the corresponding second step utility is V Tβx (V
T
(β−1)x).
The profit of the firms , Π, has also two components:
Π =
∫ 1
0
e−rtxe−λtxptxf(x)dx +
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)TλΠTdT. (2.3)
7Note that the previous notation was tx,T , for type x. We now take the effective types as our basis rather
than the initial type.
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The first and second terms are accounting for the expected profits from the first and second
steps of the mechanism respectively. The term ΠT is the expected profit (calculated at time
T) conditional on the arrival time T, and it is equal to:
ΠT =
∫ 1
0
e−rt
T
x pTtTx
fT (x)dx.
The density fT (.) is the distribution of the effective types at the realized arrival time T
and it is depending on the allocation time tx as well as the realized T . To this respect, the
monopolist by arranging the allocations of the first step of the mechanism, can also alter
the distribution of the buyers’ marginal flow benefits from the newer version of the good.
To characterize the incentive constraints of the buyers, we need to consider both re-
porting stages separately. Since buyers are forward looking, while reporting in the initial
stage they will internalize the effect of their report on the second stage of the mechanism.
Therefore, we start our characterization of incentive constraints from the second stage.
Lemma 2.3. The second step of the mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if, ∀T
i) tTx is non-incraeasing with x
ii) V Tx = V
T
0 +
1
r
∫ x
0
e−rt
T
x˜ dx˜.
Proof. Follows from the same arguments with the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Assumption 2.1. λ ≤ rβ−1 .
Now we deal with the the incentive constraints of the first stage reports. Any deviation
from truthful reporting at this stage will also alter the optimal behavior in the second stage
as it changes the allocation time and hence the corresponding effective types.
Lemma 2.4. A two-step mechanism with an incentive compatible second stage, is also
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incentive compatible at the first stage only if:
i) tx is non-increasing with x
ii) Vx = V0 +
1
r
∫ x
0
e−(r+λ)tx˜d(x˜) − λ
∫ x
0
e−(r+λ)tx˜
∂tx˜
∂x
(
V tx˜βx˜ − V tx˜(β−1)x˜
)
dx˜
Proof. See appendix B.2.
There are four conditions in total, which are defined in lemma 2.3 and lemma 2.4,
that the optimal two step mechanism needs to satisfy. Two conditions given in Lemma
2.3 are necessary and sufficient for the second step incentive compatibility, whereas two
conditions given in Lemma 2.4 are just necessary for the first step incentive compatibility.8
To the sequel, we define the problem of the monopolist by only taking these four conditions
into account. As the latter two conditions are not sufficient for the first stage incentive
compatibility, the solution of our problem does not necessarily be the optimal solution that
we are looking for. However, the solution of our problem is shown to be incentive compatible,
therefore it is also the optimal solution that we are looking for. By using lemma 2.3, and
the fact that the monopolists sets V T0 = 0 in an optimal mechanism, we get:
e−rt
T
x pTtTx
= e−rt
T
x
x
r
− 1
r
∫ x
0
e−rt
T
x˜ dx˜.
Integrating this by parts gives us:
ΠT =
∫ 1
0
e−rt
T
x pTtTx
ft(x)dx =
1
r
∫ 1
0
e−rt
T
x (x− 1− FT (x)
fT (x)
)fT (x)dx.
By lemma 2.4, and the fact that V0 = 0 in an optimal mechanism, we get:
e−(r+λ)txptx = e
−(r+λ)tx x
r
− 1
r
∫ x
0
e−(r+λ)tx˜d(x˜) + λ
∫ x
0
e−(r+λ)tx˜
∂tx˜
∂x
(
V tx˜βx˜ − V tx˜(β−1)x˜
)
dx˜.
8Our conjecture is that they are also sufficient but since we do not need the sufficiency in the general
result we did not show it formally.
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Integrating this by parts gives us:
∫ 1
0
e−rtxe−λtxptxf(x)dx =
1
r
∫ 1
0
e−(r+λ)tx
(
x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
)
f(x)dx
+ λ
∫ 1
0
e−(r+λ)tx
∂tx
∂x
(1− F (x))
(
V txβx − V tx(β−1)x
)
dx
Therefore the monopolist’s optimization problem is:
max
{tx}x∈[0,1],{{tTx }x∈[0,1]}T>0
1
r
∫ 1
0
e−(r+λ)tx
(
x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
)
f(x)dx
+ λ
∫ 1
0
e−(r+λ)tx
∂tx
∂x
(1− F (x))
(
V txβx − V tx(β−1)x
)
dx
+
λ
r
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)T
(∫ 1
0
e−rt
T
x
(
x− 1− FT (x)
fT (x)
)
fT (x)dx
)
dT
subject to · tx is non-increasing in x
· tTx is non-increasing in x, ∀T ∈ [0,∞) (2.4)
We know that fT (.) is a function of {tx}x∈[0,1] for each realized arrival time T . Therefore,
while finding the optimal mechanism, one must take this indirect effect into account. The
first line of the objective function is the sum of the discounted virtual valuations corre-
sponding to sales of the first version of the good, and the third line is the analogous of it
corresponding to the second version of the good with an important distinction that the vir-
tual valuations are now based on the effective types and their distributions for every possible
arrival time T. The second line, which is always non-positive due to the monotonicity of tx
on x, can be interpreted as the cost of the inter-versional incentives for the monopolist. A
buyer, while purchasing the first version of the good, considers the possibility of the arrival
of the newer version of the good at the very moment. If he decides to purchase, his effective
type and hence his marginal willingness to pay for the newer version will change. These
inter-versional incentives is reflected at the term (V txβx − V tx(β−1)x) appearing in the second
line of above program.
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Note that, when λ→ 0 the second and the third terms of objective function in (2.4) is
equal to 0, and hence the problem (2.4) is equivalent to the problem (2.2). This is rather
intuitive, because when λ approaches to 0 there is no upgrade, and hence we get back to the
canonical model. Proposition 2.1 characterizes the optimal allocation rule of the monopolist
problem.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal solution to (2.4) consists of two cutoff values x1, and x2
such that:
tx =
 0 x ≥ x1∞ x < x1 tTx =
 0 x ≥ x2∞ x < x2 ∀T.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
To prove this result, we write an auxiliary optimization problem in which the second
line of the objective function is omitted. Then we show that the solution to this auxiliary
problem is also the solution to the problem 2.4. This follows from the fact that the second
line of the objective function is always non-positive due to the monotonicity of tx, and its
value is maximized, i.e. equal to 0, at the optimal solution of the auxiliary problem.
The important thing to note here is that introducing product upgrades into durable
good markets does not alter the main result of the canonical model, in the sense that the
monopolist still does not use time to discriminate over buyers. Even though the type of
buyers that are purchasing the good is different than the canonical durable good model,
we still have immediate allocations for both versions of the good. The optimal allocation
may incorporate different scenarios in terms of the version(s) of the goods that each type
of buyer is acquiring. The distribution function f(x) and the parameters β, λ, and r, are
crucial to decide the optimal values of x1, and x2, and hence on the individual allocations
of each buyer. However, here we do not precisely characterize the values of x1 and x2 for a
given set of parameters.
The monopolist can induce this allocation rule by setting a constant price level for
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both versions p1, and p2, since allocations are immediate.
9 Note that the price of the newer
version of the good is independent from the arrival time T . and is given by pTt = p2 =
x2
r ∀T, t. At this price level, the buyer with the effective type x2 is indifferent between
purchasing and not purchasing the second version, so that V Tx2 = 0. On the other hand, p1
is the price level at which the agent of type x1 is indifferent on his purchase decision of the
first version. In particular, if (β−1)x1 ≥ x2, then he is indifferent between purchasing both
versions of the good and purchasing only the second version. And if (β − 1)x1 < x2, then
he is indifferent between purchasing only the first version and purchasing only the second
version.
Remark 2.1. As it is mentioned earlier the solution of the optimization problem 2.4 does
not necessarily be the optimal solution of the monopolist’s problem, since Lemma 2.4 is
an “only if ” statement. However, the optimal allocation and the price path inducing this
optimal allocation is obviously incentive compatible, therefore it is also the solution that we
are interested in.
2.4 Deterministic Arrival
Now, the arrival of the newer version of the good occurs at a certain time T which is
commonly known from all of the participants of the market. We will show that, in this
non-stationary environment, the monopolist, depending on the values of the parameters,
might use time to discriminate over buyers with heterogeneous valuations.
To show the possibility of a decreasing optimal price path, we simplify our model by
assuming a binary type space for buyers with types H (High) and L (Low), where H > L.10
9Version-wise constant price path is not the only price path to implement the optimal allocation rule.
In particular, any non-decreasing contingent price path, satisfying p0 = p1, and p
T
0 = p2, would also induce
the optimal allocation rule. A decreasing price path would only be optimal if the optimal allocation were to
occur throughout time.
10To omit the discount factor r that appears due to the integration of the flow utilities, say the types are
h, l, and we have H = h
r
, and L = l
r
.
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The buyers are still a continuum with a unit mass and the measure of the H-type buyers is
equal to µ ∈ (0, 1) while the measure of the L-type buyers is 1−µ. The flow utility acquired
from the second version of the good is still β times the flow utility acquired from the first
version of the good for both type of buyers.
To focus on the price path of the first version of the good, we further assume that the
price path for the second version is constant,and hence any purchase of the second version
occurs only at the arrival time T .11 The monopolist commits to a price path: {pt}t∈[0,T ],
where pt is the price level of the first version at t ∈ [0, T ), and pT is the price for the second
version good. The following assumption guarantees that the utility from purchasing only
the first good at t = 0 is higher than the utility from purchasing only the second version at
time T .
Assumption 2.2. βe−rT < 1.
To understand the incentive of the buyers, consider an arbitrary price path {pt}t∈[0,T ]
and say that a buyer finds it optimal to purchase the first version of the good at a time
t ∈ [0, T ) (he may or may not purchase the second version). Then it would also be an
optimal decision for this buyer to purchase the first version of the good at t ∈ [0, T ) in an
environment where there is only the first version of the good with the corresponding price
path: {pt}t∈[0,T ). To see this, suppose that there exists another time period t˜ ∈ [0, T ) that
strictly dominates purchasing at t. But for this to be correct, this buyer must purchase
the second version of the good as well, otherwise we get a direct contradiction. Then by
revealed preferences of type-X buyer:
e−rt˜(X − pt˜) > e−rt(X − pt)
X(e−rt + (β − 1)e−rT )− e−rtpt − e−rTPT ≥ X(e−rt˜ + (β − 1)e−rT )− e−rt˜pt˜ − e−rTPT .
However the inequalities above are contradicting with each other, hence our claim is correct.
11We can rather think of this as a restriction so that the markets close down after T .
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This observation is crucial for the next lemma, which is showing that there exists a critical
time period, t? < T , such that before this t? the purchasing decisions for the first version
of the good is monotonic with respect to the buyers’ type. More precisely, if L-type buyers
purchase the first version of the good at a time t < tstar, then H-type buyers also purchase
the first version of the good and their purchase time is not later than t. On the contrary,
this monotonicity does not carry out to the purchases occurring after t?. This is because
of the fact that the arrival of the second version of the good becomes closer as time goes
on, and the incentive to wait for the newer version of the good becomes strengthened, and
these strengthened incentives is stronger for H-type buyers if the arrival time is sufficiently
close.
Lemma 2.5. For a given price path {pt}t∈[0,T ],
i If the L-type buyers purchase both versions of the good then the H-type buyers would
also purchase both versions of the good.
ii There exists a critical time period t?, that is defined by e−rt? = βe−rT , such that if
the L-type buyers purchase the first version of the good at a time t < t?, then H-type
buyers also purchase the first version of the good and their purchase time is not later
than t.12
Proof. See appendix B.4.
Now we can use this partial monotonicity result given in lemma 2.5 to show that in an
optimal price path the monopolist should allocate the first version of the good to H-type
buyers immediately, if the assumption 2.2 is satisfied. If the monopolist is not allocating
the first version of the good to H-type buyers at t = 0, then it must be the case that they
are only purchasing the second version of the good. Then L-type buyers are either only
purchasing the first version of the good after t?, or only purchasing the second version of
the good, and both of these allocations are dominated when assumption 2.2 is satisfied.
12The existence of this t? is guaranteed by the assumption 2.2
76
Lemma 2.6. In an optimal posted price mechanism, H-type buyers purchase the first version
of the good immediately at t = 0
Proof. See appendix B.5
The optimal posted prices depends on the values of H and L. In particular, the relation
between (β − 1)H and βL is crucial. When (β − 1)H ≥ βL ((β − 1)H ≤ βL) the H-type
buyer owning the first version of the good gets more (less) additional utility from the second
version purchase compared to a L-type buyer that does not own the first version of the good.
From now on we will consider the case (β−1)H > βL. The analysis of the other case follows
from similar arguments.
Proposition 2.2 lists all of the possible optimal price paths that the monopolist can
commit. All of the price paths listed is an optimal one for some subset of parameter values.
As usual, the price path inducing the optimal allocation is not unique. However, we say
that the prices are constant for the first version of the good as long as all of the purchases
occurs at time t = 0. In this case time is not used to discriminate over buyers for the sale
of the first version of the good. On the other hand, if the optimal allocations for the first
version of the good occurs at different time periods for different type of buyers, then the
monopolist is using time to discriminate over buyers. In this case, the price path inducing
the optimal allocation is decreasing over time. The following proposition shows that for
some subset of the parameter space, it is possible to get a decreasing optimal price path
contrary to the case with stationary stochastic arrival.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose (β − 1)H > βL and the assumption 2.2 is satisfied. Then the
optimal posted prices and the corresponding purchase decisions of each type of buyer is one
of the following. Moreover, each policy is an optimal policy for a non-empty subset of the
parameter space
1) pt = H ∀t ∈ [0, T ), and pT > (β− 1)H. Only H-type buyers purchase the first version
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of the good, and no one purchases the second version.
2) pt = L ∀t ∈ [0, T ), and pT = (β − 1)H. Both type of buyers purchase the first version
of the good at t = 0, and only H-type buyers purchase the second version.
3) pt =
 (1− e
−rT )H ∀t ∈ [0, t¯)
L ∀t ∈ [t¯, T )
and pT = (β − 1)H where t¯ satisfies e−rt¯ =
e−rT HH−L . Both H-type and L-type buyers purchase the first version of the good at
times t = 0 and t = t¯ respectively. And only H-type buyers purchase the second
version.
4) pt = (1 − e−rT )H ∀t ∈ [0, T ), and pT = βL. Only H-type buyers purchase the first
version of the good, and both types purchase the second version.
5) pt = (1−e−rT )L ∀t ∈ [0, T ), and pT = (β−1)L. Both types purchase the first version
at t = 0 and they also purchase the second version of the good.
It is easy to calculate the corresponding profit of each policy for the monopolist. Then
we can see that each of these policies is the optimal one for some values of the parameters
of the model.13 In other words, for each policy there is a subset of parameters, which are
also satisfying the condition (β − 1)H > βL and assumption 2.2, such that the policy is
optimal. We are particularly interested on the third policy, because it displays a decreasing
price path for the first version of the good. In particular, the purchases of the first version
of the good occur throughout time and hence the corresponding price path implementing
this allocation must be decreasing.
The non-stationary environment, resulting from a certain arrival time for product up-
grades, strengthens the ability of the monopolist to sort out the buyers with lower valuations.
More precisely, unless the monopolist prefers to omit the second version sales by charging
a sufficiently high price pT , the H-type buyers that are purchasing the first version of the
13The parameters are µ, r, T , H, L.
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good at t = 0 has an additional option: purchasing only the second version of the good.
Therefore even for the case in which the monopolist allocates only the H-type buyers at
t = 0, H-type buyers have a positive utility, if the sales of the second version of the good
is not omitted by the monopolist. This in turn introduces the possibility of allocating the
first version of the good to the L-type buyers after t = 0 without hurting the incentives of
the H-type players on their purchases of the first version of the good. 14 The way that we
defined time period t¯ given in the third policy of proposition 2.2 exploits this possibility.
In particular selling the first version of the good to L-type of buyers at period t = t¯ with a
price equal to their maximum willingness to pay does not hurt the incentives of the H-type
players. And t¯ is the earliest among such time periods. The proof of proposition 2.2, given
in the appendix, follows a backward analysis. We first define the optimal sales of the first
version of the good for each value of pT , and then we optimize with respect to pT . Since the
main concern of this section is to show the possibility of a decreasing optimal price path,
the cumbersome details of the possible anonymous optimal sale mechanism are left to the
appendix and discussed in the proof of the proposition.
2.5 Conclusion
The optimal pricing problem of a durable good monopolist is analyzed. An upgraded and
a superior version of the durable good arrives and replaces the existing version of the good.
The main assumption is that the sales are anonymous, so that the seller cannot condition
the sale of the second version of the good on the sales of the first version. When the arrival of
the upgraded version follows a stationary stochastic process, the optimal price path is shown
to be constant for both versions of the good, hence all the purchases occurs immediately, i.e.
the monopolist does not use the time to discriminate over buyers. On the contrary, when
14This is not possible when there is no product upgrade; because in the canonical model, if the optimal
allocation rule allocates the good only to the H-type of buyers, then the optimal price path inducing this
allocation would leave 0 utility to the H-type buyers. Hence allocating the good to the L-type of buyers at
a lower price would hurt the incentives of the H-type buyers.
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the arrival occurs at a commonly known certain time period, it is shown that, depending
on the parameters of the model, the optimal price path might decrease over time,and hence
delayed purchases might occur. Hence the time might be a useful discriminatory tool for
the monopolist that is endowed with full commitment power.
For both cases the optimal selling mechanism, without the restriction of anonymity,
requires the monopolist to bundle both versions of the good and to sell them only together.
The corresponding allocations in this case cannot be implemented by posted prices which
is anonymous by definition.
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Chapter 3
Man vs. Machine: When is automa-
tion inferior to human labor?
This chapter is co-authored with Pinar Yildirim.
3.1 Introduction
The World Bank estimates that about 60% of jobs will be automated in the near future
(Frey and Osborne, 2017). The reasons for this expectation are relatively straightforward.
Machines, robots, and artificial intelligence technologies generally provide reliable and con-
sistent output, and do it at a lower cost compared to their human counterparts. Not sur-
prisingly, we are seeing increasing levels of adoption of automated technologies, and recent
studies document that these technologies can substitute human labor in many consumer
facing environments (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).
In this study, we provide a counterargument for a manager’s adoption of automation by
showing that automated systems can result in less desirable outcomes compared to systems
that are operated by only humans. While gains from automation are indisputable, there
81
are also clear reasons for why automation may not always result in the best outcome.
Specifically, we are concerned with two consequences of automation: loss of employees’
ability to closely monitor each other’s effort and the principal’s diminishing ability to detect
shirking behavior.
Automation may negatively influence the output in a workplace due to a host of factors.
Some of these may be behavioral reasons such as reduced morale, fear of losing employment,
feeling powerless, and loss of social interactions which lead to fewer learning opportunities
for the employees. In this paper, we abstract away from these behavioral explanations.
Our model instead focuses on the consequences of automation from a team perspective. We
consider firms where the output is created by the combined effort of agents working in teams.
When employees work in teams, they get a chance to closely monitor each other’s effort.
Monitoring of effort, however, is a problem for most managers since continuously auditing
and checking up on workers are too costly. When the employee pay incentives are set by the
principal in a way that they have an incentive to monitor their team member’s behavior,
the principal can take advantage of this to induce both individuals to exert high effort. On
the other hand, when one member of the team is replaced with automated machinery, the
principal’s monitoring capacity diminishes, because the human labor remains unmonitored.
While the machine effort (or input) is always high and its cost is always lower than its human
counterpart, in organizations with automation, to incentivize the employee to exert high
effort, the principal has to offer a lot more. As a result, in some environments, automation
becomes less desirable compared to all-human labor.
We develop a model based on Che and Yoo (2001) and study three possible incentive
schemes which can be offered to an employee: contracts that reward workers when their
peers also exert effort (joint performance evaluation or JPE in short), contracts that reward
workers when they perform better than their peers (relative performance evaluation or
RPE in short) and contracts that reward employees individually (independent performance
evaluation, or IPE). These represent the wage contracts we observe in real life, and cover
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the incentives based on both collaboration and on competition between employees in teams.
We model teams where a single member is replaced by automation and compare the
output of this team to that of a team with two human employees.1 We compare teams
with and without automation and allow the principal to consider a set of payment schemes
which reward an employee relative to, or jointly with his peer. While automation always
leads to deterministic high effort and cost savings, human-machine teams lose their strategic
component because a machine cannot retaliate against an employee that it is teaming with,
and cannot impose any peer-sanctions. We argue that this lack of strategic behavior can
reduce a principal’s ability of benefiting from the interaction between the agents and can
make human-teams more preferable over automated teams.
Our findings demonstrate three key insights. First, we show that adoption of automa-
tion to substitute human labor is not always preferable, even when automation implies
consistent high effort and low cost. This is because while teams of humans have the abil-
ity to monitor each other’s behavior and apply peer sanctions in case one deviates from
the optimal path of play, machines cannot act in the same strategic way. We show that
the human-machine teams can be more costly because the principal has to offer higher
incentives to motivate the human member of the team. Second, we show that adoption
of automation changes the wage contracts preferred by the managers in the marketplace.
While both JPE or RPE are preferred as an incentive scheme to induce effort from human
employees, adoption of automation makes JPE the less preferred incentive relative to RPE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide a brief summary
of the literature on team incentives, automation, and human-machine teams. In Section 3.3,
we provide our model and lay out some key insights. In Section 3.4, we provide a summary of
the optimal regime. We follow up with a discussion of extensions in Section 3.5 to the model
to show robustness of the findings. Finally, in Section 3.6, we conclude with takeaways for
1We focus on teams of two for simplicity, however, the results can be extended to teams with higher
number of members.
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managers and policy makers.
3.2 Literature Review
Our study relates to the long tradition of study on employee contracts and team motivation.
Earlier works in economics focused on the comparison of incentive schemes in teams. In
a well-cited paper, Che and Yoo (2001) study the principal’s wage setting problem when
two agents are working together and the principal can only imperfectly monitor their effort.
In this setting, the authors study both a static and dynamic game environment, and show
that (1) in a static setting, RPE is the optimal incentive scheme to induce effort while (2)
in a repeated interaction environment, JPE or IPE could also be preferred. Our results
are largely in comparison to this earlier paper. Unlike the previous paper, we focus on the
strategic choice of adopting automation and how this changes which incentives are preferred
by the principal.
Others have also contrasted the RPE and JPE incentive schemes and pointed out to
their desirable and undesirable properties as wage contracts. JPE can promote coopera-
tion since an agent is rewarded only if his peers perform well (Holmstrom, 1982). But it
also creates an environment open to free riding (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom,
1982). Che and Yoo (2001) show that when agents interact repeatedly, JPE can become
the preferred incentive.
Holmstrom (1982) argues that RPE helps the principal to reward an agent based on
his effort rather than luck - i.e., the exogenous shocks that influence his output partly
independent of his effort. Further, it is argued that in rank-order RPE incentives, agents
are completely insulated from the risk of common negative shocks (Lazear and Rosen, 1981;
Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Carmichael (1983) argued that RPE may dominate IPE, even
in the absence of common shocks. The issues with the RPE scheme is that it is conducive
to collusion (Mookherjee, 1984) and sabotage as well as discouraging cooperation (Lazear,
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1989).
More recently, scholars in both economics and marketing started to focus on automa-
tion, robots, and artificial intelligence (Moriarty and Swartz, 1989; Venkatraman, 1994;
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012). A significant majority of these studies focused on whether
new technologies and automation eliminate the jobs or create new ones. Studies support
both sides of the argument. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) argue that automation will
replace some jobs while creating others, and the rate of production can exceed that of de-
struction. Bessen (2016) investigated the relationship between technology and occupations
and looks at occupations since 1980 to explore whether adoption of computers is related to
job losses. Bessen (2016) argues that occupations using computers grow faster, even for the
highly routine and mid-wage occupations. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), in a follow up
empirical study demonstrated that automation resulted in the loss of about 670,000 manu-
facturing jobs between 1990 and 2007. Sachs et al. (2015) studied the impact of robotization
and found that a rise in robotic productivity is more likely to lower the welfare of young
workers and future generations when the saving rate is low.
In marketing, scholars have studied the impact of technology adoption and automation
in consumer service environments (Speier and Venkatesh, 2002; Jayachandran et al., 2005).
However, these studies do not focus on how to optimally integrate automation to teams.
This is how our study contributes the literature. We demonstrate the conditions under
which automation is preferable and we also demonstrate the payment incentive that is best
suited to maximize the output of employees.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on collusion and renegotiation-proofness
in repeated games. First introduced by Farrell (1983), a renegotiation-proof equilibrium,
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which there is no continuation play that is Pareto
dominated by another sub-game perfect equilibrium. Van Damme (1989) demonstrates
that, in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game, it is possible to sustain every feasible and
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individually rational payoff outcome by means of a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.2 In
contrast to this literature, we follow Che and Yoo (2001), and impose restrictions to rule
out collusive-outcomes only on the equilibrium path. Despite this difference, we show that,
the resulting optimal scheme induces the desired outcome also by means of a renegotiation-
proof equilibrium as in the literature.
3.3 Model
Consider a firm which will make a decision on whether or not to initiate partial substitution
of labor with automated systems. This choice makes up two possible production regimes.
The first regime is without automation, and the production is purely based on labor force.
The second regime, on the other hand, incorporates automation, and the production is
based on labor as well as automated machinery. In order to examine this choice, we study a
dynamic framework within a discrete time setting, and set δ as the common time discounting
rate. In what follows, we will describe these production regimes in more detail.
3.3.1 No-Automation Regime
The framework is borrowed from Che and Yoo (2001). Suppose a firm hires two identical
agents to perform a task in each period.3 Each agent makes a binary effort choice in each
period. The agent can either “work” by setting his effort level to e = 1, or can “shirk”
by setting it to e = 0. There is a discomfort, or cost, of high level effort, e = 1, which is
denoted by c > 0. The cost of shirking is normalized to 0.
The agents’ effort choices are not directly observed by the principal, instead she ob-
serves two distinct informative signals about the effort exerted by each agent. The signals,
similar to the effort choices, are binary and can be either “favorable” or “unfavorable”,
2See also Farrell and Maskin (1989).
3We will refer to the human employees as agents or workers interchangeably throughout the document.
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i.e., s = 1, or s = 0. The signal of an agent is independent of the effort choice of the
other, however, there is an underlying common component influencing the realizations of
both signals. This common component may, for instance, indicate the state of the economy
or a particular industry which influences both workers in a similar way. More precisely,
there is an aggregate shock which can either be “good” or “bad” with probabilities σ and
1 − σ respectively, where σ < 1. If the shock is good, then the signals of both agents are
favorable regardless of their effort choice. If the shock is bad, then the signal depends on
the effort choice of a worker. In particular, if he chooses to put effort (e = 1), then his
performance signal will be favorable with probability p1, and if he chooses to shirk (e = 0)
then his performance signal will be favorable with probability p0, where 1 > p1 > p0 > 0.
Put differently, when the aggregate shock is bad, the probability that an agent will receive
a more favorable evaluation is higher if he chooses to put in effort. The joint distribution
of the signals is summarized in the Table 3.1.
Signal Pairs
(1,1) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
E
ff
or
t
P
ai
rs (1,1) σ + (1− σ)p21 (1− σ)p1(1− p1) (1− σ)(1− p1)p1 (1− σ)(1− p1)2
(1,0) σ + (1− σ)p1p0 (1− σ)p1(1− p0) (1− σ)(1− p1)p0 (1− σ)(1− p1)(1− p0)
(0,1) σ + (1− σ)p0p1 (1− σ)p0(1− p1) (1− σ)(1− p0)p1 (1− σ)(1− p0)(1− p1)
(0,0) σ + (1− σ)p20 (1− σ)p0(1− p0) (1− σ)(1− p0)p0 (1− σ)(1− p0)2
Table 3.1: The joint distribution of the signals conditional on the effort profile of the agents.
The workers observe the effort choice of each other as they work closely. This introduces
a capacity of mutual monitoring that the principal can exploit in order to mitigate the
agency problem. We will demonstrate that this mutual monitoring is a key characteristic
in a principal’s preference for all-human teams, particularly when her capacity to detect
shirking is lower.
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3.3.2 Automation Regime:
In this regime, we consider the case of partial substitution of labor with automation. We
assume that the principal hires one employee and replaces the other with a machine. We
also assume that the machine introduces some efficiency to the principal: it operates at a
capacity that is equivalent to the high level effort of the agent but at a lower operating
cost, which is assumed to be αc, where α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, substituting one of the employees
with machinery has two direct benefits: reduction in operating costs and the scope of
the moral hazard problem since there is only one agent now with an unobservable effort
choice. Nevertheless, this replacement exterminates the interaction among the agents; hence
diminishes the potential benefit that the principal may receive due to the agents’ mutual
monitoring capacity. The latter accounts for the indirect cost of partial substitution of
human labor with machines. The trade-off between the direct and indirect effects comprise
the core of the discussion of this paper.
Similar to the no-automation regime, the employee’s effort choice is not directly ob-
served by the principal. She observes a binary performance signal, which has the same
distribution as before. In this case there is only one signal since there is only one agent.
3.4 Optimal Incentive Contract
Throughout this section, we maintain the assumption that the high level effort (i.e., work)
is sufficiently valuable for the principal such that her central focus is to find an optimal
incentive scheme inducing high effort, e = 1, in every period. We restrict our attention
to constant incentive schemes where the payment that an agent receives is time-invariant
and depends on the performance measure(s) realized within the current period. It is also
assumed that the agents have limited liability and the payments are non-negative after each
possible contingency.
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We first analyze the optimal production in all-human (i.e., human-human) and human-
machine teams individually. Next we compare the expected cost of performing the task in
both cases to determine the optimal scheme.
3.4.1 Optimal Incentive Scheme Under Automation
We start the analysis with investigating the optimal incentive for a human-machine team.
With partial substitution of labor, the principal’s problem is to set the incentive scheme to
induce high effort from the employee. An incentive scheme, in this case, is a two dimensional
vector specifying the amount of pay the agent receives after each possible performance
measure. More precisely, w = (w1, w0) is the wage scheme where w1 and w0 represent the
amount paid to agent if his performance signals are s = 1, and s = 0, respectively. In each
period, conditional on the wage scheme set by the principal, the agent determines the level
of effort he puts in. To induce high effort from the agent, the principal has to take the
following incentive constraint into account while setting the wages:
(σ + (1− σ)p1)w1 + (1− σ)(1− p1)w0 − c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from working
≥ (σ + (1− σ)p0)w1 + (1− σ)(1− p0)w0.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from shirking
The left hand side of the inequality is the agent’s utility from working, and the right side
is his utility from shirking. After some simplification, this constraint boils down to the
following expression:
(1− σ)(p1 − p0)(w1 − w0) ≥ c. (IC)
Then the principal’s problem is the following:
min
w1,w0
[σ + (1− σ)p1]w1 + (1− σ)(1− p1)w0 s.t. IC (P)
It is straightforward to see that under the optimal incentive scheme, the agent receives
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a positive payment only after a favorable performance signal, therefore w0 = 0. Moreover,
the incentive constraint is binding, therefore we can derive the optimal value of w1. The
following proposition provides the optimal incentive scheme when the task is performed by
a human-machine team.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal incentive scheme that induces the agent to work in every
period is given by w = (cˆ, 0), where cˆ = c(1−σ)(p1−p0) .
The expression for the optimal value of wage w1 conveys that when agents work in a
more favorable economy (as σ increases) or when the returns from putting a high effort
under a bad shock decreases (as the difference between p1 and p0 gets smaller) it becomes
harder for the principle to detect an agent when he shirks. Therefore, the pay needed to
incentivize him to exert effort becomes larger.
3.4.2 Optimal Incentive Scheme Under No-Automation
Our discussion in this section follows the model and the derivations in Che and Yoo (2001),
however, complementing the earlier work, we provide the complete description of the optimal
incentive schemes here. This extends the analysis provided in the earlier work.
With all-human teams, there are two agents employed and they observe the effort choice
of each other since they work closely. The principal has to provide incentives for both to
motivate them to work. To this end, she can condition the payment of one agent on the
realized performance of the other. More precisely, she can set the payment scheme as a
four dimensional vector w = (w11, w10, w01, w00) where wsisj is the amount paid to agent i
when his signal is si and his teammate’s signal is sj .
4 The structure of wage scheme, w,
plays a crucial role in shaping the inherent features of the team interaction. This in turn
allows the principal to manipulate this interaction in his benefit and to mitigate the overall
4Note that this formulation restricts the wage structure to be symmetric for the agents. This restriction,
however, is innocuous given that the agents are identical.
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agency problem.
Similar to Che and Yoo (2001), we characterize the wage schemes based on how an
agent’s payment is determined depending on the other agent’s performance. An agent can
be rewarded or punished when his teammate performs well. More specifically, following Che
and Yoo (2001), if a wage scheme rewards an agent for a good performance of his teammate,
we refer to this scheme as the “joint performance evaluation” (JPE, in short). JPE satisfies
(w11, w01) >> (w10, w00),
implying that w11 ≥ w10, w01 ≥ w00, and at least one of the constraints has to be strict.
So an agent is paid more when his partner has a favorable evaluation.
On the contrary, if a wage scheme punishes an agent for the good performance of his
teammate, we refer to it as “relative performance evaluation” (RPE, in short). RPE satisfies
(w10, w00) >> (w11, w01).
High level effort is sufficiently valuable for the principal. Thus, she wants to choose
an incentive scheme that induces effort pair (e1, e2) = (1, 1) in every period as a sub-game
perfect equilibrium outcome. Given such an incentive scheme, however, there may exist
multiple sub-game perfect equilibria with different outcomes. In such a circumstance, the
game may proceed with an outcome other than the one the principal prefers. In this respect,
the principal needs to choose an incentive scheme so that the repeated play of (work, work)
is the best outcome, that can be supported by a sub-game perfect equilibrium, in terms of
maximizing the agents’ total payoffs. This restriction allows us to draw a unique prediction
regarding the outcome of the agents’ repeated interaction. Moreover, it also allows us to
address and eliminate the possibility of a collusion between the agents. This restriction
rules out such a possibility at any period in time on the path of play.5 As in Che and
5This differs from the standard formulation of collusion and renegotiation in the literature, see for instance
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Yoo (2001), we call such an equilibrium a “team equilibrium” throughout the rest of the
analysis.
Based on what we presented until now, for a given wage scheme w, and the effort profile
(ei, ej), the expected payment that agent i receives is denoted by pii(ei, ej ,w):
pii(ei, ej ,w) =[σ + (1− σ)peipej ]w11
+(1− σ)[pei(1− pej )w10 + (1− pei)pejw01 + (1− pei)(1− pej )w00]
3.4.3 Static Environment
We first analyze the problem considering a static, one period version of the game. In the
absence of repeated interaction between the agents, the principal cannot fully benefit from
their mutual monitoring capacity. This stems from the fact that the agents cannot use peer
sanctions against each other as the team interaction takes place only once.
First, note that, for a given wage scheme, w, the effort profile (e1, e2) = (1, 1) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if the payoff from working exceeds the payoff from shirking:
pi(1, 1,w)− c ≥ pi(0, 1,w) (ICS)
This incentive constraint constitutes a necessary condition for the team equilibrium. In this
respect, the following problem comprises a relaxed version of the principal’s problem in the
static setting.
min
w
pi(1, 1,w) s.t. ICS . (PS)
The principal wants to find an optimal incentive scheme that supports both agents working
(i.e., (work, work)) as a team equilibrium outcome. Under the solution to the above problem,
Van Damme (1989). The effects of this difference on the optimal incentive scheme will be discussed later on
in the paper.
92
however, (work, work) is only guaranteed to be a Nash equilibrium. Therefore the solution
of PS does not necessarily coincide with the solution of the principal’s problem. Yet, it
turns out that (work, work) is the unique equilibrium under the incentive scheme ws that
solves PS . Therefore, ws is the optimal incentive scheme.
As depicted in the following statement, the optimal incentive scheme displays an ex-
treme form of RPE. More precisely, the agent receives a positive payment only when his
performance measure is more favorable compared to the other agent. In all the other re-
maining contingencies, the amount of payment he receives is zero.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal incentive scheme in the static setting displays an extreme
form of RPE, and is given by ws = (0, ws10, 0, 0), where w
s
10 =
cˆ
(1−p1) .
Proof. See appendix C.1.
Proposition 3.2 states that when agents’ performance measures have a common com-
ponent, a relatively more favorable signal is a stronger indication of an agent’s high level
effort. Therefore, paying the agents only in such a circumstance is the cheapest way to
provide incentives for inducing high level effort. When the agents’ interaction takes place
only once, the optimal incentive scheme requires to pay each agent only when he receives a
relatively better performance measure. This effectively puts the agents into a competition,
in which the amount of payment is set so that each agent is indifferent in his effort choice,
conditional on the other agent exerting high level effort. When we move into the dynamic
setting, we will see how this incentive scheme is vulnerable to collusion.
3.4.4 Dynamic Environment
We next study the dynamic setting, where the agents repeatedly interact with each other
over an infinite time horizon. Repeated interaction introduces the threat of peer sanction
that was not present in the static version of the game. It also implies that the possibility
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of collusion is now a more important concern for the principal. There is an opportunity of
mutual monitoring as the agents observe the actions of each other. This allows them to
sustain outcomes favoring mutual benefit by means of using credible threats. We will see
that, in a dynamic environment, RPE incentive schemes are more vulnerable to collusion
in comparison to the static setting, and JPE may become the optimal way of incentive
provision depending on the parameter range.
A strategy for an agent is a mapping from the set of histories to the set of actions at
every period. A relevant history includes the realized performance measures as well as the
effort choices of the agents in the earlier periods. The principal is interested in choosing an
optimal incentive scheme inducing high level of effort in every period as a team equilibrium
outcome. The following lemma asserts that, in an optimal incentive scheme, an agent
receives a positive payment only if he receives a favorable performance signal. In other
words, the optimal values of w01, and w00 is equal to 0. As a result, the principal’s problem
boils down to finding out the values of w11, and w10.
Lemma 3.1. In a human-human team, an optimal incentive scheme always satisfies w10 =
w00 = 0.
Proof. See appendix C.5.
Paying a positive amount to an agent when he has a poor performance evaluation makes
it more difficult to induce high effort. The lemma presents this intuition. Thanks to this
result, we now know that an optimal incentive scheme has to be either JPE, RPE, or IPE,
depending on how the values of w11, and w10 compare to each other.
6 If w11 > w10, then
w is a JPE; and if w11 < w10, then w is a RPE. In the case when w11 = w10, the incentive
scheme is an IPE.
In order to describe the optimal values of w11 and w10, first, consider the following
6Note that these three categories do not cover the whole space of possible incentive schemes. For instance,
an incentive scheme satisfying w11 > w10, and w01 < w00 is neither JPE nor RPE nor IPE.
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inequality which comprises a necessary condition.
pi(1, 1,w)− c ≥ (1− δ)pi(0, 1,w) + δmin{pi(0, 0,w), pi(0, 1,w)} (ICD)
LHS of the inequality is the resulting payoff of each agent from repeated joint work. If this
value is lower than the RHS of the inequality, then the agents would receive a higher utility
from any deviation. As a result, it would be impossible to sustain repeated joint work as
a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. This constraint does not constitute a sufficient
condition for a sub-game perfect equilibrium since the implied continuation play following a
deviation does not necessarily have to be self-enforcing. Therefore it cannot be a sufficient
condition for a team equilibrium either. In this regard, the following problem, which takes
only this constraint into account, is just a relaxed version of the principal’s problem.
min
w11,w10
pi(1, 1,w) s.t. ICD. (PD)
Solving PD is an important step towards the characterization of the optimal incentive scheme
in an all-human team. The following lemma demonstrates the solution of the problem PD.
Lemma 3.2. Define a level of discount factor δˆ(σ) = σ(1−σ)p1p0 . Then
(i) If δ > δˆ(σ), then a JPE scheme wj = (wj11, 0, 0, 0) with w
j
11 =
cˆ
p1+δp0
solves PD.
(ii) If δ ≤ δˆ(σ), then the solution to the static problem (ws) also solves the problem PD
optimally. In this case, the solution is an RPE scheme.
Proof. See appendix C.2.
Lemma 3.2 states that the solution of the problem PD displays either an extreme form
of JPE or an extreme form of RPE. For this solution to coincide with the optimal solution
of the principal’s problem, it must induce both agents to choose high effort in every period,
as a team equilibrium outcome.
The JPE incentive scheme, wj possesses all the required properties. More precisely,
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when the pay scheme is wj , the repeated joint work is a sub-game perfect equilibrium out-
come. Furthermore, wj does not create any collusive outcome. To see this, first note that,
when the pay scheme is wj , the interaction between the agents is equivalent to a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game in which (shirk, shirk) is the unique stage game Nash equilibrium. Agents’
payoff increases with the performance of their teammates, i.e, pi(0, 1,wj) > pi(0, 0,wj), and
ICD boils down to:
pi(1, 1,wj)− c ≥ δpi(0, 1,wj) + (1− δ)pi(0, 0,wj).
Therefore, initiating (shirk, shirk)∞ can deter unilateral deviations from the desired out-
come, (work, work)∞. Such a punishment is self-enforcing, since repetition of (shirk, shirk)
is self-enforcing. As a result, (work, work)∞ can be sustained as a sub-game perfect equi-
librium outcome. Moreover, the effort pair (work, work) maximizes the agents’ total payoff.
Precisely,
2pi(1, 1,wj)− 2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total payoff from (work, work)
≥ pi(1, 0,wj)− c+ pi(0, 1,wj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total payoff from (work, shirk)
,
and
2pi(1, 1,wj)− 2c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total payoff from (work, work)
≥ 2pi(0, 0,wj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total payoff from (work, work)
.
Thus, wj induces (work, work)∞ as a team equilibrium outcome, and hence is the optimal
incentive scheme for principal, whenever it is a solution for the problem PD. Under this
incentive scheme, what happens as a matter of course is the following. The principal benefits
from the agents’ mutual monitoring capacity by asking them to impose peer sanctions to
each other in case they observe any shirking behavior. The agents have enough incentive
to do this since they do not want their teammates to shirk as it hurts them as well.
Such a scheme becomes optimal for sufficiently large values of the discount factor. This
is rather intuitive. When the agents are more patient, the repeated play of (shirk, shirk)
becomes a more severe punishment. The agents are more willing to exert high level effort in
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order to avoid the punishments imposed by their teammates, and hence the amount of the
payment, wj11, that is needed to convince them to work is lower. As a result, it is natural
to have a JPE scheme as an optimal pay scheme when the agents are sufficiently patient.
The fact, that a JPE incentive scheme may be optimal, comprises the main divergence
between the static and the dynamic settings. When agents repeatedly interact with each
other over an infinite time horizon, the principal can convince them to monitor and discipline
each other by using peer sanctions through the help of JPE.
In contrast to the JPE scheme wj , the RPE scheme ws does not possess all the desired
properties. In particular, it is susceptible to collusion hence cannot be the optimal pay
scheme of the dynamic setting. It supports (work, work)∞ as a sub-game perfect equilib-
rium since (work, work) is the unique stage game Nash equilibrium. However, the agents
can sustain better payoff outcomes by coordinating over the strategy profiles that include
unilateral or bilateral deviations from (work, work) on the path of play. For instance, con-
sider a strategy profile with an outcome in which the agents alternate between (work, shirk),
and (shirk, work). The corresponding expected payoffs of the agents from this play is equal
to:
1
1 + δ
(pi(1, 0,ws)− c) + δ
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,ws),
and
δ
1 + δ
(pi(1, 0,ws)− c) + 1
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,ws)
for the first and the second agents respectively. Note that each of these are larger than
the payoff pi(1, 1,ws)− c. Moreover, this outcome can be supported in a sub-game perfect
equilibrium in which the deviations trigger the repeated play of (work, work), which is self-
enforcing. Conditional on this punishment, even the agent shirking in the current period,
who has a stronger incentive to deviate, does not want to deviate. More precisely:
δ
1 + δ
(pi(1, 0,ws)− c) + 1
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,ws) ≥ pi(1, 1,ws)− c.
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Consequently, under ws, collusion is a real concern, hence it cannot be an optimal incentive
scheme. The principal has to account for such possibilities of collusion and preclude them
all.
The solution to the problem PD characterizes the optimal incentive scheme for the case
in which the principal is able to select the equilibrium in her interest. Yet, she can not
observe the agents’ effort choices, hence she has to incentivize them properly in order to
make sure that they do not collude. This concern becomes particularly relevant when ws
is the solution, and overall PD provides only a partial characterization.
Then, what is the optimal incentive scheme when ws is the solution of the problem PD?
In order to answer this question, we focus on the the principal’s problem by restricting her
choice into the set of incentive schemes satisfying w11 ≤ w10. We already know her optimal
choice under the restriction w11 ≥ w10.7 By this approach, we reach a characterization of
the optimal incentive scheme in two different subsets, the union of which covers the entire
space of incentive schemes. After completing this step, finding the global optimal is just a
matter of a simple comparison.
First, note that the constraint ICD is still a necessary condition, and is equivalent to
ICS when w11 ≤ w10. On top of this constraint, the principal has to account for additional
one(s) in grounds of preventing collusion. This is a difficult task as there are plenty of
potential outcomes that the agents can collude upon. We, however, focus on a specific
outcome, “alternated unilateral shirking”, in which the agents alternate between (shirk,
work) and (work, shirk) over time. We define some necessary conditions to prevent this
outcome from being a possible collusion threat. This constraint then will turn out to be
also sufficient in preventing all the collusive outcomes.
In alternated unilateral shirking, each agent provides a favor to his teammate on ex-
change of receiving another in the next period. Precisely, shirking in a period while his
7Among the set of incentive schemes satisfying, w11 ≥ w10, the optimal one is either wj , or wI =
(cˆ, cˆ, 0, 0). The latter is the optimal IPE, in which the agents’ compensations are independent from each
other, hence it is trivially collusion-proof.
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teammate is working hurts the agent and favors his teammate. The principal has to choose
a payment scheme such that either this outcome cannot be supported as a sub-game per-
fect equilibrium outcome, or the corresponding total utility of the agents is not any better
than the one resulting from repeated joint work. The latter translates into the following
condition:
pi(1, 0,w)− c+ pi(0, 1,w) ≤ 2(pi(1, 1,w)− c). (IC′′R)
On the other hand, to prevent this from being a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome, the
pay scheme has to be arranged in a way that at least one of the agents prefers to deviate
from the corresponding path of play. We assume that the deviations trigger a continuation
play of (work, work)∞, which is self-enforcing as inducing it in a self-enforcing manner is
the principal’s main objective.8 Then the conditions we are looking for translate into the
following constraints for the shirking and the working agents respectively:
1
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,w) +
δ
1 + δ
(pi(1, 0,w)− c) < pi(1, 1,w)− c. (ICR)
1
1 + δ
(pi(1, 0,w)− c) + δ
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,w) < (1− δ)pi(0, 0,w) + δ(pi(1, 1,w)− c) (IC′R)
Overall, the incentive scheme has to satisfy at least one of the the constraints ICR, IC′R,
and IC′′R. To this respect, we can define a comprehensive constraint that encompasses all
of these.
Definition 3.1. An incentive scheme satisfies is said to satisfy ÎCR if and only if it satisfies
at least one of ICR, IC′R, and IC′′R.
Then we can define a relaxed version of the principal’s problem, when her choice is
8Note that, we want alternated unilateral shirk to not be a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome. But
we consider just a specific strategy profile in which the deviations from this outcome lead to repeated play
of (work,work). Precluding this strategy profile from being an SPE, does not necessarily be sufficient for
ruling out all other possible SPE that in which the corresponding outcome is alternated unilateral shirking.
Nevertheless, it turns out to be sufficient.
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restricted to satisfy w11 ≤ w10, as follows:
min
w11,w10
pi(1, 1,w) s.t. ICS , ÎCR, w11 ≤ w10. (PR)
This is just a relaxed version of the principal’s problem, as it only takes a specific form
of collusion into account. The next result provides a characterization of the solution to
this problem. Moreover, it asserts that the constraints that are taken into account in the
problem PR are sufficient to preclude all the collusive outcomes when the incentive scheme
satisfies w11 ≤ w10.
Lemma 3.3. The solution to the problem PR must be one of the following.
• wr = (0, wr10, 0, 0), where wr10 = cˆ1−(1+δ)p1 .9
• wI = (cˆ, cˆ, 0, 0).
Moreover, when the incentive scheme is restricted to satisfy w11 ≤ w10, the solution of the
problem PR coincides with the solution of the principal’s problem.10
Proof. See appendix C.3.
Remarkably, solving the problem PR gives us the optimal incentive scheme among the
ones satisfying w11 ≤ w10. In other words, the resulting solution of PR is always collusion-
proof. PR accounts for a specific form of collusion, prevention of which turns out to be
sufficient for precluding all the others. Collusion-proofness is an obvious property of wI
as the agents are getting paid depending on their own performance measures only. In wr,
9Note that, when (1 + δ)p1 ≥ 1, wr10 is not well defined. In such a circumstance, wI is the solution of the
problem PR.
10When wr solves the problem PR, the constraint ICR is binding. However, notice that ICR is based
on a strict inequality. As a result, the actual value of wr10 is infinitesimally larger than
cˆ
1−(1+δ)p1 . To this
regard, one can either discretize the choice set and let principal to choose the minimum value larger than
cˆ
1−(1+δ)p1 for w
r
10. In case we allow for arbitrarily fine choices, the principal’s problem does not always have
a solution, in the sense that there does not exist an incentive scheme maximizing her objective. However for
a given  > 0, we can find an incentive scheme in which the principal can get a payoff in the -neighborhood
of his value.
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which is the other possible solution of PR, we have an RPE scheme. The payment the
agents receive after receiving a relatively better performance signal, wr10, is set sufficiently
large so that the agents do not want to collude.The optimal RPE of the static setting, ws,
on the other hand, did not have this property as the agent could always collude by following
alternated unilateral shirking. In this regard, the difference between the payments wr10 and
ws10, can be thought as the cost of precluding collusion in RPE schemes for the principal.
Under wr, the corresponding team equilibrium features repetition of (work, work) on
and off the equilibrium path. This comprises a sub-game perfect equilibrium, because (work,
work) is an equilibrium of the stage game. The agents always prefer to exert high effort
and compete with each other in order to receive a better performance signal.
Based on these discussions, we now know that the optimal incentive scheme has to be
either wj , or wr, or wI . The principal either puts agents into a competition via a collusion-
proof RPE pay scheme, and require a relatively better performance signal for a positive
payment. Or, she may choose a JPE scheme, and take advantage of the mutual monitoring
capacity between the agents by asking them to impose peer sanctions in case they observe
a shirking behavior. Finally, she can also choose to incentivize the agents separately by
selecting the optimal IPE scheme, which would exterminate all the possible within-team
interaction. The following theorem illustrates how the parameter space is partitioned into
three sub-spaces depending on the corresponding optimal incentive schemes.
Proposition 3.3. There are two critical values of the discount factor δj =
σ(1−p1)
(σ+(1−σ)p1)p0 ,
and δr =
σ(1−p1)
(σ+(1−σ)p1)p1 , such that for a human-human production team the optimal incentive
scheme is given by:
w =

wj if δ > δj
wI if δ ∈ (δr, δj ]
wr if δ ≤ δr.
As all the incentive schemes induces the desired path of play as a team equilibrium out-
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come, the statement of the above proposition immediately follows from a simple comparison
between the expected costs of the incentive schemes wj , wI , and wr. By comparing this
result with lemma 3.2, one can see how the agents’ ability of collusion alters the principal’s
optimal decision. When the agents cannot collude, the principal can select the equilibrium
in her best interest. As a result, the optimal incentive scheme is either wj , or ws as it
is depicted in Lemma 3.2. When the agents can collude, however, the cost of motivating
agents with an RPE scheme becomes larger, and ws cannot be optimal anymore. This
expands the region in which the wj is optimal as it can also be seen from the fact that
δj < δˆ. The optimal collusion-proof RPE scheme, w
j , is sufficiently costly for the principal,
so that for some set of parameters using the IPE scheme wI becomes optimal.
As δ gets large, it becomes easier to motivate agents with a JPE scheme. This stems
from the reason that the peer sanctions that the agents can impose each other become more
deterrent so that the amount of payment that is needed to motivate agents to work is smaller.
For smaller values of δ, on the other hand, we are getting closer to the static setting as the
value of future diminishes. The possibility of collusion becomes a less important concern,
and the gap between the optimal RPE schemes of the static and the dynamic settings is
reduced. As a result, wr is optimal.
3.4.5 Collusion and Renegotiation-proofness
Agents’ ability to collude leads the principal to look for collusion-proof incentive schemes
for all-human teams. In defining collusion-proofness, we follow Che and Yoo (2001), and
require incentive schemes to not to give rise to a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome
that brings a higher total payoff to agents in comparison to the repeated play of joint
work. In other words, throughout the interaction that they involve, the agents do not
want to renegotiate and coordinate over some other equilibrium outcome. This is a bit
different from the conventional definition of collusion-proofness (or renegotiation-proofness)
that exists in the literature, for instance Farrell (1983), and Van Damme (1989). Our
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definition restricts the strategy profile only on the equilibrium path, while the conventional
definition puts restrictions both on and off the path of play. Despite this difference, under
the optimal incentive schemes we propose, there exist other outcome equivalent equilibria
satisfying the conventional renegotiation-proofness criteria.
We know that, the optimal scheme in an all-human team has to be one of wj , wr, or wI .
For wr, repetition of the unique stage Nash equilibrium, (work,work), comprises the unique
sub-game perfect equilibrium. This strategy profile already satisfies the renegotiation-
proofness criteria. When the incentive scheme is wI , the agents’ compensations are in-
dependent from the effort choice of each other. In this respect, collusion is not a relevant
concern, and hence the renegotiation-proofness criteria is automatically satisfied.
When it comes to the JPE scheme wj , the suggested strategy profile is not renegotiation-
proof as it requires to punish all the deviations with a repeated play of (shirk, shirk). The
team interaction is equivalent to a prisoner’s dilemma game in which exerting the high level
effort is the cooperative action. Thus, action pair (shirk, shirk) is Pareto dominated, and
having it, even off the path of play, violates the conventional renegotiation-proofness criteria
that has been proposed in the literature. Nevertheless, by following the logic suggested by
Van Damme (1989), one can see that the outcome (work,work)∞ can also be supported by
means of another equilibrium satisfying this criteria. Precisely, consider the strategy profile
in which the agents start with exerting high level effort and continue to do so as long as
there is no deviation; if the agent i deviates at time t, then starting from period t+ 1, the
other agent shirks until player i works. As soon as the agent i works, the play reverts back
and the agents continue to exert high level effort afterwards. Given this strategy profile,
conditional on agent i deviating at time t, he prefers to exert high effort level at time t+ 1
so that the game reverts back to repeated joint work at t + 2. This stems from the fact
that:
(1− δ)(pi(1, 0,wj)− c) + δpi(1, 1,wj − c) ≥ pi(0, 0,wj).
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Also, the agents do not want to deviate from exerting high level effort, since:
pi(1, 1,wj − c) ≥ (1− δ)pi(0, 1,wj) + (1− δ)δ(pi(1, 0,wj)− c) + δ2(pi(1, 1,wj)− c).
Moreover, none of the continuation plays arising on and off the equilibrium path are Pareto
dominated. Therefore, this strategy profile comprises a renegotiation-proof sub-game per-
fect equilibrium with the desired outcome.
3.4.6 The Optimal Regime
Finally, we can talk about the principal’s decision on whether or not to initiate the par-
tial replacement of the labor with automated machinery. This decision is an immediate
implication of the previous findings. One just needs to compare the expected costs of the
corresponding optimal production plans in all-human and human-machine teams to reach
the conclusion. Obviously the principal never prefers to keep an all-human team in produc-
tion when IPE is optimal. This stems from the fact that when the principal compensates the
agents based on their individual performance measures, there is no team interaction, and
she cannot benefit from their mutual monitoring capacity. In this case, using automated
machinery and partial elimination of agency costs is the best option for her.
Using an all-human team becomes valuable if the principal can exploit the interaction
between the employees with an incentive scheme that falls within the category of JPE and
RPE. With a JPE scheme the principal directly benefits from the agents’ mutual monitoring
capacity as she pays them only when they both receive a favorable performance measure.
This leads them to monitor each other and impose peer sanctions to deter shirking. Or she
can use RPE, and put the agents into a race by paying them only when their performance
measures are relatively better compared to each other. The next proposition demonstrates
how the principal’s optimal team choice varies across the parameter space.
Proposition 3.4. There are two critical values
¯
δ < δ¯ such that, the principal initiates a
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partial substitution of labor force with automated machinery if and only if δ ∈ [
¯
δ, δ¯]. When
δ <
¯
δ, and δ > δ¯ she prefers human-human teams for production and uses RPE and JPE
incentive schemes for compensation, respectively.
Proof. See appendix C.4.
Proposition 3.4 points out that automation is optimal only over a portion of the pa-
rameter space. The all-human regime can be preferred over the automation regime, and it
is likely depending on the parameter values that the principal utilizes both the JPE and
the RPE schemes. Human-machine teams become particularly valuable for an intermediate
range of discount factors. In this range, the principal has a limited benefit from employing
a human-human team. This is mainly due to two reasons. The advantage of using the opti-
mal JPE scheme is higher for large values of the discount factor as it has a lower expected
cost. On the other hand, using a collusion-proof RPE scheme is more advantageous for
low values of the discount factor, since then collusion is a weaker concern, and the cost of
precluding it is lower.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates how the optimal choice of the regimes and incentive schemes
change as σ and δ changes. As the discount rate increases, for low σ, JPE becomes more
preferable over automation. For low discount rates, as σ increases, the principal’s ability to
detect shirking agents narrows down. In this case, having a relatively better performance
measure than the other member of the team is a very strong indication of high level effort
for an agent. So in this range, we find that setting a collusion-free RPE incentive with
all-human teams is preferred over automation.
The critical values defining the region of automation,
¯
δ and δ¯, also depend on the other
parameter values. For instance, when α gets smaller, the cost of operating machine becomes
smaller, and as a result, the region featuring automation expands.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Regime and Incentive Scheme vs. σ and δ. The figure is produced
under p1 = 0.7, p0 = 0.3, α = 0.9.
3.4.7 Human teams survive under costless automation
Finally, we discuss a special case in which the automation is costless, i.e., α = 0. As
technology progresses, we expect that automation will become more effective because of
its decreasing cost. It is reasonable to question whether the automation will be the only
preferred regime as α approaches to zero. We find that this is not the case, as illustrated
in Figure 3.2. This is a striking result as it suggests that even if automation was costless,
principal may still prefer human labor over adopting it under some parameter regions.
Figure 3.2 shows that when α is equal to 0, the value of δ¯ is equal to 1. As a result, the
region featuring a human-human team together with a JPE incentive scheme disappears.
This result is not specific to the parameter values used in Figure 3.2. A human-human team
together with the JPE incentive scheme wj can never be better than a human-machine team
when α = 0. In other words, when α = 0, the expected cost of wj is larger than the expected
cost of inducing agent to work in a human-machine team, i.e., the inequality
2(σ + (1− σ)p21)
cˆ
p1 + δp0
> (σ + (1− σ)p1)cˆ
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Figure 3.2: Costless Automation (α = 0) and Optimal Regime. The figure is produced
under p1 = 0.6, p0 = 0.4, α = 0.
holds, regardless of the values of the parameters p1, p0, δ, and σ. In this respect, the idea
that the JPE schemes are particularly valuable in exploiting agents’ mutual monitoring
abilities, which is one of the main conclusions of Che and Yoo (2001), is not likely to
survive the technological progress towards reaching costless automation.
The situation is different for RPE. As it is illustrated in the figure, there is always a
region featuring human-human team together with an RPE scheme even when the cost of
automated machinery is 0. For this to happen, the value of σ has to be sufficiently large.
In such a circumstance, the probability of aggregate shock, and hence the probability of
receiving a favorable performance signal is sufficiently large. A good performance signal in
itself is not a very strong indication of high level effort. As a result, the principal has a low
ability to detect shirking agents. This increases the expected cost of human-machine teams
as the principal has to pay the agent every time he receives a good performance signal in
order to convince him to work. This means that the agent is getting paid with an excessive
probability. The principal can instead hire a human-only team, and receive two signals,
and strengthen her ability to detect shirking agents. This allows her to better identify the
source of a favorable performance signal. She can adapt a collusion-proof RPE scheme, and
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pay the agents only after they have a better performance signal than their teammates. This
allows her to avoid the excessive probability at which the agents receive a positive payment.
3.5 Extensions
One of the most crucial components of our discussions so far is the fact that the partial
substitution of labor with automated machinery, besides altering the structure of produc-
tion, changes the extent of available information for principal. Machines, in contrast to
their human counterparts, does not have a performance measure, and partial substitution
of labor force eliminates a signal that carries information about the aggregate stance of the
economy as well.
In this section, we study a model in which the production, in every period, results
in a stochastic outcome with a distribution purely depending on the effort choices. The
realization of this stochastic outcome comprises the only source of information available
to principal. In this regard, the automation does not have a direct effect on available
information.
We show that our main result follows here as well, i.e., a human-human team may
be preferable to a human-machine team even though machine has a lower cost compared
to human effort. As it was in the main model, within-team interaction and the principal’s
ability to exploit this interaction in her best interest via the choice of compensation scheme,
comprises the main driving force behind this result. In this regard, this section can be
considered as a robustness check with the main conclusion that our key insight is robust to
model selection.
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3.5.1 Heterogeneous Effort Decision
The employees determine their effort levels from a continuum, i.e., ei ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ {0, 1}.
The cost of effort is convex, and is assumed to be a quadratic function of the effort level,
i.e., ci(e) =
c
2e
2, ∀i ∈ {0, 1}. If the principal decides to adapt automation, she also decides
at which capacity to operate the machine. This is modeled as a choice of effort from a
continuum, i.e., em ∈ [0, 1], with the cost function cm(em) = αc2 e2m, where α ∈ [0, 1]. The
cost of operating machinery is assumed by the principal.
We assume that the effort choices of the agents remain unobservable to principal. A
stochastic outcome is realized in each period, and its distribution is determined by the
joint effort of the employees, or the employee and the machine depending on the produc-
tion regime. The principal can evaluate the agents’ performance based on this stochastic
outcome. Formally, this production outcome, in each period, results in a “success” or a “fail-
ure”. In an all-human team, the probability of achieving success is equal to f(e1, e2) = pe1e2
for a given effort profile (e1, e2). Similarly, in a human-machine system, the probability of
success is given by f(e, em) = peem.
The functional form that we assume for the probability of success has some important
implications that are worth mentioning. First, there is a complementarity between the
effort choices of each team member. More precisely, the marginal return from an agent’s
effort increases in the effort of his teammate. Second, effort of both agents are crucial in
production. In other words, the probability of success is equal to 0 in case one of the agents
exerts 0 effort, regardless of the other agent’s choice.
The values of success and the failure for the principal are normalized to 1 and 0,
respectively, and she chooses the production regime and the compensation schemes in order
to maximize her expected profit. In contrast to our main model, here in this section, the
principal also decides what effort level to induce the agents to choose, rather than directly
inducing the maximal effort level. Before delving into the agency problem, we focus on the
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first best scheme which provides a useful benchmark for the general analysis.
3.5.2 First Best Benchmark
Assume that there is a social planner who can set the level of effort for each agent. This
social planner is interested in efficiency and would like to maximize total surplus. Then,
the corresponding problem is given by:
max
e1,e2
pe1e2 − c
2
e21 −
c
2
e22.
Due to increasing marginal returns and symmetric cost structure, the solution to this prob-
lem features either maximal or minimal effort for both agents. The ratio between the
productivity and cost parameters, κ ≡ pc , is crucial for the solution. A higher κ indicates a
higher effective productivity, hence requires both agents to work at the maximal capacity.
Similarly, a lower κ indicates a lower effective productivity and hence requires both agents
to not work at all. The critical value of κ at which this switch takes place is equal to 1.
Therefore, the solution to the first best problem, (e∗1, e∗2), is given by the following:
(e∗1, e
∗
2) =

(1, 1) if κ > 1
(0, 0) if κ ≤ 1.
In the rest of the analysis we assume that κ > 1 so that we have a non-trivial problem.
When it comes to the social planner’s problem for a human-machine team, the situation
is a bit different due to the asymmetric cost structure. The problem is the following:
max
e,em
peem − c
2
e2 − αc
2
e2m.
From the first order conditions, one can easily see that as long as the production goes on,
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the social planner always set em = 1, and e = min{κ, 1}.11 Comparing the corresponding
profit with the one from shutting down the production, 0, gives us the first best solution:
(e∗, e∗m) =

(0, 0) if κ <
√
α
(κ, 1) if κ ∈ [√α, 1]
(1, 1) if κ > 1.
3.5.3 Human-Machine Team
Now, we focus on the agency problem starting with human-machine teams. The principal
specifies an amount w to pay the agent in case of a success, and also chooses at what level
to operate the machine, i.e, em. Given the values of w and em, the agent decides his effort
level e. Proposition 3.5 characterizes the optimal production plan in this regime.
Proposition 3.5. In a human-machine team, the optimal production plan, i.e., the wage,
the capacity at which the machine operates, and the induced effort level of the agent, is
characterized by:
(e, em) =

(0, 0) if κ <
√
2α
(κ2 , 1) if κ ∈ [
√
2α, 2]
(1, 1) if κ > 2
w =

1
2 if κ ≤ 2
1
κ if κ > 2
Proof. See appendix C.6.
This statement indicates that, when the effective productivity, κ, falls below a certain
threshold, i.e.,
√
2α, which is larger than the threshold of the first best benchmark due to
the agency problem, the principal shuts down the production. Otherwise, she has a positive
11The reasons are twofold. First, em cannot be strictly lower then e as it is cheaper. Second, we cannot
have an interior solution for both em, and e. To see the latter note that if some e, em ∈ (0, 1) brings a
positive social surplus, then multiplying them with 1 +  increases the surplus.
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profit and production continues. Likewise the first best benchmark, it is always optimal
to operate the machine at its maximal capacity conditional on positive production. The
induced effort from the agent, however, is not always at its maximal level due to the agency
problem as well as the asymmetric cost structure. Since the principal does not observe the
effort choice of the employee, she has to leave a positive rent to motivate him to work. This
rent increases with the induced effort level. When κ is large, the effort is productive enough
to compensate this rent, hence the principal induces the maximal effort. As κ decreases, the
effort becomes less productive, and the principal is less willing to pay rent, hence she induces
a lower effort level. Finally, as the value of κ becomes sufficiently small, the productivity
is not large enough to compensate the cost of production and the agency anymore, and the
principal shuts down the production.
3.5.4 Human-Human Team
Let the production be governed by an all-human team. The principal sets a wage w to pay
each of the agents if success is achieved as the output. Given the value of w, the strategy
profile that the agents follow comprises a team equilibrium, where the team equilibrium is
defined as it was in the benchmark model. To this respect, the principal, by her choice
of w, decides what effort levels to induce agents to exert. The next result establishes an
important step towards the goal of characterizing the optimal payment scheme and the
resulting team equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4. For a given value of the wage w, a team equilibrium outcome has to be in one
of the following forms:
i) Agents choose (e1, e2) = (1, 1) in all periods.
ii) Agents choose (e1, e2) = (0, 0) in all periods.
Proof. See appendix C.7.
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This statement indicates that the principal either shuts down the production or spec-
ifies a wage level that induces both agents to choose their maximal effort level as a team
equilibrium outcome. It is not possible to have a team equilibrium outcome in which the
agents choose an interior effort level. The intuition behind this based on the fact that, if
the agents were to choose an interior effort level at some period, they could do better by
jointly increasing their efforts at the same rate. One shall refer to appendix for more formal
discussion.
In a team equilibrium inducing the outcome (1, 1)∞, deviations trigger a continuation
play in which the agents choose their minimal efforts forever. Such a punishment is self-
enforcing as the effort profile (e1, e2) = (0, 0) is always a stage game Nash equilibrium,
hence can be a part of the team equilibrium.12 This is the most extreme punishment that
the agents can impose to each other as it brings the minimum possible continuation utility
to both.
Let ei(w, ej) be the best response of agent i, conditional on wage w and the effort choice
of his teammate ej , which follows from the following problem:
max
ei
peiejw − c
2
e2i .
The first order condition lead to ei(w, ej) = min{1, κwej}. Due to the symmetry we can
further suppress the notation, and use e(w, e) instead. In an optimal production plan that
keeps the production open, the following condition must be satisfied:
wp− c
2
≥ (1− δ)[wpe(w, 1)− c
2
(e(w, 1))2].
This incentive constraint ensures that the agents do not want to deviate from exerting
maximal effort. The left hand side of the inequality is the expected utility of an agent on the
12Such a punishment violates the renegotiation-proofness criteria proposed in the literature. In contrast to
our benchmark model, here it is not possible to find another equilibrium inducing the same outcome under
the same pay scheme without violating this criteria. This stems from the fact that it is impossible to deter
deviations without hurting Pareto efficiency in this framework with the functional form we assume.
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equilibrium path, whereas the right hind side is his expected payoff resulting from deviation.
In the current period, the agent deviates to his best response, and receives a positive payoff.
In the remaining periods, he gets punished and receives a 0 payoff. If the best response
effort level is equal to 1, then this incentive constraint is automatically satisfied. Therefore,
for this condition to be non-redundant, we must have e(w, 1) = min{1, κw} = κw, and the
above incentive constraint boils down to:
wp− c
2
≥ (1− δ)w
2p2
2c
.
Then, the principal’s problem can be written as follows:
max
w
(1− 2w)p s.t. wp− c
2
≥ (1− δ)w
2p2
2c
The objective function is equal to (1−2w)p, because both agents will get paid w if a success
takes place. From this problem, it is evident that the principal chooses the minimum wage
level satisfying the incentive constraint. If this wage level brings her a positive profit, she
keeps the production running and induces the maximal effort from the agents; otherwise
she closes the production. The next proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 3.6. The optimal production plan, i.e., the optimal wage and the induced
effort levels of agents, in a human-human team is given by:
(e1, e2) =

(0, 0) if κ ≤ 2
1+
√
δ
(1, 1) if κ > 2
1+
√
δ
w =

0 if κ ≤ 2
1+
√
δ
1
κ(1+
√
δ)
if κ > 2
1+
√
δ
Proof. See appendix C.8.
From Lemma 3.4, we already knew that the principal either shuts down the production
or induces both agents to choose their maximal effort levels as a team equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3.6 characterizes the critical value of the effective productivity below which
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shutting down the production is the optimal choice for principal. The value of this threshold
decreases with the value of δ. Intuitively this stems from the fact that as the agents become
more patient, the punishment that they impose each other becomes more deterrent. As
a result, principal can convince the agents to exert maximal effort with a lower payment,
hence she is willing to keep the production open even for lower levels of κ.
Now, we know the optimal production plans for both human-human and human-
machine teams. Thus, we can figure out the corresponding profit levels, which we denote
by pihh, and pihm respectively.
pihm =

0 if κ <
√
2α
pκ
4 − αc2 if κ ∈ [
√
2α, 2]
p− (2+α)c2 if κ > 2
pihh =

0 if κ ≤ 2
1+
√
δ
p− 2c
(1+
√
δ)
if κ > 2
1+
√
δ
It is evident from these expressions that an all-human team may generate a higher profit
for the principal depending on the parameter values. To illustrate this, suppose that the
effective productivity is sufficiently large, i.e., κ > 2, so that the principal optimally induces
the maximal effort level from the agents regardless of whether or not she initiates partial
automation. In this case, if the discount factor is greater than (2−α)
2
(2+α)2
, the principal prefers
a human-human team over a human-machine team. The agents are sufficiently patient,
as a result, the punishment that the agents impose on each other in case of a deviation,
exerting minimal effort afterwards, is more deterrent. Consequently, the principal can take
advantage of the mutual monitoring capacity between the agents at a larger scale. Another
important thing to point out is that as the cost parameter of operating machinery increases,
the cutoff value of δ at which the above switch takes place becomes smaller. Machinery
is more costly, as a result, the principal is more willing to have an all-human team in
production.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we ask a simple question: “Is it possible that partial subtitution of employees
with automation results in inferior outcomes for principals?” We find that the answer is
yes. Specifically, we extend our investigation to question how when some of the employees
in an industrial or service environment are replaced by machines, the interaction between
the members of a system changes. We show that replacing human labor with machines can,
in some cases, be suboptimal because it can make the remaining agents more expensive.
More specifically, we demonstrate in this paper that automation has both desirable and
undesirable properties. Most examples of automation introduces efficiencies in cost while
reducing the uncertainty in the quality of output. Moreover, as we argue in the extensions
to our model, automation can complement human output. Many examples where human
employees are partially replaced by their machine counterparts exist in consumer facing
environments. For instance, call center employees are replaced by automated answering
systems, cash registerers are replaced by self-check out counters, ticket salespersons are
replaced by kiosks, bank tellers are replaced by ATMs (Autor et al., 2002). Partial substi-
tution of labor with machines might result in lower productivity of the remaining workers
for behavioral reasons such as the fear of loss of employment in the future, boredom, losing
interest in jobs due to lower social interactions, or the inability to learn from peers. All of
these constitute as the undesirable effects of adopting automation at work.
In this study, we took a different approach to studying the negative impact of automa-
tion and demonstrated a reason for lower productivity under automation. Our explanation
is simple yet powerful: in the absence of human team members, the principle’s capacity
to monitor agents’ effort diminishes. This is because all-human teams have the ability to
monitor each other’s effort choices more closely compared to the principal can monitor their
work. This close monitoring results in them imposing peer sanctions on each other when a
party deviates from the optimal path of play.
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In specific, we show that adopting a regime that includes partial automation does two
things. The type of incentive scheme chosen by the principle (rewarding performance of
agents relative to each other or jointly) depends on the automation regime adopted. We
show that human teams can be incentivized based on rewarding cooperation or competi-
tion in output, conditional on the values of the discounting and common environmental
shock. Importantly, considering various payment schemes, there is a parameter region un-
der which automation is better, but also there are regions where all-human machines are
more preferable. When we contrast our results to the earlier literature, we are not only
looking at the outcome of automation (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017), but we consider the
strategic decision of adopting automation. Our study, to our knowledge is the first to argue
that while automation is expected to substitute labor, this is not unconditionally true the
despite the benefits from reduced costs lower uncertainty in output. It is also the first to
study automation in the context of teams.
When the discount rates and the degree of dependency in exogenous shocks to pro-
ductivity between the workers are low, principals prefer to introduce joint performance
evaluation (JPE) or automated systems over a relative performance evaluation (RPE). At
high discount rates and low likelihood of a good common shock (low σ), the peer sanction
by a team member is an effective disciplining device to punish the shirking member, and the
manager can induce both workers to work through JPE. In this case, as members will only
receive a wage when they both work, they can effectively monitor each other. If the dis-
count rates decreased, this makes the punishment less costly, and reduces the effectiveness
of JPE. Similarly, if the common shock is higher, the probability that an agent will receive
a favorable outcome when he shirks is higher. So under automation, the principal’s ability
to detect shirking is lower. She prefers RPE over automation when the common shock is
sufficiently high, because an RPE scheme without collusion motivates agents to choose to
work.
An important second insight coming from our research is that automation is likely to
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change the degree to which existing incentive schemes are used. The research by Che and
Yoo (2001) suggests that, in the δ - σ space, JPE is more often preferred than RPE.Indeed,
many firms hire individuals with contracts the employee is rewarded based on the perfor-
mance of others in the same team or department. In a world where automation is an option
for managers, JPE is preferred less often than RPE. In fact, if automation becomes sig-
nificantly cheaper than human work, JPE is the incentive that will cease to be effective.
While automation replaces some human labor, within the remaining all-human teams, RPE
is more common than JPE. Broadly, this implies that as technology evolves and the cost
of automation becomes cheaper, the remaining human systems are more likely to be paid
based on a relative evaluation scheme. While we do not expect human teams to be obsolete
in the near term, we expect that the payment schemes of employees in automated environ-
ments will be more competitive rather than collaborative. These can both be desirable and
undesirable for the future of human labor.
As automated systems are gradually replacing human labor in manufacturing and ser-
vice environments, managers are naturally concerned about the morale of the remaining
employees. The World Bank estimates that about %60 of jobs will be automated in the
near future (Frey and Osborne, 2017).
So what could the principals do to prepare for automation? First automation is likely
to bring significant cost savings compared to human operators. But we show that principals
should not expect to adopt automation under all conditions. In fact, automation can be
more expensive compared to human labor when the principal has the ability to detect
employee shirking or when the agents in a team have incentives to monitor each other’s
behavior.
Our findings help managers to think about how to set employee contracts to increase
the efficiency of their systems. For policy makers or social planners, the concerns span
beyond higher efficiency in workplaces. It is important that humans obtain and maintain
employment and do not lose a significant income to maintain quality of life. While our
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findings show that automation is indeed set to replace jobs, this may not necessarily be the
outcome in all environments. Particularly when humans value their future earnings highly,
and in economies where individuals are more likely to observe favorable outcomes, automa-
tion may be less preferred by the principles. This statement, however, should be taken
with a grain of salt since out study only applies to environments with partial substitution.
When full substitution is possible, then a manager could always yield higher benefits. Full
automation in all work environments or may happen in the not so near future. Until then,
there are reasons to believe that human teams will not become obsolete.
For future research, we leave many interesting questions. Many service robots in prac-
tice are installed in consumer facing environments (ATM machines, automatized call centers,
recommendation and information kiosks in stores). Moreover, robots, machines and smart
technologies are also helping consumers to go through their days, sometimes partially re-
placing human work (e.g., Roomba replacing cleaning services, Alexa replacing personal
shopping assistants, etc.). As consumers are becoming more dependent on these new tech-
nologies, this opens up a whole new area of research for marketers.
In marketing, for example, retail sales personnel are beginning to be replaced by ma-
chines that provide information about products, check availability of products in the inven-
tory, or make recommendations based on what the consumer is searching for. One relevant
question is how to set the salesforce incentives when they are working in such partly auto-
mated retail environments so that they still engage in informing and educating consumers
about the products and not simply rely on the consumers to obtain that information from
the machines.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
The principal can always randomize over different values of U with a restriction that the
expectation resulting from the randomization is exactly equal to the promised utility. This
immediately requires the concavity of the value function V , and then the almost everywhere
differentiability directly follows.1
To see the bounds indicated in expression (1.1), first note that V (0) = V ∗(0) = 0 and
V (v) = V ∗(v) = v − µ. We also know that V (U) ≤ V ∗(U) for every U ∈ [0, v], since the
value function V ∗ is defined by an optimization problem with a smaller set of constraints
compared to the one of the value function V . Moreover, V ′ is decreasing over the state
space as it is a concave function. Therefore its derivative cannot be larger than the slope
of V ∗ at 0 and cannot be smaller than the slope of V ∗ at v. But we know that the value
function V ∗ is piece-wise linear, and its slope is 1− µλµλv+c over the interval [0, (1−µλ)v−c),
and equal to 1− µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v−c over the interval ((1− µλ)v − c, v]. This concludes our proof.
1One can also apply the result of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), to show the differentiability of the
value function. To see how their result can be applied in this context see for example (Horner and Guo,
2015).
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2
The continuation utilities are given in the equations 1.2 and 1.3. By utilizing these expres-
sions, it will be shown that the approval probabilities xs and xns will be set equal to their
efficient levels, 0 and 1 respectively, as long as this does not violate the promise keeping
constraint.
To this end, assume that xns(UD) < 1 for some value of UD. Then consider the
following deviation that is acquired by increasing xns by  and decreasing Uns by
(1−δ)v
δ  for
a sufficiently small . Note that this change is respecting the constraint PK. In consequence,
the principal’s utility increases by:
∆ = (1− µλ)
[
(1− δ)(v − µ(1− λ)
1− µλ ) + δ
(
V (Uns)− V (Uns − (1− δ)v
δ
)
)]
Moreover, from lemma 1.1, it is known that V ′ ≤ 1 − µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v−c . Then by using the
fundamental theorem of calculus, one can get:2
∆ ≥ (1− δ)(1− µλ)
[
v − µ(1− λ)
1− µλ v −
µ(1− λ)v
(1− µλ)v − c
]
> 0.
Therefore this deviation, in case if it is feasible, strictly benefits the principal. The
suggested deviation would not be feasible if Uns = 0, which occurs when UD < (1 −
δ)v. Therefore, when U <
¯
U = (1 − δ)v the approval rate xns will be set such that the
continuation utility Uns = 0, otherwise xns = 1. This proves the lemma for xns and Uns.
Now suppose that xs > 0 for some value of U. Then consider decreasing xs by  and
hence increasing Us by
(1−δ)v
δ  for a sufficiently small . This results with a change ∆ that
2The concavity of the value function V is sufficient for utilizing the fundamental theorem.
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is equal to:
∆ = µλ
[
−(1− δ)(v − 1) + δ
(
V (Us)− V (Us + (1− δ)v
δ
)
)]
Again from lemma 1.1, we know that V ′ ≥ 1− µλµλv+c , therefore:
∆ ≥ (1− δ)µλ
[
1− v + v − µλv
µλv + c
]
> 0.
Therefore this deviation, as long as it is feasible, strictly benefits the principal. The sug-
gested deviation would not be feasible if Us = v, which occurs when UD > δv − (1−δ)cµλ .
Therefore when U > U¯ = δv − (1−δ)cµλ the approval rate xs will be set such that the contin-
uation utility Us = v, otherwise xs = 0. This proves the lemma for xs and Us.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3
First remember that V (0) = VN (0) and V (v) = VN (v). Moreover, from the optimal choice
of xn which is indicated in (1.4), it is known that:
V ′N (U) =

V ′(Uδ ) if U ≤ δ¯a
v−µ
v if U ∈ (δ¯a, δa¯+ (1− δ)v)
V ′(U−(1−δ)vδ ) if U ≥ δa¯+ (1− δ)v
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Then by the concavity, the comparison of V ′ and V ′N satisfies:
V ′N (U) ≤ V ′(U) if U ∈ [0, δ¯a]
V ′N (U) < V
′(U) if U ∈ (δ
¯
a,
¯
a)
V ′N (U) = V
′(U) if U ∈ [
¯
a, a¯]
V ′N (U) > V
′(U) if U ∈ (a¯, δa¯+ (1− δ)v)
V ′N (U) ≥ V ′(U) if U ∈ [δa¯+ (1− δ)v, v]
But this requires that:
VN (U) ≤ V (U) if U ∈ [0, δ
¯
a]
VN (U) < V (U) if U ∈ (δ
¯
a, δa¯+ (1− δ)v)
VN (U) ≤ V (U) if U ∈ [δa¯+ (1− δ)v, v]
Otherwise it would not be possible to have V (0) = VN (0) and V (v) = VN (v). Therefore,
the equality V = VN can only arise in [0, δ
¯
a] ∪ [δa¯ + (1 − δ)v, v], and this in turn implies
that xn ∈ {0, 1} in the optimal policy.
Focusing on the interval [0, δ
¯
a] first, from the solution of the problem PN , it is known
that xn = 0 and V
′
N ≤ V ′. Then due to the fact V (0) = VN (0), it immediately follows that
there must exists a critical value
¯
UN , satisfying the following:
¯
UN = sup{U ∈ [0, v] | V = VN over [0, U ]}
Since VN < V over the interval (δ
¯
a, δa¯+ (1− δ)v), we must have UN ≤ δ
¯
a. In principle UN
might be 0 so that [0, UN ] = {0}. However, we will show that
¯
UN > 0.
Suppose
¯
UN = 0 to get a contradiction, and hence VN (U) < V (U) for each U sufficiently
close to 0. However, when U is sufficiently close to 0, the solution to the problem PN implies
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that xs = 0, xns =
U
(1−δ)v , Uns = 0, and Us =
U
δ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ , therefore:
VD(U) = (1− δ)
[
(1− µλ) U
(1− δ)v (v −
µ(1− λ)
1− µλ )− c
]
+ δµλV (Uδ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ )
Then from the upper bound of V ′, it is known that:
V (Uδ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ ) ≤
(
U
δ
+ (1−δ)cδµλ
)(
1− µ(1− λ)
(1− µλ)v − c
)
.
Thus, VD(U) < 0 for sufficiently small U . Which suggests that VD(U) < V (U), as well as
VN (U) < V (U), when U goes to 0.
Consequently, there must be a randomization, i.e. γ ∈ (0, 1), for the values of U that
are close enough to 0. This in turn, requires that V is linear in this region, with a slope m.
Then in this region, VN (U) = δV (
U
δ ) = δm
U
δ = V (U), and this gives us a contradiction as
we assumed that VN < V . Therefore UN > 0.
To show the linearity of V , and hence VN , over [0, UN ], note that V
′(U) = V ′N (U) =
V ′(Uδ ) in this region. However, since V is concave, the derivative is weakly decreasing.
Hence the derivative must be constant, i.e the value function is linear.
The proof for the other end of the state space follows from analogous arguments.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1.4
Refer to the main text for the proof of the first part, i.e. V (U) = VD(U), and γ(U) = 1 for
every U ∈ [
¯
UD, U¯D].
To show the second part of the result, i.e the inequality
¯
UD ≤
¯
U < U¯ ≤ U¯D, I focus
on the comparison between
¯
UD and
¯
U . To get a contradiction, suppose that the inequality
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¯
UD >
¯
U holds, and hence:
V (
¯
UD) = (1− δ) [(1− µλ)v − µ(1− λ)− c] + δ
[
µλV ( ¯
UD
δ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ ) + (1− µλ)V ( ¯UD−(1−δ)vδ )
]
= m
¯
UD
where m is the constant slope of V over [0,
¯
UD]. Then, consider some U =
¯
UD −  for a
sufficiently small  > 0 satisfying U >
¯
U . Clearly:
VD(U) = (1− δ) [(1− µλ)v − µ(1− λ)− c] + δ
[
µλV (Uδ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ ) + (1− µλ)V (U−(1−δ)vδ )
]
> V (
¯
UD)−m.
The strict inequality stems from the fact that:
V ( ¯
UD
δ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ )− V (Uδ + (1−δ)cδµλ ) < m

δ
V ( ¯
UD−(1−δ)v
δ )− V (U−(1−δ)vδ ) = m

δ
.
But this consists of a contradiction, since
VD(U) > V (
¯
UD)−m = m(
¯
UD − ) = V (U)
Therefore the inequality
¯
UD ≤
¯
U holds. By analogous arguments one can also show that
U¯D ≥ U¯ , hence the proof is complete.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.1
To complete the proof, one just needs to show that the value function V is strictly concave
over the interval [
¯
UD, U¯D].
It is already shown that
¯
UD ≤
¯
U < U¯ ≤ U¯D. Moreover, the description of the optimal
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approval decisions (xs, xns), and the continuation utilities (Us, Uns) are provided in lemma
1.2. Then, by using the fact that V = VD over [
¯
UD, U¯D], one can get:
V (U) =

(1− δ)(1− µλ) U(1−δ)v (v − µns) + δµλV (Us) if UD ∈ [¯UD, ¯U)
(1− δ)pi + δ[(1− µλ)V (Uns) + µλV (Us)] if UD ∈ [
¯
U, U¯ ]
(1− δ)[pi + µλ(U+
(1−δ)c
µλ
−δv
(1−δ)v )(v − 1)] + δ(1− µλ)V (Uns) if UD ∈ (U¯, U¯D]
Where the continuation utilities are given by:
Us =
U
δ
+
(1− δ)c
δµλ
and Uns =
U
δ
− (1− δ)v
δ
.
Hence the derivative of V over [
¯
UD, U¯D] satisfies:
V ′(U) =

(1− µλ)(v−µnsv ) + µλV ′(Us) if UD ∈ (¯UD, ¯U ]
(1− µλ)V ′(Uns) + µλV ′(Us) if UD ∈ [
¯
U, U¯ ]
(1− µλ)V ′(Uns) + µλ(v−1v ) if UD ∈ (U¯, U¯D]
I want to show that, there does not exist an interval in [
¯
UD, U¯D] over which the value
function is linear. Suppose not in order to get a contradiction. Let I be the largest interval
with a linear V .
First, note that v−µnsv > s¯, and (
v−1
v ) < ¯
s, where s¯ and
¯
s are the upper and lower
bounds for V ′ respectively.3 Therefore, V ′ cannot stay constant in any neighborhoods of
¯
U and U¯ . As a result, there are three possible cases: i)I ⊂ [
¯
UD,
¯
U), ii) I ⊂ (U¯, U¯D], iii)
I ⊂ [
¯
U, U¯ ].
For the first case, due to the concavity of V , V ′ must be constant over Us|I =
(Us(inf(I)), Us(sup(I))). Moreover, due to the lower bound on δ, Us(inf(I)) < U¯ , hence
Us|I ⊂ [
¯
UD, U¯D]. This gives an immediate contradiction with the definition of I, since the
3See lemma 1.1.
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length of Us|I is larger than the length of I. An analogous contradiction carries over the
second case.
For the last case, V ′ must be constant along the intervals Us|I and Uns|I , due to the
concavity of V . Moreover, either Us(inf(I)) < U¯ or Uns(sup(I)) > U¯ must be correct,
because both of them cannot be wrong at the same time due to the lower bound on δ.
Therefore, either Us|I or Uns|I must be the subset of [
¯
U, U¯ ] ⊂ [
¯
UD, U¯D], which contradicts
with the definition of I, because both of these intervals have a larger length than I.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 1.5
Define:
¯
b = inf{U ∈ [0, v] | V˜ ′(U) ≤ v − µ
v
},
b¯ = sup{U ∈ [0, v] | V˜ ′(U) ≥ v − µ
v
}.
Then the optimal approval decision conditional on no self-monitoring satisfies:
x˜n(UN ) =

0 if UN ≤ δ
¯
b
∈ (0, 1) if UN ∈
(
δ
¯
b, δb¯+ (1− δ)v)
1 if UN ≥ δb¯+ (1− δ)v
. (A.1)
Therefore:
V˜ ′N (UN ) =

V˜ ′(Uδ ) if UN ≤ δ¯b
v−µ
v if UN ∈ (δ¯b, δb¯+ (1− δ)v)
V˜ ′(U−(1−δ)vδ ) if UN ≥ δb¯+ (1− δ)v
Clearly V˜N (v) = V˜ (v), since there is only one possible way to provide the maximal
utility to the agent. However, unlike the previous case, the equality V˜N (0) = V˜ (0) does
not hold. To see this, first observe that V˜N (0) = 0. Then, in order to examine the value of
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V˜D(0), by using the fact that the incentive and the promise keeping constraints are binding,
we get:
U˜ns(0) = −(1− δ)v
δ
x˜ns(0),
U˜s(0) =
1− δ
δµλ
c− (1− δ)v
δ
x˜s(0).
Obviously, x˜ns = 0 since the continuation utility U˜ns(0) cannot be negative. Moreover,
U˜s(0) =
1−δ
δµλ c, since the optimal choice of x˜s(0) is 0.
4 As a result, V˜D(0) = δV˜ (
(1−δ)c
δµλ ),
which is strictly positive. Therefore we must have V˜N < V˜ (0) = V˜D(0). Then by using this
and fundamental theorem of calculus together with the following
V˜ ′N (U) ≤ V˜ ′(U) if U ∈ [0, δ¯b]
V˜ ′N (U) < V˜
′(U) if U ∈ (δ
¯
b,
¯
b)
V˜ ′N (U) = V˜
′(U) if U ∈ [
¯
b, b¯]
V˜ ′N (U) > V˜
′(U) if U ∈ (b¯, δb¯+ (1− δ)v)
V˜ ′N (U) ≥ V˜ ′(U) if U ∈ [δb¯+ (1− δ)v, v]
we can conclude that there exists U˜N such that V˜ (U) = V˜N (U) if and only if U ∈ [ ˜¯UN , v].
In addition, the facts that U˜N is strictly smaller than v, and V˜ is linear over [
U˜N−(1−δ)v
δ , v]
follow from exactly the same arguments provided in the proof of lemma 1.3. On the other
hand, since ˜¯UN ∈ [δb¯+ (1− δ)v, v], it immediately follows that x˜n = 1 over [ ˜¯UN , v].
A.7 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Initially note that it is already known that the equality V˜ = V˜D holds at 0 and U˜D, Then
the same logic that is used in lemma 1.3, it immediately follows that the equality V˜ = V˜D
holds for each U ∈ [0, U˜D].
4Refer to earlier discussions to see why it is optimal to set x˜s equal to 0.
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When it comes to the approval decisions, the case for x˜s has already been discussed.
Here the focus will be on the contingency of no self-reporting, i.e the choice variables x˜ns,
and U˜ns. Since these variables are isolated from the other contingency, their choice satisfy
the following local problem:
max
x˜ns
(1− δ)x˜ns(v − µ(1−λ)1−µλ ) + δV˜ (U˜ns)
s.t. (1− δ)vx˜ns + δU˜ns = U
From the constraint, it is possible to substitute between x˜ns and U˜ns at a rate 1 to
(1−δ)v
δ ;
moreover their marginal returns for the principal are (1 − δ)(v − µ(1−λ)1−µλ ), and δV˜ ′(Uns)
respectively. Therefore, showing that V˜ ′ < 1− µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v , would be sufficient to complete the
proof. Suppose not to get a contradiction, and define:
¯
d = inf{U ∈ [0, v] | V˜ ′(U) ≤ 1− µ(1− λ)
(1− µλ)v},
d¯ = sup{U ∈ [0, v] | V˜ ′(U) ≥ 1− µ(1− λ)
(1− µλ)v}.
From the hypothesis it is known that d¯ > 0. Moreover, x˜ns(U) = 0, U˜ns(U) =
U
δ , and
x˜s(U) =
U
δ +
(1−δ)c
δµλ , ∀U ∈ [0, δ¯d]. This would require that V˜
′ = (1−µλ)V˜ ′(U˜ns)+µλV˜ ′(U˜s),
i.e the derivative of the value function is equal to the the expectation of the derivative over
the continuation values. This in turn requires V˜ ′ to be constant over [0,
¯
d + (1−δ)cδµλ ], due
to the concavity together with the fact that U˜s(U), U˜ns(U) > U , for every U ∈ [0, δ
¯
d].
Therefore
¯
d must be equal to 0.
Now it is known that, V˜ ′(U) = 1 − µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v , for every U ∈ [0, d¯]. Then again from the
same logic, this constant slope must carry over to a larger region, and hence constitutes a
contradiction with the definition of d¯, as it requires that V ′(U˜s(U)) = 1− µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v , x˜s = 0,
∀U ∈ [0, d¯]. This stems from the fact that V˜ ′ = (1− µλ)
(
1− µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v
)
+ µλV˜ ′(U˜s), as the
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principal is indifferent between the marginal increase on x˜ns and U˜ns in this region. As a
result we have V˜ ′ < 1− µ(1−λ)(1−µλ)v , and the result immediately follows.
Finally the strict concavity, and the inequality U˜D > U¯ follows from the identical
arguments presented in the previous case, hence not repeated here.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 1.6
First of all, Umax = sup{W | VW (W ) ≥ 0} exists since W takes its values from a bounded
interval. Therefore, to complete the proof, one just needs to show that VUmax(U) ≥ 0 for each
U ∈ [0, Umax]. Suppose not to get a contradiction, and assume that VUmax(Umax) < 0. Then
the definition of Umax implies that ∀ > 0, ∃U ∈ [Umax − , Umax], such that VU(U) ≥ 0.
However, it is known that VW (U) is continuous on U and W , therefore VW (W ) must be
continuous in W . Therefore ∃∗ > 0 such that ∀W ∈ [Umax−∗, Umax], VW (W ) < 0. Which
is a contradiction. Therefore VUmax(Umax) ≥ 0.
To show that the last inequality holds with equality, suppose that VUmax(Umax) > 0.
Then the principal could grant the agent a utility level that is slightly higher than Umax
due to the continuity of VW (w), and this contradicts with the definition of Umax.
Finally, in order to show that increasing µ strictly decreases Umax, let µ and µ
′ are two
values with µ > µ′. Note that, an incentive compatible policy when the prior is equal to
µ is also incentive compatible when prior is µ′ and vice versa. This stems from the fact
that the agent does not care about the type of the project. Let Umax be the corresponding
maximal state variable when prior is µ. Take an optimal policy when the agent is given
Umax. It is clear that this policy would bring a strictly positive value to principal when the
prior is µ′, therefore the corresponding maximal state variable, U ′max must be strictly larger
than Umax.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
The “only if part” of the statement follows directly from revealed preferences. In other
words, if the mechanism is incentive compatible, then the buyer of type x does not want to
mimic type x′ and vice versa. More precisely take x > x′, then:
U(x) ≥ e−rtx′ (x
r
− ptx′ ) = U(x′) + e−rtx′ (
x
r
− x
′
r
)
U(x′) ≥ e−rtx(x
′
r
− ptx) = U(x)− e−rtx(
x
r
− x
′
r
)
Then we get,
e−rtx
r
≥ U(x)− U(x
′)
x− x′ ≥
e−rtx′
r
(B.1)
which requires tx ≤ tx′ . Therefore we get i). Now, since tx is monotone it is differentiable
and continuous almost everywhere. Therefore e−rtx is differentiable and continuous a.e. and
hence, limx′→x e
−rtx′
r =
e−rtx
r a.e. We also know that U(x) is continuous and differentiable
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a.e so by taking the limit of the expression (B.1), when x′ → x, we get
∂U(x)
∂x
=
1
r
e−rtx a.e.
Hence, ii) follows immediately.
For the “if” part, suppose for a given mechanism conditions i) and ii) are satisfied,
and we want to show that this mechanism is incentive compatible. Take any two arbitrary
types x, and x′ and WLOG assume x > x′. First, we want to show that x does not want
to report his type as x′. In other words the following must be true
U(x) ≥ e−rtx′ (x
r
− ptx′ ) = U(x′) + e−rtx′ (
x
r
− x
′
r
). (B.2)
However by ii) we know that
U(x)− U(x′) = 1
r
∫ x
x′
e−rtx˜dx˜.
Hence, expression (B.2) boils down to:
∫ x
x′
e−rtx˜dx˜ ≥ e−rtx′ (x− x′).
But this is correct given monotonicity in i). Similar arguments follow for the reports of x′
as well. Hence the statement is true.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2.4
i) Monotonicity: Take arbitrarily two agents of type x, and x′, where x > x′ without loss
of generality, we want to show that tx ≤ tx′ . Showing that purchasing the good at time
t > tx′ is worse then purchasing it at tx′ for agent x is sufficient to prove monotonicity. To
this end, take an arbitrary t satisfying t > tx′ . We know by revealed preferences of agent
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x′ that:
U(x′) ≥ e−(r+λ)t (x
′
r
− pt) +
∫ t
0
e−(r+λ)TλV Tβx′dT +
∫ ∞
t
e−(r+λ)TλV T(β−1)x′dT
Then we get:
x′
r
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t)− (e−(r+λ)tx′ptx′ − e−(r+λ)tpt) ≥
∫ t
tx′
e−(r+λ)Tλ(V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)dT
We want show that the symmetric version of the above expression holds for agent x as well.
Hence we need show
x− x′
r
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t) ≥
∫ t
tx′
e−(r+λ)Tλ
(
(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x)− (V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)
)
dT.
(B.3)
Now to show the inequality above is correct we need to consider two cases.
• Case 1 : [x′ < β−1β x]
Incentive compatibility in the second step is satisfied by hypothesis. Therefore, by the
second condition in Lemma 2.3 we know that the highest possible value of
(
(V Tβx−V T(β−1)x)−
(V Tβx′−V T(β−1)x′)
)
can be attained by arranging tTz = 0, for all z ∈ [(β−1)x, βx], and tTz =∞,
for all z ∈ [0, (β − 1)x). Therefore
(
(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x)− (V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)
) ≤ x
r
,
which leads to
∫ t
tx′
e−(r+λ)Tλ
(
(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x)− (V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)
)
dT ≤ x λ
r(r + λ)
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t).
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However, since x′ < β−1β x, and λ <
r
β−1 , we know that
x− x′
r
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t) > x λ
r(r + λ)
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t).
Therefore equation (B.3) is satisfied and we are done for this case.
• Case 2 : [x′ ≥ β−1β x]
Again by Lemma 2.3 the highest possible value of
((
(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x) − (V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)
)
can be attained by arranging tTz = 0, for all z ∈ [βx′, βx], and tTz = ∞, for all z ∈ [0, βx′).
Therefore,
(
(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x)− (V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)
) ≤ (x− x′)β
r
.
Hence
∫ t
tx′
e−(r+λ)Tλ
(
(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x)− (V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)
)
dT ≤ (x− x′) βλ
r(r + λ)
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t).
However, since λ < rβ−1 , we know that
x− x′
r
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t) > (x− x′) λβ
r(r + λ)
(e−(r+λ)tx′ − e−(r+λ)t).
So equation (B.3) is valid for this case as well. Hence we are done to show monotonicity.
ii) Derivative of Vx: By truthfully reporting, agent get the utility
U(x) = Vx +
∫ tx
0
e−(r+λ)TλV TβxdT +
∫ ∞
tx
e−(r+λ)TλV T(β−1)xdT.
Now, for a given type x′ with x > x′, what would happen if the agent x reports his type
as x′ at first stage reports? He would be allocated the first version of the good at time
tx′ rather than tx where, from from part i), we know that tx ≤ tx′ . This deviation from
truth-telling will affect his utility via two different channels. The first channel is a direct
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effect as he now acquires the first version at a different time.1 The second channel is an
indirect effect due to the change on second stage utility.
We know that the second step of the mechanism is incentive compatible and so the agent
x reports his effective type truthfully in the second stage. Because of this, misreporting in
the first stage alters the reports of the second stage only if it alters the effective types at
the realized arrival time. This happens only if the arrival occurs between tx and tx′ . In
particular, after truthful reporting, the effective type of agent x would be (β − 1)x inside
the time interval (tx, tx′), and it would be βx if he deviates and misreports its type as x
′.
Therefore, the incentive constraint of agent x preventing him to not to mimic x′ is
U(x) ≥ e−(r+λ)tx′(x
r
− ptx′
)
+
∫ tx′
0
e−(r+λ)TλV TβxdT +
∫ ∞
tx′
e−(r+λ)TλV T(β−1)xdT
= Vx′ + e
−(r+λ)tx′ (x− x′)
r
+
∫ tx′
0
e−(r+λ)TλV TβxdT +
∫ ∞
tx′
e−(r+λ)TλV T(β−1)xdT.
The incentive constraint of the agent x′ preventing him to mimic x is a symmetric version
of the above expression. Then by combining these two inequalities we get
e−(r+λ)tx
r
+
∫ tx′
tx
e−(r+λ)Tλ(V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)dT
x− x′ ≥
Vx − Vx′
x− x′ ≥
e−(r+λ)tx′
r
+
∫ tx′
tx
e−(r+λ)Tλ(V Tβx − V T(β−1)x)dT
x− x′ .
First of all, we know tx is monotone. Therefore it is continuous almost everywhere, and so
when x′ → x, e−(r+λ)tx′r → e
−(r+λ)tx
r , almost everywhere. Moreover, when x
′ → x, by using
Leibniz Rule, L’Hopital’s Rule, almost everywhere continuity of tx and incentive constraints
of second step reports which we have proven in previous Lemma 2.3, we get the following :
limx′→x
∫ tx′
tx
e−(r+λ)Tλ(V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)dT
x− x′ = limx′→x
∫ tx′
tx
e−(r+λ)Tλ(V Tβx′ − V T(β−1)x′)dT
x− x′
= −λ e−(r+λ)tx ∂tx
∂x
(V txβx − V tx(β−1)x) a.e
1If tx = tx′ then we do not need to worry about first stage incentive constraints.
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Therefore we can conclude that
∂Vx
∂x
=
e−(r+λ)tx
r
− λ e−(r+λ)tx ∂tx
∂x
(V txβx − V tx(β−1)x) a.e
Then by integrating it we get the result ii).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1
For now, rather than the problem in (2.4), we consider an auxiliary problem in which the
second term of the objective function is omitted. Precisely
max
{tx}x∈[0,1],{{tTx }x∈[0,1]}T>0
1
r
∫ 1
0
e−(r+λ)tx
(
x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
)
f(x)dx
+
λ
r
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ)T
(∫ 1
0
e−rt
T
x
(
x− 1− FT (x)
fT (x)
)
fT (x)dx
)
dT
subject to • tx is non-increasing in x
• tTx is non-increasing in x, ∀T ∈ [0,∞) (B.4)
In this problem, the contingent allocation terms {tTx }x∈[0,1], for the second version of the
good, appear only on the last term of the objective function. Then the optimal {tTx }x∈[0,1]
for this problem will be similar to the one of the canonical model. Therefore it follows a
cutoff rule, where the value of the cutoff is a function of the distribution fT (.). Hence we
denote the cutoff value by x?(fT ), and its value is exactly the same as the value of the cutoff
for the static monopoly with distribution fT (.). So that for a given fT the allocations are
of the form:
tTx =
 0 x ≥ x
?(fT )
∞ x < x?(fT )
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On the other hand, the first version allocations {tx}x∈[0,1] are affecting both lines of the
objective function as they alter the distribution functions fT (.) of the effective types. If
this indirect effect did not exist, then the optimal allocation rule would be the immediate
allocation for those agents having a type higher then x? i.e the static monopoly allocation.
Despite this additional effect, the optimal allocations have a similar structure to the one of
the static monopoly in the sense that it also follows a cutoff rule. This is because of the
stationary structure of the environment
Claim: There is a cutoff value xˆ, depending on the values of λ, α, r, such that the
optimal solution of the program (B.4) satisfies:
tx =
 0 x ≥ xˆ∞ x < xˆ
Proof of the Claim: This is due to the stationary structure resulting from the Poisson
arrival process. In particular, if at t 6= 0 an agent is allocated the first version of the good
then it must be the case that the total effect of allocating the first version to this agent
on the objective function is positive. But then it must be positive t=0 as well since the
environment is stationary. Therefore it is better for the monopolist to allocate the good to
this agent at the beginning t = 0. Hence we know that the term tx must be either 0 or ∞
for every x. Furthermore, since tx is restricted to be monotone with respect to x, optimal
solution must incorporate a structure as given above. 
Then we have the solution of the problem (B.4), as:
tx =
 0 x ≥ xˆ∞ x < xˆ ∀T, tTx =
 0 x ≥ x
?(xˆ)
∞ x < x?(xˆ)
Since the allocation of the first version only occurs at t = 0, the distribution of the
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effective types is independent of the realized arrival time T, and just depending on the
cutoff of the first version allocations. Moreover, the allocation of the second version is same
with the static monopoly allocations corresponding to the effective type distribution.
Turning back to the original problem of the monopolist as defined in (2.4) we know that
the second term, which is omitted in the relaxed problem, would be equal to zero under
the allocation rule that is specified above. This is because of the fact that ∂tx∂x = 0 almost
everywhere. Furthermore, we also know that the highest possible value of this term is also
zero, since tx must be non-increasing and hence its derivative is never strictly positive.
Therefore the solution of program (B.4), which is defined as above, is also the solution for
the original problem (2.4) as it is maximizing the second term as well. Then we have x1 = xˆ,
and x2 = x
?(xˆ).
B.4 Proof of Lemma 2.5
To start with the first part suppose that the L-type buyers purchase both versions, hence
pT < (β − 1)L. Then the H-type buyers purchase the second version as well, since pT <
(β−1)H. Moreover, since purchasing the first version conditional on purchasing the second
version has a positive return for the L-type buyers, it must have a positive return for the
H-type buyers as well hence H-type buyers also purchase the first version.
For the second part, suppose the L-type buyers purchase the first version at t < t?.
Then, to prove the statement, we just need to show that the H-type buyers purchase the
first version of the good, thanks to our observation given before. Suppose not to get a
contradiction. Then it must be the case that the L-type buyers are only purchasing the first
version of the good while H-type buyers are only purchasing the second version, because
otherwise if the L-type buyers were purchasing the second version, then, from the first part
of the lemma, the H-type buyers would purchase both versions of the good. Also, if a H-type
buyers is not purchasing the second version, then it means that he is not purchasing any
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versions of the good which would also be a contradiction. Then by the revealed preferences:
e−rt(L− pt) ≥ e−rT (βL− pT )
e−rT (βL− pT ) ≥ e−rt(H − pt)
Which is a direct contradiction since H > L and e−rt > e−rt? = βe−rT .
B.5 Proof of Lemma 2.6
Showing that under the optimal price path there must be an agent of some type that is
purchasing at t = 0 would be sufficient to prove this lemma due to the second part of
Lemma 2.5.
Assume that nobody purchases at t=0 to get a contradiction. There must be a sale
of the first version at some time before T, because otherwise, if there is a sale of only the
second version good, we would get a contradiction immediately, as the monopolist could
deviate and sell only the first version of the good at t = 0 to the agents that are purchasing
the second version. This is better for the firm as it can get a higher discounted payment
due to assumption 2.2.
Denote the earliest time period at which a sale of the first version occurs by t. We want
to show that it is equal to 0. Suppose t > 0 to get a contradiction. Then there must be a
sale of the second version of the good, because otherwise there exists an obvious profitable
deviation, which is selling at t = 0 with the price level pt. If the agent purchasing the first
version at t also purchases the second version, then it must be a H-type from lemma 2.5.
Then the monopolist can be made better off by changing the price level at t = 0 so that
the H-type is indifferent between purchasing at 0 and t as that does not alter the incentives
of the L-type buyers. We get a similar contradiction for the other case in which the agent
purchasing the first version at t is not purchasing the second version.
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.2
To prove the proposition, we first treat the price of the second version of the good as a fixed
value. We then find the corresponding optimal price path {pt}t∈[0,T ) of the first version of
the good for any given value of pT and we finally optimize pT at the end. There are 5 cases
to consider for pT .
i) βH < pT .
In this case there is no sale of the second version of the good. We know that in an optimal
policy H-type buyers purchase the first version at t=0, and the maximum amount that they
are willing to pay at t=0 is H. On the other hand, at any time t > T , the L-type buyers
are willing to pay at most L (given that there is no sale of the second version). Therefore,
if the monopolist is going to sell the first version of the good to L-type buyers at a time t,
then he should arrange the price as pt = L. However this will affect the incentives of the
H-type buyers that are purchasing at t = 0. Given that pt = L for some t, the maximum
amount that the H-type buyers are willing to pay at t = 0, which we denote by p¯, satisfies
H − p¯ = e−rt(H − L)
p¯ = (1− e−rt)H + e−rtL
And the corresponding profit of the monopolist, when L-type buyers purchase at time t, is
Πt = µ((1− e−rt)H + e−rtL) + (1− µ)e−rtL. (B.5)
Note that the expression above is linear in e−rt, hence it is maximized either at t = 0 or
at t = ∞2. If t = 0 is optimal, then both types purchase the good at t = 0 and the price
level is equal to L. On the other hand, if t = ∞ is optimal, then only the H-type buyers
2It is also possible have that any t > 0 is a maximizer of the expression B.5. In such a case restricting t
to be either 0 or ∞ is wlog.
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purchase the good (at t = 0) at price H.
Therefore, for the first case there are two candidates of the optimal policy.
• A1: Sell the first version of the good to agents of both types at t=0 at a price level L
and have no sales of the second version.
• A2: Sell the first version only to the H-types at t=0 at a price level H, and have no
sales of the second version.
Actually, this is analogous to the result of Stokey (1979) and intuitively follows because if
there is no sales of the second version, we turn back to canonical model.
ii) (β − 1)H < pT ≤ βH.
At the optimal policy, the marginal benefit from the second version of the good is (β− 1)H
for H-type buyers since they purchase the first version at t = 0. Therefore, there is no
sale of the second version in this case as well. However, the situation is different than
the previous case in the sense that now there is an additional option for H-type buyers.
In other words, by purchasing only the second version of the good, they can guarantee a
non-negative utility. As a result, the maximum amount that H-type buyers are willing to
pay at t=0 is less than H. Denote this maximum price level by p¯, which satisfies:
H − p¯ = e−rTβH − e−rT pT .
p¯ = (1− βe−rT )H + e−rT pT
Where the LHS of the first line is the utility from the purchase of the first version of the
good, and the RHS is from the purchase of the second version. Similar to the previous case,
a candidate optimal policy is selling the first version good at t=0, to both types of agents
at a price L3. However, the corresponding policy would be equivalent to A1, so that we do
3Note that L is less than p¯, since pT ≤ βH, βe−rT < 1, and (β − 1)H > βL. Therefore H-type buyers
are willing to buy at this price level.
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not write it again here.
We can think of another candidate, which is a modified version of the policy A2, that
is selling version 1 at t=0 only to the H-type buyers but now with a payment p¯, rather than
H. However, this policy is strictly dominated since the payment is less than the one of A2.
Finally, in policy A2, there is no sale of the first version to the L-types, which is due to
the fact that the monopolist needs to decrease the price level at t = 0 (which was equal to
H) to be able to sell to the L-type buyers at any time. However, in this case, by departing
from the case 1, there may exists a time period earlier than T, at which selling the good to
the L-type buyers at the maximum price that they are willing to pay (which is equal to L)
does not hurt the incentives of the H-types. Hence it does not require to decrease the price
at t=04, because, now H-type buyers are having a positive utility from the first version
purchase at price p¯. Nevertheless, even if such a period of time exists, doing any better
than both of the policies A1 and A2 is not possible due to the fact that the resulting policy
would be equivalent to one of the intermediate policies in the expression B.5. Therefore,
the firm cannot do any better here in this case.
iii) βL < pT ≤ (β − 1)H.
In this case, H-type buyers purchase the second version of the good, since pT is always
smaller then their marginal benefit and L-type buyers do not purchase. The maximum
amount that H-type buyers are willing to pay at t=0 for the first version of the good, p¯, in
this case satisfies the following:
H − p¯+ e−rT ((β − 1)H − pT ) = e−rT (βH − pT )
p¯ = (1− e−rT )H
where the LHS of the first line is the utility of the H-type buyers from purchasing both
4We can find such a time period by finding a t so that the H-type buyers are indifferent between purchasing
at t at price L and purchasing at time 0 with price p¯. Time period t satisfying this indifference condition
should be less than T.
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versions of the good, and the RHS is the utility from purchasing only the second version
of the good. Note that p¯ is higher than L.5 Hence the L-type buyers are not willing to
purchase at t=0 with price p¯. Then the monopolist should either set a smaller price than
p¯ at t = 0 to be able to sell the L-type buyers at t = 0, or he can sell it at a later time to
them. Note that, at any time t, the highest amount that L-type buyers are willing to pay
for the first version of the good is L as they do not purchase the second version of the good
in this case. Like in the previous cases, charging a price level that is equal to L will affect
the incentives of the H-type buyers.
One possible optimal policy here is to sell the first version of the good at t=0 to both
types of buyers at a price L, and set pT = (β − 1)H. Another possibility is to sell the first
version of the good to the H-type buyers at a price p¯ at t = 0, and to the L-type buyers at a
later time (before T) without hurting the incentives of the H-type buyers. As we discussed
in case 2, finding such a time period is possible here, because H-type buyers are having a
positive utility from purchase of the first version of the good. To find this time period, let’s
denote pHt as the price level, which leaves the H-type buyers indifferent between purchasing
good at t=0 with payment p¯, and purchasing at t with payment pHt . In particular
H − p¯ = e−rt(H − pHt )
pHt =
(e−rt − e−rT )H
e−rt
Then we can find the earliest possible time period t¯ at which the firm can sell the first
version of the good to the L-type buyers at price L without hurting the incentives of the
H-type by using the equality pHt¯ = L. In particular,
(e−rt¯ − e−rT )H = e−rt¯L
e−rt¯ = e−rT
H
H − L
5This is because βe−rT < 1, and (β − 1)H > βL.
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Note that t¯ < T is always satisfied due to assumption 2.2 and βL < (β−1)H. Hence selling
the first version of the good to the L-type buyers at t¯ at a price L is a feasible policy. To
sum up, we have the following two candidates for this case.
• A3: Sell the first version to both type of buyers at t=0 at price L, and sell the second
version to only to the H-type buyers at a price (β − 1)H.6
• A4: Sell the first version of the good to the H-type buyers at t=0 with price p¯ =
(1 − e−rT )H, and also sell to L-type buyers at t = t¯ with payment pHt¯ = L. Sell the
second version to H-type buyers at price (β − 1)H.
Note that, in this case there can not be any better policy then these two due to the linearity
of the profit function as we have discussed in case 1. For instance, take the policy A4, if it
is better to decrease the price at t=0 to sell to the L-type buyers earlier than t¯, then the
monopolist should continue to decrease price level at 0 until it reaches L at which L-type is
willing to buy; and this corresponds to the policy A3.
iv) (β − 1)L < pT ≤ βL.
In this case, the H-type buyers always purchase the second version of the good while L-type
buyers purchase the second version only if they have not purchased the first one. We can
easily see that the maximum amount that the H-type buyers are willing to pay at t = 0 for
the first version of the good is same as in case 3 and so it is equal to p¯ = (1− e−rT )H.
There are three candidates for the optimal policy in this case. The first one is to sell the
first version of the good to both types of buyers at t=0 at a price level that leaves the L-type
buyers indifferent between purchasing only the first version and purchasing only the second
version, and to sell the second version only to the H-type buyers. However, this policy is
strictly dominated by A3. In particular, the maximum amount of the payment that L-type
buyers are willing to pay at t = 0 is less than L, and the amount charged for the second
version of the good at time T is strictly less than the one of A3. The second policy, is to sell
6Note that this policy is strictly dominating the policy A1.
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the first version of the good to the H-type buyers at t=0 with price p¯ = (1−e−rT )H, and to
the L-type buyers at a later time, and to sell the second version only to the H-type buyers.
This is dominated by the policy A4 for the same reason above. Then the final candidate is:
• A5: Sell the first version of the good only to the H-type buyers at t=0 at the price
p¯ = (1− e−rT )H, and sell the second version of the good to both at the price βL.
v) pT ≤ (β − 1)L.
In this case, both types of the buyers purchase the second version of the good regardless of
their decision on the first version sales. From the same reasoning as above the maximum
amount that the H type buyers are willing to pay at t=0 is p¯ = (1 − erT )H, and he is
indifferent between purchasing the first version at t = 0 with payment p¯ and purchasing at
t with payment pHt =
(e−rt−e−rT )H
e−rt . Similarly, the maximum amount that the L-type buyers
can are willing to pay for the first version of good at time t is pLt =
(e−rt−e−rT )L
e−rt .
Since pLt < p
H
t , there does not exist a time period in which the monopolist can sell the
first version of the good tothe L-type buyers at price pLt without hurting the incentives of
the H-type buyers when they are purchasing at t = 0 with price p¯. Therefore the monopolist
must decrease the initial price to be able to sell the L-type agents at any time. Then, again
due to the linearity of the monopolist profit, there are two possibilities for the optimal
policy in this case. However one of them, which is selling the first version of the good only
to the H-type buyers with price p¯ and selling the second version of the good to both types
with a price (β−1)L is strictly dominated by the policy A5. Therefore the only option that
we are left with is:
• A6: Sell the first version of the good to both type of buyers at t=0 at a price (1 −
e−rT )L, and sell the second version of the good to both types of buyers at a price
(β − 1)L.
We have considered all of the possible optimal policies for the monopolist. First note
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that the policy A1 is strictly dominated by the policy A3, (hence we omit A1). Then the
corresponding profit level for each are listed below as follows:
Table B.1: Sale Policies and Corresponding Profits.
Policy Profit
A2 µH
A3 L+ µe−rT (β − 1)H
A4 µ[1 + e−rT (β − 2)]H + (1− µ)e−rT LHH−L
A5 µ(1− e−rT )H + e−rTβL
A6 [1 + e−rT (β − 2)]L
Each of these 5 policies may be the optimal one depending on the values of β, µ, H, L
and r. All the policies except A4 involves immediate allocations like in the stochastic arrival
case. Hence time is not used to discriminate over people in those policies. On the contrary,
in policy A4 the price of the first version of the good is decreasing over time. As a result,
purchase times of agents for the first version of the good are different for L and H-types of
buyers. More precisely, the H-type buyers purchase at the beginning, whereas the L-type
buyers purchase at a later time (before T). The reason for such a pattern is based on the
anonymous structure of the posted prices for the second version sales. The existence of the
second version puts a restriction on the amount that a H-type buyer is willing to pay for
the first version of the good since it is possible for him to give up from the purchase of the
first version of the good and purchase only the second one. As a result there exists a time
period so that the monopolist can sell the first version of the good to the L-type buyers
without hurting the incentives of the H-type buyers. This is not possible in the canonical
durable good monopoly model.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
One can rewrite the incentive constraint ICS as follows:
(1− σ)(p1 − p0)[p1(w11 − w01) + (1− p1)(w10 − w00)] ≥ c
Then, it is straightforward to see that ws solves the problem PS . Moreover, when the
incentive scheme is ws, (work, work) is a Nash equilibrium since ICS is satisfied under ws.
Next, we argue that (work, work) is indeed the unique Nash equilibrium, hence comprises a
team equilibrium as well. Suppose that the agent j chooses high level effort with probability
ej . Then, under the incentive scheme w
s, the expected payment of agent i from working
and shirking are given by:
pi(1, ej ,w
s) = (1− σ)p1[ej(1− p1) + (1− ej)(1− p0)]ws10,
pi(0, ej ,w
s) = (1− σ)p0[ej(1− p1) + (1− ej)(1− p0)]ws10,
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respectively. After plugging the value of ws10, the difference between these expected pay-
ments, which we denote by ∆pi(ej ,w
s), becomes:
∆pi(ej ,w
s) = [ej(1− p1) + (1− ej)(1− p0)] c
(1− p1) .
Note that, ∆pi(ej ,w
s) > c as long as ej < 1. Therefore, (work, work) is the unique Nash
equilibrium, and also the team equilibrium. Therefore ws is the optimal incentive scheme
in the static setting.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
We examine the problem PD by considering it as a nested optimization problem. More
precisely, we divide the entire space of incentive schemes into two sub-spaces, depending on
the comparison between the values of w11, and w10. Then we characterize the solution of
PD in these two sub-spaces separately. Getting the general solution is then just a matter
of a simple comparison between these two local solutions.
First, we analyze the case in which w11 ≤ w10. The incentive constraint ICD boils down
the incentive constraint of the static setting, i.e., ICS . Therefore, under the restriction
w11 ≤ w10, PD is equivalent to PS , hence ws is the solution.
On the other hand, when w11 ≥ w10, the incentive scheme is a JPE, since w01 = w00 = 0,
and ICD is equivalent to:
pi(1, 1,w)− c ≥ (1− δ)pi(0, 1,w) + δpi(0, 0,w). (ICJ )
Therefore, one can write the conditional problem in this case as follows:
min
w
pi(1, 1,w) s.t. ICJ , w11 ≥ w10. (PJ )
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Due to the linearity of the objective function and the constraints, the optimality requires
either to increase or to decrease w11 as much as possible. If latter is the case, then we must
have w11 = w10, due to the condition w11 ≥ w10. Moreover we know that the incentive
constraint ICJ can be rewritten as:
(p1 + δp0)w11 + [1− (p1 + δp0)]w10 ≥ cˆ
As a result, the solution to this auxiliary problem must be either wj = ( cˆp1+δp0 , 0, 0, 0), or
wI = (cˆ, cˆ, 0, 0), where cˆ = c(1−σ)(p1−p0) .
Finally, in order to get the general solution of the problem PD, one just needs to compare
the expected costs of the incentive schemes wj , ws, and wI . The statement follows from
this comparison immediately.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
The problem PR is defined as follow:
min
w11,w10
[σ + (1− σ)p1]w11 + [(1− σ)p1(1− p1)]w10 s.t. ICS , ÎCR, w11 ≤ w10.
In order to solve this problem, we need to have a precise comprehension of its constraints.
First note that, we can rewrite ICS , ICR, and IC′′R respectively as follows:
w10 + p1(w11 − w10) ≥ cˆ (ICS)
w10 + (1 + δ)p1(w11 − w10) > cˆ (ICR)
w10 + 2p1(w11 − w10) > cˆ (IC′′R)
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The constraint IC′R, on the other hand, is given by:
(
(δ + δ2)p1 − (1− δ2)p0
)
w11 +
(
(δ + δ2 − 1)− (δ + δ2)p1 + (1− δ2)p0
)
w10 > (δ + δ
2 − 1)cˆ.
As we can see from this expression, the structure of IC′R crucially depends on the value
of δ. In particular, when δ + δ2 = 1, this constraint boils down to w11 − w10 > 0, which
can never be satisfied since the problem is defined conditional on w11 ≤ w10. In such a
circumstance, to satisfy the constraint ÎCR, the incentive scheme has to satisfy either ICR,
or IC′′R. When δ + δ2 6= 1, we can express IC′R more explicitly as follows:
IC′R =

w10 +
(
1−δ2
1−δ−δ2 p0 − δ+δ
2
1−δ−δ2 p1
)
(w11 − w10) < cˆ if δ + δ2 < 1
w10 +
(
δ+δ2
δ+δ2−1p1 − 1−δ
2
δ+δ2−1p0
)
(w11 − w10) > cˆ if δ + δ2 > 1
The focus is on the incentive schemes satisfying w11 ≤ w10. Thus, the optimal values of
w11, and w10 must belong to the dashed region of the figure C.1.
w11
w10
w11 = w10 = c^
(0,0)
Figure C.1: The region satisfying w11 < w10, together with w11 ≥ 0, and w10 ≥ 0.
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The linear lines describing the constraints ICS , ICR, IC′R, IC′′R pass through the point
w11 = w10 = cˆ. Moreover, these lines never intersect again as they have different slopes.
As a result, there are two possibilities for the optimal solution: i) Increase w11 as much as
possible and set it equal to w10. ii) Decrease w11 as much as possible and set it equal to 0.
If precedent is the case, then we have w11 = w10 = cˆ. The corresponding incentive scheme
is an IPE, and the agents’ payments are independent from the performance measure of each
other. Such a scheme is obviously collusion-proof, and hence satisfies the constraints.1
The analysis is more tricky when the optimality requires to decrease w11 = 0. It turns
out that, ICR is the essential constraint to satisfy for fulfilling the comprehensive constraint
ÎCR. In other words, IC′R, and IC′′R are redundant. The redundancy of IC′′R is rather
obvious, because it is always harder to satisfy in comparison to ICR since 2p1 > (1− δ)p1.
To see the redundancy of IC′R, we consider two cases separately. When δ + δ2 > 1, IC′R
is always harder to satisfy in comparison to ICR, because
(
δ+δ2
δ+δ2−1p1 − 1−δ
2
δ+δ2−1p0
)
> (1 +
δ)p1 in this case. On the other hand, when δ + δ
2 < 1, the direction of the inequality
is reversed. In this case, if IC′R was the relevant constraint for fulfilling ÎCR, then the
incentive scheme would satisfy ICS , and IC′R at the same time. But this is impossible as
we have w11 = 0. This stems from the fact that the constraint IC′R, which is equivalent
to
(
1− 1−δ2
1−δ−δ2 p0 +
δ+δ2
1−δ−δ2 p1
)
w10 < cˆ in this case, is always violated, even for the smallest
value of w10 satisfying the constraint ICS , i.e., c1−p1 , regardless the value of δ.
To sum up, when it is optimal to set w11 = 0, the value of w10 must be the minimum
amount fulfilling ICR, and ICS . Therefore, w10 is equal to cˆ1−(1+δ)p1 .2
Now we would like to show that, when the incentive scheme is restricted to satisfy
w11 ≤ w10, the solution of the problem PR coincides with the solution of the principal’s
problem. We already argued that the incentive scheme wI is free from collusion, and induces
(work,work)∞ as a team equilibrium. This suggests that whenever wI solves PR, it also
1The constraint ÎCR is satisfied as IC′′R is satisfied.
2Since the constraint ICR is based on a strict inequality, the actual optimal value of w10 is infinitesimally
larger than cˆ
1−(1+δ)p1 .
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solves the principal’s problem conditional on w11 ≤ w10.
In order to complete the proof, one needs to show that, wr is also free from collusion.3
To this end, we argue that, (work,work)∞ is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium when
the incentive scheme is wr; hence it is also the unique team equilibrium.
First step: There is no loss of generality by restricting attention into the strategy profiles
in which the agents condition their effort choices only to the realized effort decisions in the
previous periods. Generally speaking, the agents can condition their effort choices on the
realized performance signals as well. However, for a given sub-game perfect equilibrium of
this sort, one can find another sub-game perfect equilibrium in which the strategy profile
is just a function of the effort decisions of the earlier periods. This stems from the fact
that, the agents can use a public randomization device to coordinate over all the possible
probability distributions over the action profiles that they can reach by conditioning their
efforts on the realized signals. Moreover, modifying a given strategy profile by using such
public randomization would not alter the incentives as the agents only care about their
continuation utilities while choosing their actions.
Second step: When the incentive scheme is wr, the agents never shirk together in a
sub-game perfect equilibrium. Note that, in order to convince an agent to stick with (shirk,
shirk) at some period, his continuation utility must be at least equal to U00, which is defined
by:
(1− δ)pi(0, 0,wr) + δU00 = (1− δ)pi(1, 0,wr) + δpi(1, 1,wr).
However, when the incentive scheme is wr, there does not exist a strategy profile delivering
an expected utility that is higher than or equal to U00 to both agents at the same time.
To see this, consider a strategy profile, and let λe1e2 be the discounted probability that
the effort pair (e1, e2) being chosen following this initial period at which the agents play
(shirk, shirk). For instance, if the agents alternate between (work, shirk), and (shirk, work)
3Throughout the entire proof, we assume that [1− (1 + δ)p1] > 0, so that wr10 is well defined. Otherwise,
wI would always be the optimal solution of PR, and the statement would be trivially correct.
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afterwards, then we have λ11 = 0, λ10 =
1
1+δ , λ01 =
δ
1+δ , and λ00 = 0. It is crucial to note
that, λ11 + λ10 + λ01 + λ00 = 1, since all the terms are multiplied with 1 − δ. Then the
expected continuation utilities of the agents satisfy:
U1 = λ11[pi(1, 1,w
r)− c] + λ10[pi(1, 0,wr)− c] + λ01pi(0, 1,wr) + λ00pi(0, 0,wr)
U2 = λ11[pi(1, 1,w
r)− c] + λ01[pi(1, 0,wr)− c] + λ10pi(0, 1,wr) + λ00pi(0, 0,wr)
By using the fact that, λ00 = 1− λ11 − λ10 − λ01, and plugging in the values, one can get:
U1+U2−2U00 = 2c
(p1 − p0)(1− (1 + δ)p1)
[
λ11(δp1−p0)+(λ10+λ01)[(1+δ)p1−2p0]−2(p1 − p0)
δ
]
.
The value of U1 + U2 − 2U00 is strictly negative regardless of the choices of λ11, λ10, and
λ01. Therefore, there does not exist a strategy profile delivering a continuation utility that
is higher than Us to both agents at the same time, hence they never shirk together when
the incentive scheme is wr.
Third step: Unilateral shirking can not be supported in a sub-game perfect equilibrium
either, when the incentive scheme is wr. To prove this, one needs to show that the action
pair (work, shirk) never appears in an equilibrium. From the incentive constraint ICR, we
know that in order to convince the first agent to stick with (shirk, work) when the incentive
scheme is wr, his continuation utility must be set larger than U01, where:
U01 =
1
1 + δ
[pi(1, 0,wr)− c] + δ
1 + δ
[pi(0, 1,wr)].
To complete this step of the proof, we will mainly argue that, while providing an expected
utility that is larger than U01 to an agent, it is impossible to not to violate the other agent’s
incentive constraints. First notice that, by the the definition of wr, we know that:
pi(1, 1,wr)− c = δ
1 + δ
[pi(1, 0,wr)− c] + 1
1 + δ
[pi(0, 1,wr)].4
4Since there is an  term in the value of wr, there is an arbitrarily small difference between the values of
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Then by using the facts λ00 = 0, and λ11 = 1− λ10 − λ01, we can get:
U1 =
δ + λ10 − δλ01
1 + δ
[pi(1, 0,wr)− c] + 1− λ10 + δλ01
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,wr)
U2 =
δ + λ01 − δλ10
1 + δ
[pi(1, 0,wr)− c] + 1− λ01 + δλ10
1 + δ
pi(0, 1,wr)
Thus, in order to keep the first agent’s expected utility higher than U01, we need to have
λ10 − δλ01 > 1− δ. As a result, if an agent’s utility is larger than U01, then his teammate’s
payoff must be smaller than pi(1, 1,wr) − c. This stems from the fact that the maximum
value of U2, conditional on λ10−δλ01 ≥ 1−δ, can be achieved when λ10 = 11+δ , λ(0, 1) = δ1+δ ,
and λ11 = 0.
Suppose that the agents play (shirk, work) at period 1 without loss of any generality.
Let λ2e1,e2 be the corresponding probability of agents playing (e1, e2) at t = 2. Similarly, let
λte1,e2 , be the probability of agents playing (e1, e2) at time t conditional on having played
(shirk, work) in all the previous periods. If probability of always playing (shirk, work) at
periods 1, 2, ...., t− 1 is 0, then λte1,e2 is equal to 0 as well.
Now, we will show that there does not exist a continuation play supporting (shirk, work)
as a sub-game perfect equilibrium. First, there is no loss of generality to assume that, once
the agents play (work, work) in a period, they continue to work together afterwards. By
modifying a given strategy profile, without altering the incentives, one can reach to another
strategy profile that satisfies this condition. Moreover, from the previous paragraph, we
know that, once (work, shirk) is played, the first agent’s continuation utility must be lower
than pi(1, 1,wr) − c. Then by putting all these together, we know that the first agent’s
right and left sides of the equlity. However, this does not effect our arguments.
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continuation utility starting from t = 2 satisfies:
U1 <
∞∑
t=2
Λt−101 δ
t−2λt11[pi(1, 1,w
r)− c] +
∞∑
t=2
Λt−101 δ
t−2λt01(1− δ)pi(0, 1,wr)
+
∞∑
t=2
Λt−101 δ
t−2λt10[(1− δ)(pi(1, 0,wr)− c) + δ(pi(1, 1,wr)− c)],
where Λt01 =
t∏
k=1
λk01 is the probability of having (0, 1)
t on the path of play starting from
the first period.5 Then by using the facts, λt10 = 1 − λt11 − λt01, and pi(1, 1,wr) − c =
δ
1+δ [pi(1, 0,w
r)− c] + 11+δ [pi(0, 1,wr)], one can rewrite the above inequality as follows:
U1 <
∞∑
t=2
Λt−101 δ
t−2
(
1
1 + δ
− 1− δ
1 + δ
λt11 −
1
1 + δ
λt01
)
[pi(1, 0,wr)− c]
∞∑
t=2
Λt−101 δ
t−2
(
δ
1 + δ
+
1− δ
1 + δ
λt11 +
1− δ2 − δ
1 + δ
λt01
)
pi(0, 1,wr)
However, we know that Λt01 = Λ
t−1
01 λ
t
01, therefore:
U1 <
(
1
1 + δ
− 1− δ
1 + δ
λ211 −
∞∑
t=3
Λt−101 δ
t−2
(
1− δ
δ(1 + δ)
+
1− δ
1 + δ
λt11
))
[pi(1, 0,wr)− c]
+
(
δ
1 + δ
+
1− δ
1 + δ
λ211 +
∞∑
t=3
Λt−101 δ
t−2
(
1− δ
δ(1 + δ)
+
1− δ
1 + δ
λt11
))
pi(0, 1,wr)
The right side of the inequality is maximized by setting λ211 = λ
2
01 = 0, and is equal to
U01.
6 Therefore, it is not possible to convince the first agent to stick with (shirk, work)
at t = 1, while respecting the other agent’s incentives for the future periods. To sum
up, (work,work)∞ is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, hence the team equilibrium,
when the incentive scheme is wr.
5Note that Λ101 = 1.
6Since λ201 = 0, Λ
t
01 = 0 for each t ≥ 2.
155
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
This immediately follows from the comparison between the optimal production plans for
human-human and human-machine production teams.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 3.1
So far, all the proofs are based on the assumption that w01 = w00 = 0.
7 Here, we will show
that this assumption is correct. The proof is based on showing that all the “corresponding
problems” that one can define without w00 = w01 = 0 boil down to their counterparts
assuming w00 = w01 = 0. While defining these ”corresponding problems”, we take all the
consequences of not having w00 = w01 = 0 into account.
We examine the principal’s problem by means of two conditional problems as before.
More precisely, we divide the entire space of incentive schemes into two, the ones satisfying
w11 ≥ w10, and w11 ≤ w10 respectively. We focus on characterizing the optimal scheme in
these two sub-spaces separately. We then show that it is optimal to set w01 = w00 = 0 in
both cases.
First step: We, first, limit our attention into the incentive schemes satisfying w11 ≥ w10.
The arguments here basically follow the same steps with the proof of lemma 3.2 without
having any restriction on the values of w01, and w00. We have the following problem:
min
w
(σ + (1− σ)p21)w11 + (1− σ)p1(1− p1)(w10 + w01) + (1− σ)(1− p1)2w00
s.t. ICD, w11 ≥ w10.
In the absence of the restrictions imposed on the values of w01, and w00, the condition
7Note that the proof of this lemma is presented after the proofs of lemma 3.2, and lemma 3.3. The reason
to follow this expositional order is due to the fact that this proof uses the notation and the definitions (of
problems and constraints) that are described after lemma 3.1 in the main text.
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w11 ≥ w10 does not directly imply that the incentive scheme is a JPE. In this regard, ICD
may be equivalent to ICS , or ICJ .
p1w11 + (1− p1)w10 − p1w01 − (1− p1)w00 ≥ cˆ, (ICS)
(p1 + δp0)w11 + (1− p1 − δp0)w10 + (δ − p1 − δp0)w01 − (1 + δ − p1 − δp0)w00 ≥ cˆ.
(ICJ )
Obviously, the solution to above problem requires to set w00 = 0, since the coefficients of
w00 are negative in the constraint functions, and positive in the objective function. On the
other hand, the variables w10, and w01 have the same coefficients in the objective function,
while the latter has a smaller coefficient in the constraints. Thus, it is also optimal to set
w00 = 0. As a result, conditional on the incentive scheme satisfying w11 ≥ w10, it is always
optimal to set w01 = w00 = 0.
Second step: Now, we limit our attention into the set of incentive schemes satisfying
w11 ≤ w10. We focus on a variant of the problem PR which arises in the absence of the
assumption w01 = w00 = 0. This problem, which we denote by P ′R, is defined as follows:
min
w
(σ + (1− σ)p21)w11 + (1− σ)p1(1− p1)(w10 + w01) + (1− σ)(1− p1)2w00 (P ′R)
s.t. ICD, ÎCR, w11 ≤ w10.
In the absence of w01 = w00 = 0, the condition w11 ≤ w10 is not sufficient to conclude
that the incentive scheme is RPE. To this respect, the problem P ′R accounts for the general
constraint ICD, which may be equivalent to ICS , or ICJ .
In order to figure out how things are different here in comparison to proof of lemma 3.3,
which characterizes the optimal solution of PR, we need to have a better understanding of
the constraints. The corresponding expressions for ICS , ICJ are already given in the first
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step. The constraints ICR, and IC′′R are given by:
w10 + (1 + δ)p1(w11 − w10)− w00 + (δ − (1 + δ)p1)(w01 − w00) > cˆ, (ICR)
w10 + 2p1(w11 − w10)− w00 + (1− 2p1)(w01 − w00) ≥ cˆ. (IC′′R)
Furthermore, we can write IC′R, depending on the value of δ, as follows:
IC′R =

w10 +
(1−δ2)p0−(δ+δ2)p1
1−δ−δ2 (w11 − w10)− w00 + (δ+δ
2)p1−(1−δ2)p0−δ2
1−δ−δ2 (w01 − w00) < cˆ, if δ + δ2 < 1,
(p1 − δp0)(w11 − w10) + (δ2 + δp0 − p1)(w01 − w00) > 0, if δ + δ2 = 1,
w10 +
(δ+δ2)p1−(1−δ2)p0
δ+δ2−1 (w11 − w10)− w00 + δ
2+(1−δ2)p0−(δ+δ2)p1
δ+δ2−1 (w10 − w00) > cˆ, if δ + δ2 > 1.
In what follows, we will argue that the solution of P ′R satisfies w01 = w00 = 0, and
conclude that P ′R is equivalent to PR. Suppose not to get a contradiction, i.e., we have either
w01 6= 0, or w00 6= 0. Then, the comprehensive constraint ÎCR must have been fulfilled by
means of satisfying IC′R. Otherwise, if ÎCR was carried through ICR, or IC′′R, then we would
have w01 = w00 = 0. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the constraints ICS , ICJ ,
ICR, and IC′′R increase with the variable w00, yet the objective function decreases. Second,
in all these constraints, the coefficients of w10 are weakly larger than the ones of w01; while
their coefficients are same in the objective function. Therefore, if IC′R was redundant, then
the solution of the problem P ′R would satisfy w01 = w00 = 0. For this reason, conditional
on the hypothesis, IC′R and ICD are the relevant constraints. Next, we separately examine
the three cases that define IC′R.
The case: δ + δ2 > 1. In this case, all the constraints IC′R, ICS , and ICJ increase with the
variable w00, yet the objective function decreases. Moreover, in all these constraints, the
coefficients of the variable w10 are weakly larger than the ones of w01; while they have the
same coefficients in the objective function. Therefore it is optimal to set w01 = w00 = 0,
which gives us a contradiction.
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The case: δ + δ2 = 1. In this case, the sign of the term (δ2 + δp0 − p1) is crucial for the
analysis, hence we further separate the discussion into three sub-cases.
If δ2 + δp0 − p1 < 0 : IC′R requires w00 > w01 as we already have w11 ≤ w10. Then
the incentive scheme is an RPE, and ICD is equivalent to ICS . Increasing w01, or w00
always hurt the objective function as well as the constraint ICS . Therefore, the only reason
to assign a positive value for w01, or w00 is to fulfill IC′R. Then one can easily see that
w00 must be set infinitesimally larger than
p1−δp0
p1−δ2−δp0 (w10 − w11), while w01 is equal to
0. Consequently, the values of w11, and w10 must be arranged in a way to minimize the
objective function, conditional on the corresponding value of w00 and the constraint ICS .
This choice can be seen in the following problem more explicitly.
min
w11≤w10
(σ + (1− σ)p21)w11 + (1− σ)p1(1− p1)w10 + (1− σ)(1− p1)2 p1−δp0p1−δ2−δp0 (w10 − w11)
s.t. p1w11 + (1− p1)w10 − (1− p1) p1−δp0p1−δ2−δp0 (w10 − w11) ≥ cˆ
Due to the linearity of this problem, w11 is either equal to w10, or equal to 0. The latter
cannot be the case, because the constraint would be violated as it features a negative
coefficient for w10. If precedent is the case, then we have w11 = w10 = cˆ, which also brings
us a contradiction as it requires w01 = w00 = 0.
8
If δ2 + δp0 − p1 > 0 : The contradiction follows here as well from similar arguments to
those provided in the previous sub-case.
If δ2 + δp0 − p1 = 0 : We have an immediate contradiction here. Because, it is impos-
sible to satisfy IC′R as it boils down to w11 − w10 > 0, in this case.
The case: δ + δ2 < 1. In this case, the direction of the constraint IC′R is reversed. In contrast
to the previous cases, it now introduces a positive upper bound for an affine function of the
choice variables. From the earlier discussions, we know that fulfilling the constraint IC′R
is the only reason to assign a positive value for w01, and w00. Due to the linearity of the
8This choice satisfies IC′′R, therefore IC′R becomes redundant.
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problem, w11 is either equal to w10, or equal to w00. If the precedent is the case, then the
best we can do is to set w11 = w10 = cˆ. This gives rise to a contradiction as it requires
w01 = w00 = 0. If, on the other hand, it is optimal to set w11 = 0, then the value of w10
must be sufficiently large so that we need to assign a positive value for w01, or w00 in order
to fulfill the constraint IC′R. More precisely, we need w10 = 1−δ−δ
2
1−δ−δ2−(1−δ2)p0+(δ+δ2)p1 cˆ+ A,
for some positive A. Moreover, from linearity, it is without loss of generality to assume
that only one of w01, and w00 is positive. Here we will discuss the case where w00 > 0,
and the other case follows from similar arguments. The value of w00 will be just enough to
satisfy IC′R, i.e., w00 = A 1−δ−δ
2
1−δ−2δ2−(1−δ2)p0+(δ+δ2)p1 +  for some infinitesimally small  > 0.
9
Note that the incentive scheme is RPE in this case, hence ICD is equivalent to ICS . Then,
to satisfy ICS , we must have w00 ≤ A −
p1−(1−δ2)p0
1−p1
1−δ−δ2−(1−δ2)p0+(δ+δ2)p1 cˆ. Summing up these,
we get A (δ+δ
2)p1−(1−δ2)p0−δ2
1−δ−2δ2−(1−δ2)p0+(δ+δ2)p1 > cˆ
p1−(1−δ2)p0
1−p1
1−δ−δ2−(1−δ2)p0+(δ+δ2)p1 .
10 This condition basically
defines a lower bound for the value of A. Then by using this lower bound, we get that
w10 >
1−δ2+(δ+δ2)p1−(1−δ2)p0
(1−p1)((δ+δ2)p1−(1−δ2)p0−δ2) . But then there is no need to have a positive value for
w00, because the value of w10 is sufficiently large so that ICR is satisfied at this value when
w00 = 0. Therefore, we can decrease w00 to 0 and improve the objective function without
hurting ICS . As a result IC′R become redundant, and we get a contradiction.
To sum up, the solution to problem P ′R coincides with the solution of PR, which induces
repeated joint work as a team equilibrium outcome. As a result, conditional on the incentive
scheme satisfying w11 ≤ w10, it is always optimal to set w01 = w00 = 0. And this completes
our proof.
9We must have 1− δ − 2δ2 − (1− δ2)p0 + (δ + δ2)p1 > 0, otherwise a contradiction follows immediately
since increasing w00 would not help to meet IC′R.
10We must have (δ + δ2)p1 − (1− δ2)p0 − δ2 > 0; otherwise A would be negative, which contradicts with
our assumption.
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 3.5
For given w and em, the agent has the following problem:
max
e
pweem − c
2
e2.
The solution to this problem gives us his best response function:
e(w, em) = min{1, κwem}.
Then we can write the principal’s problem as follows:
max
w,em
(1− w)pe(w, em)em − αc
2
e2m.
The net value of the success is now equal to 1 − w, since the principal pays w to agent
in case of a success. This term is multiplied with the probability of success, pe(w, em)em.
Finally, since the principal assumes the cost of operating machinery, we subtract it from
her revenue.
We first figure out the optimal plan to induce the maximal effort, e = 1, from the agent.
The wage must be set w = 1κem , and hence the principal’s problem boils down to:
max
em
(1− 1
κem
)pem − αc
2
e2m.
The first order condition with respect to em is given by:
∂
∂em
= p− αcem.
which is always positive, hence em = 1, and w =
1
κ .
If principal induces agent to choose an effort level e < 1, from his best response function,
161
we know that e = κwem, and hence the wage must be set w =
e
κem
. Then, we can rewrite
the principal’s problem as follows:
max
w,em
(1− w)wpκe2m −
αc
2
e2m.
The first order condition with respect to em is given by
∂
∂em
= 2(1− w)wpκem − αcem,
which is linear in em. Therefore it is optimal to set em at its maximum capacity unless the
principal would like to shut down the production. Then by plugging in em = 1, and taking
the first order condition with respect to w, one can see that it is optimal to set w = 12 . This
in turn induces agent to set his effort level to e = κ2 .
Putting these all together, there are three possibilities for the principal: i) Shutting
down the production. ii) Inducing agent to choose e = κ2 < 1 with em = 1, and w =
1
2 . iii)
Inducing agent to exert maximal effort e = 1 with em = 1, and w =
1
κ . The corresponding
profit levels of these are 0, pκ4 − αc2 , and p− c− αc2 respectively. Then the statement of the
proposition immediately follows from a simple comparison between these profit levels.
C.7 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Choosing (0, 0) in every period is a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Therefore, it is natural
to expect to see this to be a team equilibrium when w is not sufficiently large to provide
incentives.
Now assume that for some w, there is a corresponding team equilibrium that induces
positive effort at least for some periods. We want to show that, in this team equilibrium,
the agents choose their maximal effort levels in every period. First note that, there is at
least a period in which the agents receive a positive payoff. This, however, requires that
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the effort pair (e1, e2) = (1, 1) maximizes the agents’ total payoffs in the stage game due to
the increasing marginal returns. Therefore, showing that the repetition of this effort pair
in every period can be sustained as a sub-game perfect equilibrium would be sufficient to
complete our proof. This stems from the fact that there cannot be any other SPE bringing a
higher total payoff to agents. To get a contradiction, suppose that choosing (e1, e2) = (1, 1)
in every period cannot be sustained even with the most sever punishment, i.e., exerting
minimal effort in all the remaining periods. Thus, deviating to the best response in a
period is a profitable deviation for agent i. In other words:
wp− c
2
< (1− δ)[wpe(w, 1)− c
2
(e(w, 1))2].
It must be e(w, 1) = min{1, wκ} = wκ, because otherwise the agents are already best
responding to each other and do not want to deviate. Therefore, we must have
wp <
c
2
+ (1− δ)w
2p2
2c
.
However, we already know that the team equilibrium, that we have started with, induces
an effort profile (e1, e2) >> (0, 0) at least for some periods. Therefore this profile must
also be sustained as a SPE with the most sever punishment. In other words, the following
incentive constraints for agent 1 and 2 must be satisfied respectively.11
wpe1e2 − c
2
e21 ≥ (1− δ)[
w2p2
2c
e22]
wpe1e2 − c
2
e22 ≥ (1− δ)[
w2p2
2c
e21]
By reorganizing these two inequalities one can get get:
wp ≥ c
2
(
e21 + e
2
2
2e1e2
)
+ (1− δ)w
2p2
2c
(
e21 + e
2
2
2e1e2
)
11These expressions are based on the fact that ei(w, e1) = min{1, wκej} = wκej . The second equality
follows from the fact that e(w, 1) = min{1, wκ} = wκ.
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But this contradicts with wp < c2 + (1− δ)w
2p2
2c , because e1, e2 ≤ 1, and hence
e21+e
2
2
2e1e2
≥ 1.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The optimal plan either induces the maximal effort in every period, or shuts down the
production. The incentive constraint will be relevant only if it induces effort. Denoting
x = wp, one can rewrite the incentive constraint as follows:
−(1− δ)x2 + 2cx− c2 ≥ 0
The principal will choose the minimum possible value of w satisfying the above condition.
We know that x = c
1+
√
δ
is the minimum value of x at which the above inequality is satisfied.
Therefore it is optimal to set w = c
p(1+
√
δ)
. Thus, the principal has a positive profit only if
κ ≥ 2
1+
√
δ
, where κ = pc . Otherwise it is optimal to shut down the production.
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